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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The history of sociology, as is the case in the history
of other intellectual disciplines,

is one marked by contro

versy and debate. Although considerable effort went toward
establishing sociology as a legitimate discipline with its
own particular object of investigation,

sociologists have

continually called into question all aspects of their disci
pline and of its relation to the larger society. Such inter
nal criticism is, of course, basic to the further advance of
any intellectual discipline.
In the history of sociology in America,

the past two

decades has been a period characterized by a tremendous amount
of such internal criticism.

It is with an account of this

internal critical movement,

the sociological critique of A m e r 

ican sociology,

that this dissertation will be concerned. In

the chapters to follow,

the basic arguments,

criticisms and

proposals made in the context of the sociological critique
of American sociology will be presented and discussed. A l 
though the bulk of this dissertation will Involve an expli
cation of this critical movement, an attempt will be made to
assess its shortcomings and its promise. That is to say, a
determination will be made as to what in this movement points
in the direction of a more significant, relevant sociology
and what in this movement represents no significant advance
over so-called

"mainstream" sociology.
-
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To address such questions, of course, presupposes
some notion of what constitutes a significant sociology. This
is a question which, I will argue, can only be answered by
determining the adequacy of the fundamental tenets of the
sociological approach to understanding our world. And to make
such a determination, I believe we must turn to philosophy,
which suggests that a sociological critique of American soci
ology must ultimately fall short of the kind of analysis that
is necessary to erect a new sociology on a sound methodological
and theoretical foundation.
Nonetheless, I believe the sociologists involved in
this critical movement are to be credited with highlighting
some serious problems in sociological thought and practice.
Moreover, they did have some notion of a more significant
direction for sociology —

that, for example, it would be one

which would emphasize a close working relationship between
sociologists and various social movements aimed at improving
society. Yet, I would maintain, that insofar as they have
failed to articulate a sound theoretical and methodological
base for sociology, they have failed in one of their principal
aims —

to make sociology relevant to our eternal efforts to

improve society.
Let us, then, turn our attention to the task of delin
eating the broad outlines of this sociological critique of
American sociology. This will encompass a brief discussion
of all of the most significant issues raised by critical
sociologists. In addition, I will present an in depth analysis
of the work of three Important forerunners of this critical
- 2 -

movement; namely, Robert Lynd, Pitirim Sorokin, and most im
portantly, C. Wright Mills. This will provide a good back
ground for the more detailed, specific discussion of the
major points of contention raised by critical sociologists
in the 1960's and 1 9 7 0 's.
(l) Origin and Major Manifestations of the
Sociological Critique of American Sociology

The selection of the year i960 as the starting-point
for this examination of the sociological critique of American
sociology was, in part, an arbitrary decision. More importantly,
however, that particular date was selected both because it
marks the beginning of one of the most turbulent decades in
American history and because it is around this time that this
critical movement began to blossom and take on far greater
dimensions than anything of its kind in the past.
By i960 , sociology had come of age as an academic
discipline. It had become an accepted part of the college
curriculum and its research activities had become widely re
cognized and suppoted by both private and public organizations.
Given this newly-won status, sociologists were increasingly
called upon to contribute their knowledge and insight to the
solution of pressing social problems. As such, sociologists
could not help but be deeply affected by the social move
ments of the 6 0 's, especially the civil rights' and anti
war movements, which brought these pressing social problems
to the attention of the world. Sociologists could no
longer Ignore the question of where they and their disci
pline stood with respect to the Important social issues of
- 3 -

the time.*
Among the first discoveries made by sociologists who
began to reflect critically on themselves and their profes
sion was the conservative bias that was built into the prin
ciple of value-neutrality, a principle generally accepted
as an essential aspect of a truly scientific approach to the
study of society. This principle came to be viewed as a kind
of mask which concealed an underlying commitment to the es
tablished social order and a disavowal of all forms of rad
ical social change. Such characterizations of sociology as
the following became commonplace during the 6o's:

"Mainstream,

contemporary sociology is largely the creation of cold war
liberals who, for the most part, have been content to ob
serve and rationalize the operations of the American co
lossus from a position of privilege in the name of science
[that is, as value-neutral observers]

.1,2

For many of these critics, synonymous with "mainstream"
sociology was the theoretical framework known as structuralfunctionalism which had been developed by Talcott Parsons
during the previous decade. During the late 5 0 's and early

6 0 's structural-functionalism came under increasing attack
not only for its inadequacy as a general theory of social
action but also, and more significantly, because it contained
a built-in conservative bias which sanctified the established
social order.
As most critical sociologists saw it, the problem here
was fundamentally one of a lack of awareness on the part of
sociologists of where they stood, of what their implicit biases
-
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were and of how these biases affected their work as sociolo
gists. That is to say, these critics very soon discarded the
possibility of a value-free sociology; all aspects of soci
ological work were seen as involving value j u d g m e n t s . ^
Such considerations as those discussed above gave rise
to one of the first major manifestations of the sociological
critique of American sociology, the "sociology of sociology".
Since the problem was conceived as basically one of either a
lack of awareness of one's biases or a lack of honesty in not
forthrightly declaring what these biases were, the solution
was seen to lie in a self-reflective study of sociologists
and their profession using sociological research techniques
and theories which had been developed to investigate other
occupations and professions. In the words of Alvin Gouldner,
a leading figure in the sociology of sociology:
What is needed is a new and heightened selfawareness among sociologists, which would lead
them to ask the same kinds of questions about
themselves as they do about taxicab drivers or
doctors, and to answer them in the same ways.
Above all, this means that we must acquire the
ingrained habit of viewing our own beliefs as
we would those held by others. It means, for
example, that when we are asked why it is that
some sociologists believe sociology must be a
"value-free discipline", we do not simply reply
with logical arguments on its behalf. Sociologists
must surrender the human but elitist assump
tion that others believe out of need whereas
they believe because of the dictates of logic
and reason.
This call for a "heightened self-awareness" among
sociologists echoes throughout the work of those who have con
tributed to the sociology of sociology. Along with greater
awareness, it was argued, goes not only improvement of the
individual sociologist's understanding of himself and his

work as a sociologist, but also eventual improvement of the
discipline as a whole. The practice of sociology would be
come more profound, more self-conscious, resulting, ulti
mately, in more complete and valid knowledge of society. All
this was to accrue from sociologists using sociological per
spectives to study themselves and their discipline.
One does not have to reflect very deeply, however, to
see that the mere attainment of self-consciousness by soci
ologists could not possibly lead to all the improvements envi
sioned by these sociologists of sociology. Recognition of
one's implicit biases or of the inherent conservatism of main
stream sociology, although important, is not sufficient in it
self to provide substance and direction for the creation of a
new and more significant sociology. An element of critical
evaluation is necessary, in the context of which suggestions
for the revision of the predominant modes of sociological
method and theory can be made.
Judging from the kinds of studies that have been car
ried out under the rubric of the sociology of sociology, crit
ical evaluation is hardly in evidence. The kinds of studies
which predominate are descriptive in nature. They are de
scriptive in the direct sense that they seek to describe the
current situation of sociologists and their discipline —
what personal and social factors influence the work of soci
ologists. But as far as evaluating the current situation and
proposing more viable alternatives to current sociological
practice, sociologists of sociology are noticeably silent.
- 6 -

This point is further illustrated by what have been
two prominent topics for empirical studies in the sociology
of sociology contained in The American Sociologist; namely,
the allocation of prestige to sociology departments (i.e.,
the ranking of sociology departments) and the measurement of
sociologists’ productivity.

These topics certainly involve

reflection on certain aspects of the sociological profession,
but in addition to being arguably trivial,^ none of these
studies includes a significant element of evaluation. Outside
of some suggestions for the improvement of measuring product
ivity or prestige, there is no indication of how the knowledge
gained from these studies is to lead to the development of a
more significant sociology. Indeed, in reviewing the first
ten years of publication of The American Sociologist, incoming
editor Allen Grimshaw decried the growing interest in issues
having to do with the measurement of productivity and pres7
tige in sociology.
Another such study in the sociology of sociology con
cerned the relationship between an author's theoretical orienQ

tation and the method of data collection employed.

The final

result of this investigation was a table which cross-classi
fied the author's theoretical orientation and the kind of
research technique used. Again, although this knowledge may
help us better understand an aspect of current sociological
practice, there is absolutely no suggestion as to how such
information can be used to bring about a more significant
sociology.

The descriptive aim of the sociology of sociology bears
a close resemblance to the sociology of knowledge. In both,
the principal concern is with seeking to uncover those social
factors that help to shape a sociologist's work, the aim being
to make sociologists aware of how such social factors Influence
their work. This aim is clearly in evidence in Alvin Gouldner's
first major excursion in the sociology of sociology, Enter
Plato, in which Gouldner is principally interested in discus
sing the relation between Plato's social theory and Greek
civilization. At one point Gouldner characterizes his effort
this way:
Some social scientists are interested in studying
industrial workers; some study physicians, and
still others, drug addicts and prostitutes. I
happen to be curious about social theorists. They,
as the anthropologists would say, are "my people".
The ultimate objective is to contribute to an
empirically testable social theory about social
theorists, as part of a sociology of science.°
Using sociology to study social theorists is quite
clearly within the confines of a descriptive, sociology of
knowledge approach. Indeed, Gouldner appears to be engaged
in what could more accurately be called a "sociology of
sociologists", as he himself indicates in the above passage.
His treatment of Plato and later, of Talcott Parsons in The
Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, certainly bears this out.
An element of critical evaluation is necessary if one
is to address the crucial issue of whether these influences on
the work of sociologists are of beneficial or detrimental
Import. Knowing, for example, that the conduct of social
research has been heavily Influenced by preconceptions of
- 8 -

members of granting agencies as to what constitutes an accept
able methodology is of no real help in addressing the more
important question of the validity of various methods.
Perhaps in recognition of such questions, Gouldner himself
diverges from a purely descriptive, neutral discussion of the
social factors influencing Plato's social theory.
Although the bulk of Enter Plato is devoted to a
descriptive analysis of the relation of Plato's social theory
to Greek civilization, Gouldner leaves no doubt that he con
siders Plato's ideas unsatisfactory; hence the Introduction
of an element of critical evaluation. To be accurate,

then,

we must add to the above-quoted passage from Enter Plato the
following statement:

"Put otherwise,

it is the task of the

historian of social theory not simply to describe but critic
ally to evaluate a theory in its historical setting."10 This
recognition of the need for a critical sociological approach
to the study of sociology, one which goes beyond the descriptive
emphasis in the sociology of sociology,I would argue, repre
sents a second major manifestation of the sociological critique
of American sociology.
It is really only with the addition of this element of
critical evaluation that we come to the heart of this critical
movement as a whole. In distinguishing a "critical sociology"
from a "sociology of sociology", I do not mean to imply that
they can in reality be separated. These two manifestations of
the sociological critique of American sociology are so closely
intertwined that to speak of them as separate and distinct

- 9 -

would be to distort them .11 Indeed, those engaged in the soci
ology of sociology have frequently expressed the hope (and
belief) that their research, although basically descriptive
in nature, would lead ultimately to significant revisions of
mainstream sociology.

12

Behind this entire critical movement there lies this
hope: that a more valid, and hence more relevant, sociology
could be brought about, a sociology which would be of more
genuine practical benefit in seeking solutions to the complex
social problems which became all too evident during the 6o's.
Some sociologists saw that this hope could only be realized
if a thoroughgoing critique and revision of current sociologic
al method and theory were carried out. Mere descriptive
analysis of the present status of sociology was seen as
insufficient.
In terms of sociological theory, structural-functionalism has clearly been the major target of this critical
movement. I have already briefly discussed the built-in
conservative bias in this theory which runs contrary to the
principle of value-neutrality. Beyond this, functionalism
is argued to be an Inadequate theory of society, principally
because it leaves out of account the important elements of
social conflict and social change. Simply put, such critic
ism represents an attempt to revise a major theoretical,
framework In sociology with the intent of developing a more
valid one. That more valid theoretical framework has been,
logically enough, some form of conflict theory which recog
nizes the central place of social conflict in the analysis
- 10 -

of modern society. Moreover, conflict theory, it is argued,
avoids the conservative bias of functionalism, in particular
the charge that it is a rationalization for the established
social order.
In addition to conflict theory, critical sociologists
turned to other alternatives such as a phenomenologicalexistential perspective. It was maintained that functionalism,
with its emphasis on the functional interrelation of society —
viewing society as a system, a whole —

tended to lose sight

of the individual. Indeed, as we will see in much more detail
later, many of these critical sociologists appear to have
felt obligated to come to the defense of the individual in
the face of what they believed to be both actual social domi
nation and domination of the system idea in sociology. Alfred
McClung Lee's "existential humanism" represents perhaps the
clearest, and certainly the most forthright, expression of
this view, as is plainly evident, for example, in the heading
of Chapter 2 of his Toward a Humanist Sociology, "How Soci
ology Can Magnify the Individual." In the eyes of the major
ity of these critics, humanism is synonymous with the defense
of the individual.
The development of a phenomenological sociology during
the 1960 's was not only part of the attempt to reaffirm the
important place of the individual in society and in sociology,
but it also encompassed a distinctive methodology which repsented a significant departure from the predominant survey
and quantitative research techniques. Although the debate
between advocates of quantitative and qualitative research

had been going on for many years prior to this time,

the

Increasing acceptance of the phenomenological perspective gave
rise to greater use and discussion of qualitative research
techniques. Conventional research methods, especially any form
of survey research, were argued to be artificial instruments
capable, at most, of obtaining people's reports of their be
havior and beliefs, which may or may not reflect their actual
behavior and beliefs. In contrast, phenomenological sociolo
gists maintained that only by studying the actual behavior of
individuals and groups in various social settings can one ob
tain a valid picture of social life. This usually involves
some form of participant observation in which the researcher
actually participates in the everyday lives of the people
being studied; it Is only In this way that a researcher can
approach a "true" perspective, that is, the perspective of
individuals and groups themselves which is defining of social
reality according to phenomenological sociologists.
A specific manifestation of this distinctive approach
to sociological research is that of ethnomethodology, which,
in the words of Don H. Zimmerman,

"...studies on-going social

activity In order to discover the properties of the social
organization of natural language which provide for the ac
complishments of definite meanings, convergent definitions,
warranted accounts, all In the lively context of their
occurrence.til4
A
Some critical sociologists argued that conventional
research utilizes a "consensus" methodology whereas ethno
methodology and similar approaches utilize a "conflict"
- 12 -

methodology. The use of the term "consensus" to characterize
conventional research indicates that such research requires
the cooperation of the people or groups being studied, a
limitation which confines one to investigating the surface
phenomena of society and which precludes investigation of the
hidden, repressed aspects of social phenomena. Conflict
methodology challenges those being studied rather than seeking
their cooperation; it utilizes such devices as the law suit
to uncover otherwise hidden aspects of social life.1-* In sum,
the keynote in this entire line of criticism of predominant
methodological approaches is that the only really valid ap
proach to studying social life is to get deeply involved in
it first.1^
In this brief discussion of the second manifestation
of the sociological critique of American sociology, so-called
"critical sociology", we have seen that the focus is basically
on inadequacies in the discipline of sociology and not on
inadequacies in the character of sociologists. This focus,
I believe, gives rise to the most significant contributions
to the sociological critique of American sociology. Nonethe
less, there remains a further manifestation of this critical
movement.
Beyond the implications of this sociological selfcriticism for the discipline itself, there lies the question
of the impact of sociology upon the larger society. For the
most part, these critical sociologists see their criticism of
conventional sociological practice issuing in a more signifi
cant sociology, which they believe will ultimately contribute

to the realization of a more humane, Just social order. That
is to say, a significant sociology, in this view, is a rad
ical sociology —

radical in the sense that the work of soci

ologists contributes to a thoroughgoing transformation of the
established social order.
That this sociological self-criticism has implications
beyond the discipline itself and includes a commitment to
radical social change is another feature of the work of Alvin
Gouldner, in whose work we have already seen the other two
major manifestations of this critical movement. In response
to the criticism that his "reflexive" sociology is mere
navel-gazing (i.e., sociologists contemplating themselves),
Gouldner counters:

"My call for a Reflexive Sociology was...

scarcely intended to confine sociology to a study of soci
ology [i.e., navel-gazing]. The goal was surely not to prevent
studies of other parts of society but, rather, to enable them
to be done more profoundly by sociologists with a deeper selfawareness, who had committed themselves and their work to
human self-emancipation.
A radical sociology also entails actual participation
in social movements seeking to transform the status quo, as
did members of the so-called "Sociology Liberation Movement"
during national sociological conventions in the late I 960 's.

l8

Having seen through the facade of value-neutrality so to speak,
these critical sociologists perceived the need to make expli
cit their position on social issues. The principal position
adopted by these critics, in contrast to the cooperative
nature of the relationship of conventional sociology with

the established social order, was one of direct opposition
to the status quo. This opposition tended to take either of
two closely-related forms: either (l) a commitment to a
Marxist analysis of capitalist society and a Marxist vision
of a just society, or (2) a commitment to what Gouldner calls
"human self-emancipation", that is, to the radically demo
cratic vision of a society consisting entirely of self-deter
mined individuals.
Those adhering closely to a Marxist analysis of mod
ern society frequently denounced conventional sociology as an
instrument of the capitalist ruling class who are solely
concerned with maintaining their privileged position in the
status quo. Sociologists are exhorted to join ranks with the
working class, Indeed with all oppressed classes, and take
part in the struggle to overthrow the capitalist system.
Such radicalism Is forthrightly proclaimed in the preface to
Radical Sociology: An Introduction edited by David Horowitz:
The present text, by contrast to most sociology
texts, adopts a perspective more in harmony with
the Interests of those further down the social
hierarchy: it sees social conflict as a reflection
of the imbalances of property and power at the
heart of the present social order, and their
intensification as possible preludes to the over
throw of its inequitable, racist and imperial
framework. It is in this sense a "radical" text
book, unorthodox in Its methodology and approach,
and untypical in its concern with the consequences
of accumulated power and wealth, and its dis
interest in the academically fashionable (p ro 
fitable) problems of social administration.
In another anthology entitled Radical Sociology, the
editors go as far as to include a number of articles on how
sociologists can organize to help bring about major political
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and economic change.
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Along with the advocacy of radical

activity there also goes an adherence to a dialectical view
of social change. One consequence of an adherence to a dia
lectical view of social change is that it encompasses no
clear conception of a just society —

the logic of this view

suggests that there is no culmination to the dialectical
process, no final resting place in history in which all
contradictions will be resolved. Hence, the view of a better
society which is adopted by many of these critical sociolo
gists is characterized by what I will later call an "endless
dialectic''. In this view, then, a radical sociology is one
which assists in the creation of a social order characterized
principally by continual debate, conflict, and change.
Even more widespread than this commitment to some of
the basic tenets of Marxism was the closely related commit
ment to the realization of a society in which individuals
would be free from all forms of domination, whether that
domination be manifested in the inequality of a capitalist
economic system, a massive state bureaucracy, or the concep
tual structure of sociology itself. The vision of a society
of educated, free individuals engaged in a constant dialogue
concerning the future direction of their society is a radical
democratic vision that has deep roots not only in American
history but also in the history of American sociology. In
the history of American sociology one of the most influential
expressions of this radical democratic vision is contained in
the work of C. Wright Mills, whose overall influence on the
sociological critique of American sociology has been great,
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as we will see shortly.
Among the most fervent defenders of individual autonomy
among critical sociologists is Alfred McClung Lee. No better
expression of this faith in democracy can be found than is con
tained in the following passage from Lee's Sociology For W hom ?:
Whatever optimism or pessimism we might have
about the future of the human lot depends upon
the relative speed with which broader popular
participation may be achieved in the control and
employment of social power. Will people learn
how to participate in time to save themselves
from the short-sightedness and greed of entre
preneurs? Will people discover in time how to
control themselves and their resources for human
ends? Or will they continue to serve mostly as
pawns in the vast and hazardous game-plans of the
self-serving manipulators while the earth's re
sources are being exhausted and human population
continues to Increase .21
Alvin Gouldner's commitment to "human self-emancipation"
is no less clear than that expressed by Lee in the above pas
sage. It is significant to note, however, that Gouldner draws
heavily upon the work of members of the Frankfurt School, an
influential group of twentieth-century Marxist thinkers. The
need to overcome the domination of individuals in our modern
technocratic world is a pervasive theme in the work of these
critical theorists of the Frankfurt
The preceding discussion of

School.
the broad outlines of

the

soci'logical critique of American sociology should give us
some notion of the various forms this criticism has taken.
Our primary concern In the rest of this dissertation

will be to

add detail and critical analysis to

that have

the basic Issues

been merely touched upon thus far. As I indicated previously,
the discussion of these basic issues (such as the debate
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over the merits of quantitative versus qualitative methods)
had gone on in American sociology for many years prior to
i960 . Indeed, one could very well argue that the most signi
ficant and influential critiques of American sociology were
written prior to i960 . In particular, I have three major
works in mind: Robert S. Lynd's Knowledge For What? (1939),
Pitirim Sorokin's Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology (1956),
and most significant of all, C. Wright Mills' The Sociological
Imagination (1959). Each of these works deals, at least to
some extent, with all of the issues raised in the sociolo
gical critique of American sociology. The Sociological
Imagination alone encompasses all the basic arguments put
forth, and greatly elaborated upon, by contemporary critical
sociologists. Despite the significance of these earlier
works, however, I would still maintain that it was not until
the early 6 0 's that the sociological critique of American
sociology took on the dimensions of a full-fledged movement,
a movement which has already had and will continue to have
a significant impact on the future course of American
sociology.
Nevertheless, I believe a brief synopsis of these
earlier critiques will provide a good deal of insight into
the nature of this critical movement, of its shortcomings
and its promise.
(2) Precursors of the Sociological Critique
of American Sociology
First published in 1939, Robert S. Lynd's Knowledge
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For What? is temporally the farthest removed from this cri
tical movement, yet the similarities between Lynd's book and
the work of these later critical sociologists is striking.
To begin with, the respective periods in American history in
which they were writing were among two of the greatest periods
of social unrest and social change in this country.

22

In the

late 3 0 's, America was still struggling to recover from the
depths of the Great Depression. The Roosevelt administration
had proposed and implemented many new social programs to put
people back to work and to get the country back on its feet
economically. Radical groups such as the communist party
achieved their highest membership during these troubled times.
In short, the seriousness of the problems which beset America
at this time suggested the need for profound socio-economic
change. It is within this general context that one must view
Lynd's criticisms of the social sciences; and, as I have
indicated previously, It is within a similar general context
of social unrest and social change that one must view the
work of critical sociologists during the 6 0 's and 70's. In
the forefront of both critiques Is the common concern with
developing a more significant sociology, one which would
contribute to the amelioration of the pressing social prob
lems of the time.
Lynd's analysis of the status of the social sciences
is based upon a tenet which will later serve as a funda
mental point of departure for the sociology of sociology,
namely, that social scientists are human beings as well as
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scientists and that, as such, they and their work are subject
to all of the general social influences which affect the life
23
of any individual.
Social scientists do not and cannot sit
aloof from society and study it in a totally detached and
neutral way. The personal and social backgrounds of social
scientists invariably find their way into social scientific
research and theory.
The recognition of the existence of such extrascientific influences leads directly to the call for greater
self-awareness among social scientists —

that they become

honest and forthright in acknowledging their biases and that
they do not try to hide behind the illusion that their work
is of a purely neutral, scientific nature. So, Lynd comes
out in favor of a position which is very close to one of the
major themes in the work of critical sociologists, a theme
that will be discussed in more detail later in Chapter III
as the "let's be honest" theme:
A social scientist has no place qua scientist
as a party to power politics...But also, when
the social scientist hides behind the aloof
"spirit of science and scholarship" for fear
of possible contamination, he is likewise
something less than a scientist. We social
scientists need to be more candid about our
selves and our motivations. We should be more
sensitive and realistic about what our evasions
do to ourselves and to our science.
The point here being that the principle of value-neutrality
is illusory in the actual practice of social science.
But rather than leave the value question with the
simple assertion of the need for acknowledging one's biases,
Lynd takes this discussion a significant step further in

actually proposing an objective base or ground for value
j u d g m e n t . Lynd proposes a standard by which one can judge

of the soundness both of social scientists' understanding of
society and of their contribution to the realization of a
better society. He proposes that:

"The values of human beings

living together in the pursuit of their deeper and more per
sistent purposes constitute the frame of reference that

p^
identifies significance for the social sciences."

These

values, he goes on to argue, are not Just the stereotyped
values of people in a particular culture, but they connect
with what Lynd calls "persistent cravings" of human beings in
general. To identify these persistent cravings and to use
them as a basis for social reform is the fundamental task of
the social scientist. This is what a significant social
science involves.
Although one may certainly take Lynd to task for the
vagueness of his conception of a sound social order and of how
social scientists can help realize it, one must acknowledge
the boldness of his proposal of an objective base for value
judgment in the social sciences. It is a proposal, moreover,
which does not dodge difficult philosophical issues. It is a
proposal which the vast majority of critical sociologists are
unwilling to hazard.
Lynd is particularly concerned with what he believes
to be significant deficiencies in the predominant modes of
research and theory in social science. Most prominent among
these deficiencies is the lack of a psychological perspective.
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The social sciences, according to Lynd, had in a sense lost
sight of the individual —

an assertion not all that different

from the later criticism of functionalism as a theory which
diminishes individuals by considering them as subordinate
(ultimately, manipulated)

elements of a social system.

Part and parcel of this emphasis on the individual for
both Lynd and later critical sociologists is the notion that
the basis of social reality is to be found by focusing on the
behavior of individuals and not on the type of analysis which
utilizes large, abstract concepts such as institutions,
systems, and the like. As Lynd clearly states,

social

"...this view

ing of culture in terras of the behavior of individuals provides
the basis for a more realistic and coherent theoretical struc
ture for the social s c i e n c e s . L i k e w i s e ,

the individual is

seen as the key to efforts directed at improving society. Psy
chology,

"With its f i e l d ...fortunately concentrated on the cen

tral powerhouse of culture,

individuals, it is in the strategic

position of having the other social sciences turn increasingly
to it for the solution of realistic problems —
education and child development,

mental health,

labor problems, advertising

and market research, public opinion and propaganda.

It is a

safe prescription to almost any young social scientist-inpQ
training to 'get more psychological underpinning'." °
Putting aside for the moment the question of the
validity of this line of reasoning, in bringing to the a t 
tention of social scientists their blindness with respect to
the crucial place of the individual in society, Lynd is
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indicating that a major problem with social science is the
inadequacy of its general theoretical framework.
In a similar vein, Lynd also highlights deficiencies
in the predominant research techniques utilized in the social
sciences. Most notably, he criticizes the inherent conserva
tism of descriptive, empirical research techniques, having in
mind the gathering of data by means of questionnaires, inter
views, and variants of these basic survey techniques. Lynd
argues that the strict adherence to an empirical approach
involves an implicit acceptance of the values and goals of
2Q
the established social order. ^
The job of the social scientist is not merely to re
flect the prevailing opinions and beliefs of individuals but
to penetrate "current folk assumptions" and get at the under
lying reality. Put otherwise, the job of the social scientist
is basically a critical one, one which the predominant descrip
tive, empirical approach in sociology does not encompass. None
theless, Lynd does not advocate the abandonment of any specific
research techniques,

just as later critical sociologists ul 

timately argue that all research techniques have a place in
a more significant sociology.
What is perhaps more important, as we will see Mills
also maintain, is that these research techniques have as their
focus American society as a whole, that significant problems
in our society guide the selection of topics for research rather
than let the requirements of a particular research technique
dictate the topics to be studied.^0 Ultimately, for Lynd,
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the task of social scientists involves the careful investi
gation of what he calls "outrageous hypotheses" —
such as the following:

hypotheses

"It is possible to build a culture

that in all its institutions will play down the need for and
the possibility of war."

31

This is, again, to emphasize the

practical nature of social science research, since as Lynd
notes,

"There is no other agency in our culture whose role

it is to ask long-range and, if need be, abruptly irreverent
questions of our democratic institutions; and to follow these
questions with research and the systematic charting of the
■30

way a h e a d . T h a t

social science has largely failed to live up

to these expectations can be attributed, in large measure,
to deficiencies in its theoretical and methodological under
pinnings .
Writing some seventeen years later, in the midst of
the emergence of structural-functionalism as the major
theoretical framework in sociology, Pitirim Sorokin chose a
similar focus for his critical analysis of sociology in Fads
and Foibles in Modern Sociology. Although Sorokin has little
to say about the practical implications of a more significant
sociology for society (certainly the central feature of
Knowledge For What?), he does discuss in detail major theo
retical and methodological issues in contemporary sociology.
In his own words:
The creative renaissance of our disciplines
requires a basic reconstruction of the prevalent
conceptions of sociology and psychology. The
central task of this reconstruction consists of
replacing the prevalent defective views on what
constitutes psychosocial reality, what is valid

knowledge of It, and what are the methods of
its cognition, by more adequate conceptions
of these fundamentals.33
In a general way, the above statement indicates Sorokin's
willingness to attempt to resolve some very difficult and basic
issues in sociology, issues which ultimately cannot be resolved
without addressing underlying philosophical questions. For
example, the question of what constitutes valid knowledge of
society (or,"psychosocial reality" in Sorokin's terms) neces
sarily takes Sorokin into two major areas of philosophical
'S/i

endeavor, namely, metaphysics and epistemology.

Indeed, if

one had to point to the major topic of discussion in Fads and
Foibles in Modern Sociology it would be Sorokin's persistent
criticism of sociology's "sham-scientific" m et hodology,^
during the course of which he not only exposes significant
problems in predominant research techniques but also proposes
what he believes to be a more adequate approach to studying
society. And it is principally within the context of this
crticism that we also get some notion of what Sorokin believes
constitutes sound sociological theory.
In attempting to expose the methodology employed by
sociologists In their research as being in fact unscientific
and, In some cases, plainly invalid, Sorokin strikes a central
nerve in American sociology. Characteristic of American
sociology as a whole has been the constant effort to improve
the validity, reliability, and overall accuracy of various
research techniques by drawing increasingly upon developments
in other sciences and in mathematics. It is precisely this
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borrowing from other sciences and the field of mathematics
that Sorokin casts considerable doubt upon. For example, he
spends a good deal of time discussing the dangers of what he
calls "quantophrenia" in modern sociology. He sees the use
of elaborate statistical procedures and the results of these
procedures as conveying a false sense of precision about
what is essentially unquantifiable social phenomena.
When confronted by tables, graphs, or numbers of
various kinds one tends to assume that studies employing such
devices are accurate, objective scientific reports. Perhaps
it is because of this that research utilizing some statistical
procedure often receives favorable treatment by public and
private organizations which support sociological research.
But this is precisely the false impression which Sorokin seeks
to dispel: the introduction of statistics does not by itself
make a study any more objective or scientific, much less
valid.
Throughout his treatment of predominant modes of
research, Sorokin brings to our attention the existence of
strong subjective elements in so-called "objective" research
—

a theme which we will see is later greatly elaborated upon

by phenomenological sociologists and ethnomethodologists. The
fact that most of the data collected by sociologists, particu
larly by means of questionnaires or interviews, is of a
subjective and therefore, highly uncertain, nature is not
fully appreciated by most sociologists. Such weaknesses in
sociological research are aptly summarized in the following

- 26 -

passage:
In brief, the bulk of recent psychosocial
research deals with speech-reactions, gathered
by speech-reactional operations, centered around
wishful, hypothetical, "syndromatic" and sub
jective utterances, rarely checked for their
accuracy, sincerity and correspondence to the
facts. This sort of "hearsay" is the material
out of which most recent psychosocial theories
and "research conclusions" have been manu
factured by mechanically processing the "stuff"
through the calculating gadgets of the
statistical routine.3°
Although Sorokin contends that there is this sub
stantial element of subjectivity in current sociological re
search, he himself advocates a highly subjective approach to
the investigation of social phenomena, which he refers to as
"supralogical, suprasensory intuition." Such intuition, he
goes on to argue, only comes through actual involvement In
the particular aspect of social behavior one may be studying;
that is, it takes a "direct cofeeling and coexperiencing" with
those being studied for one to gain this kind of insight. It
is through such intuition that the most truly creative thought
has come, and certainly not through the"statistical routine."
In line with Lynd's call for social scientists to
draw more heavily upon psychology, I believe Sorokin's argu
ment here represents another attempt to make room for the in
dividual In sociology —

specifically, to acknowledge the

contribution of individual Intuition and insight to social
research.
In contrast to Lynd, however, Sorokin does affirm
his belief in the viability of the system concept, of viewing
society as a whole. Indeed, his depiction of the stages of
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civilization development as the ideational, idealistic. and
sensate represents a much more all-embracing conception of
society than most American sociologists are willing to hazard.
In this context Sorokin also notes the futility of the search
for "social atoms", whether these atoms be individuals, small
groups, roles, or the like. Society cannot be understood by
breaking it down into these so-called social atoms. Insofar
as empirical research does Just that (i.e., break society
down into smaller units) the knowledge gained from such re
search is vastly Inferior to the knowledge which can be gain
ed by an intuitional grasp of the whole.
This brief discussion of some of the principal themes
in Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology has revealed Sorokin's
fundamental concern with exposing and seeking to correct serious
defects in the predominant theoretical and methodological ap
proaches in contemporary sociology. Congruent with the major
thrust of Lynd's criticism of the social sciences in general,
Sorokin is, In essence, arguing that the problem with sociology lies in the discipline itself and not In sociologists.

37

The meaning of this important distinction will become clearer
when we discuss the work of later critical sociologists whose
attention :is, more often than not, focused on sociologists
themselves —

on their biases, on their complicity with the

established social order, on their lack of courage to speak
out forthrightly on controversial social issues.
Sorokin, in fact, provides a much more detailed criti
cism of sociology than does Lynd, particularly as regards its
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methodological foundations. Sorokin goes as far as to chal
lenge the validity of empiricism as the dominant theory of
cognition underlying sociological research. But for all the
fury of his criticism, Sorokin concludes his book on an equi
vocal note, which tends to undermine the strength of that
criticism. Imagine that after nearly 300 pages of detailed,
vehement criticism of "empirical psychosocial science"
Sorokin can say:
The prevalent empirical psychosocial science
has delivered especially during the sixteenth,
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centu
ries, important knowledge of man and his
sociocultural universe. Helped in part by the
logico-mathematical method, this empirical
science has labored strenuously for several
centuries. At the present time it is tired
and has become somewhat neurotic and less
creative.3°
This is to argue that empiricism was at one time a valid,
creative basis of psychosocial science and that it is only
because of its overuse that its validity and creativity have
diminished, as if this theory of cognition, like a biological
organism, was once young and vital but now is old and tired.
The weakness of such a line of argument should be obvious
enough.
What is significant about this equivocal stance which
Sorokin takes here is that this represents no isolated phe
nomenon, for there are numerous examples of such equivocation
to be found in the work of critical sociologists. Much of
the severe criticism of current sociological practice is
burdened by such numerous qualifications that one gets the
distinct impression that, as critical as these sociologists
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may believe they are, none of them seems to want to rock the
boat too hard.
As insightful and significant as one may consider the
criticism of sociology found in the work of Lynd and Sorokin,
there can be no doubt that the most influential precursor of
the sociological critique of American sociology was C. Wright
Mills. Perhaps the most obvious evidence of his tremendous
influence lies in the fact that some of the important antholo
gies of critical sociology are dedicated to the memory of
C. Wright Mills who died unexpectedly in 1962.39 Mills has,
on occasion, been referred to as the "father" of this critical
movement, as, for example, Robert W. Friedrichs notes in
A Sociology of Sociology: "...only as the discipline discovered
its consolidating paradigm —

system —

in grave difficulty

was it tempted to open the pandora's box that was the soci
ology of sociology. Indeed, it took the explosive impact of
C. Wright Mills' The Sociological Imagination in 1959 for a
sociology of sociology to intrude upon the sociologists'
collective conscience.
In addition to the great praise for his insight Into
the shortcomings and promise of sociology and his courage In
challenging the sociological establishment, many of these
critics discuss at length many of his major arguments,
particularly those contained In The Sociological Imagination.
As I hope to point out throughout my presentation of the
major themes of the sociological critique of American sociolo
gy, all of these themes derive in whole or in part from The
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Sociological Imagination. So, a brief discussion of this
seminal work here will set the stage for the later, more de
tailed analysis of the major themes of this critical move
ment .
Mills' interest in sociology and sociologists as objects
of study and critical analysis actually goes back much further
than The Sociological Imagination, published in 1959. As
early as 19^3, Mills wrote an article entitled "The Profession
al Ideology of Social Pathologists" in which he sought to
expose the implicit biases in the work of social pathologists.
Particularly significant in this early essay is M i l l s ' attempt
to demonstrate that the similar social backgrounds of these
social pathologists were largely responsible for the similar
ity in their approach to and definition of social pathology.
Mills argued that their perception of what was wrong with
American society reflected their small town, rural, middle-class
backgrounds. They saw urban and industrial expansion as the
principal culprits in most social problems, and to counter such
"pathological" conditions, it was argued, we must strive for
community welfare, stability, and the like, these being among
the principal characteristics of a "healthy" society.**1
M ill s' discovery of an implicit conservative bias in
this early literature on social pathology parallels the later
discovery of an implicit conservative bias in functionalism.
The existence of bias, of course, indicates the influence of
extra-scientific factors in the work of sociologists —

that

value judgments enter into the work of all sociologists in spite

of all the protestations of value-neutrality.
In this early essay, Mills also criticized the atom
istic, fragmented view of society contained in the work of
these social pathologists, a view of society which provides an
inadequate basis for any program of political action to correct
these ills. Social reform, in this context, becomes primarily
concerned with correcting (i.e., adjusting) individuals rather
than addressing the larger, more crucial problems of social
structure.

ii2

What Is important to note about Mills' critic

ism here is that It is based upon the recognition that a funda
mental shortcoming In American sociology is the inadequate
conception of society which sociologists, for the most part,
presuppose.
In The Power Eli te , another of Mills' major works, he
takes up a highly controversial subject and treats it in a way
which also reveals some fundamental shortcomings in modern soci
ology. Among the most significant of these shortcomings is the
failure to appreciate the existence and power of modern insti
tutions. Mills focuses on three such centers of power:

"These

hierarchies of state and corporation and army constitute the
means of power; as such they are now of a consequence not be
fore equalled in human history —

and at their summits, there

are now those command posts of modern society which offer us
the sociological key to an understanding of the role of the highJio

er circles in America.

Sociologists' failure to perceive this

fundamental fact of modern society, Mills goes on to argue,
derives in large part from the inadequacy of an empirical
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methodology. An empirical approach to the study of society
may yield a lot of data but very little in the way of under44
standing of modern society as a whole.
Hence, it is because
of an inadequate methodology that sociologists have failed, by
and large, to appreciate the true nature of modern society.
Needless to say, such criticism goes to the heart of sociology.
That the most significant shortcomings of modern soci
ology derive from its inadequate methodological and theoretical
foundation is a theme which receives its most detailed and
insightful attention in The Sociological Imagination. In ad
dition, Mills' critical analysis of sociology is clearly tied
to the potential practical benefit sociologists can bring to
the society which they study. Prom the opening pages in which
Mills depicts the malaise of contemporary American society,of
people being unknowingly swept along by the blind drift of
social forces they do not understand, the practical implica
tions of sociology are highlighted (that is, how sociology
can help alleviate this unhealthy condition of modern society).
But sociology cannot contribute to social reform in a meaning
ful way —

fulfill its promise -- in the absence of sound

method and theory.
The basic defects of the predominant modes of theory
and research in sociology are brought out in the context of
Mills' discussion of "grand theory" and "abstracted empiri
cism". Grand theory, for Mills, is synonymous with structuralfunctionalism and, even more specifically, with one of Talcott
Parsons' major works, The Social System. Mills argues that
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Parsons' work represents an attempt to develop a universally
valid theoretical framework to account for every important
aspect of social life. He contends that this grandiose task
is carried out with little regard for the historical record
and with no thought of any significant social or sociological
problem as a point of reference, which amounts to saying that
Parsons was writing in a vacuum with no firm connection to the
reality which he was attempting to capture in his theoretical
framework.
In spite of the alleged thoroughness of Parsons’ theo
retical framework, Mills perceptively notes that his analysis
of the social order is in fact limited to "the institution
alization of values", a focus which leaves out of account many
important structural features of modern society (such as proper
ty, for e x a m p l e ) . ^ Moreover, in focusing on common values as
that which holds society together, grand theory tends to
enshrine the current normative order as necessary to social
stability, as functional; hence, Parsons is led to assume that
virtually all power is legitimated.

46

So, grand theory could

not possibly be a part of a significant sociology which seeks
to change the status quo. Indeed, to carry Mills' analysis a
bit further, it can be argued that grand theory actually helps
perpetuate the ills of modern society by regarding them not
as evidence of something wrong In society as a whole but as
sources of dissension and disorder in an otherwise stable, order
ed society. The problem for grand theory, then, becomes one of
adjusting to the status quo rather than seeking to change the

-
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present state of American society by trying to increase the
scope of reason and freedom, as we will see Mills advocating
later.
Whereas grand theory suffers from its implicit justi
fication of the established social order,

the most serious

defects of abstracted empiricism derive from its having been

significantly shaped by the increasing bureaucratization of
modern society.

47' That is to say, empirical research in soci

ology has largely become bureaucratized:
In each and every feature of its existence and
its influence, abstracted empiricism, as it is
currently practiced, represents a 'bureaucratic'
development. (l)In an attempt to standardize
and rationalize each phase of social inquiry,
the intellectual operations themselves of the
abstracted empirical style are becoming
'bureaucratic'. (2) These operations are such
as to make studies of man usually collective
and systematized: in the kind of research
institutions, agencies, and bureaus in which
abstracted empiricism is properly installed,
there is a development, for efficiency's sake
if for no other, of routines as rationalized
as those of any corporation's accounting
department. (3) These two developments, in
turn, have much to do with the selection and
shaping of new qualities of mind among the
personnel of the school, qualities both
intellectual and political. (4) As it is
practiced in business — ...in the armed
forces and increasingly in universities as
well, 'the new social science' has come to
serve whatever ends its bureaucratic clients
may have in view... (5) Insofar as its
research efforts are effective in their
declared practical aims, they serve to in
crease the efficiency and the reputation —
and to that extent, the prevalence of bureau
cratic forms of domination in modern society.
All of the above-mentioned bureaucratic characteristics
of the predominant modes of empirical research run directly
contrary to the kind of creative insight (gained by means of
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the "sociological imagination") necessary to come to the best
possible understanding of modern society. Rather than employ
the talents of creative, independent thinkers, research organ
izations tend to rely on technicians, those who utilize set
procedures defined by "The Scientific Method". Mills notes
that scientific method, statistics, and the like have become
so important in sociological research that they have become
the determining factors in sociologists' selection of topics
to study. Topics of investigation which cannot be easily
quantified and are not amenable to scientific method tend not
to be pursued, which leads Mills to note:

"...surely it is

evident that an empiricism as cautious and rigid as abstracted
empiricism eliminates the great social problems and human
issues of our time from inquiry."^9 jt is this "methodological
inhibition" which precludes the investigation of such important
issues as the one Mills himself outlines in his opening remarks
in The Sociological Imagination.
An even more fundamental defect of contemporary soci
ological research lies in its dubious philosophical base, in
particular, the theory of knowledge which it presupposes. In
a passage reminiscent of criticism put forth by members of the
Frankfurt School, Mills argues that empirical research can never
penetrate the realm of appearance, the realm of opinion; it
only reflects people's perception of reality which may or may
not be accurate and which, in our mass culture, is quite often
manipulated:

"Many problems with which its practitioners do

try to deal -- effects of mass media, for example —
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cannot be

adequately stated without some structural setting. Can one
hope to understand the effects of these media —

much less

their combined meaning for the development of a mass society if one studies, with whatever precision, only a population
that has been

'saturated' by these media for almost a

generation?
Closely related to the above observation is M il l s '
criticism of the "building block" theory of knowledge which
holds that the results of these narrow empirical studies can
somehow be added up to yield more significant general con
clusions. But no matter how many studies of the psychological
reactions of individuals sociologists add up, Mills argues,
they will never gain any insight into the nature of social
structure and its significance for the lives of individuals.^^
Although Mills does not pursue this line of criticism
much further, he leaves no doubt as to what he believes is a
more adequate approach to the study of social life. This
approach, broadly defined, involves historical and comparative
research in the tradition of classical sociological theorists,
the most important representative of which for Mills is Max
Weber. Weber's work in the areas of religion and economics
is particularly noted for the depth of its historical and
comparative analysis.52 Just what such an approach involves
is indicated in the following observation:

"Comparative study

and historical study are very deeply involved with each other.
You cannot understand the underdeveloped, the Communist, the
capitalist political economies as they exist in the world
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today by flat, timeless comparisons. You must expand the
temporal reach of your analysis."53
What is especially significant about M il l s ' approach
is its holistic nature; that is, rather than study isolated
segments of social life or individuals in isolation from the
larger social structure, these classical theorists clearly
perceived the necessity of studying social life in its full
historical, structural setting if one is to get a valid pic
ture of social life. This alternative approach is, of course,
captured in what Mills calls the "sociological imagination"
which he defines at one point as that which "...enables its
possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms
of its meaning for the inner life and external career of a
variety of individuals."^ Put somewhat differently:

"The

sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and
biography and the relations between the two within society.
That is its task and its promise. To recognize this task and
this promise is the mark of a classic social analyst."55
Not only does the sociological imagination have impli
cations with respect to methodology but it also clearly entails
an alternative conception of society, a conception of society
which emphasizes social structure. Social structure, for Mills,
basically involves the institutions of modern society (govern
ment, economy, religion, etc.) and their interrelationship.
The most inclusive unit of social structure is the nation
state, for it is "The nation-state which is now the dominating
form in world history and, as such, a major fact in the life
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of every m a n . "56 Such a view of society contrasts significant
ly with both Parsons' focus on institutionalized values and
abstracted empiricism's "psychologism".
Perhaps the most significant element of Mills' critique
of the predominant modes of method and theory in contemporary
sociology is his discussion of the value question. Mills'
basic argument with respect to the question of the proper
relation between the work of sociologists and value consider
ations is repeated on numerous occasions, sometimes almost
verbatim, by later critical sociologists. Although Mills' ar
gument certainly appears to be the immediate reference-point
for these critical sociologists, there is nothing in his argu
ment which could not be derived from Max Weber's discussion of
the principle of value-neutrality, as Alvin Gouldner clearly
demonstrates in his widely-cited essay,

"Anti-Minotaur: The

Myth of a Value-Free Sociology."
Among the many clear expressions of what I will later
characterize as the "let's be honest" position is the follow
ing passage from The Sociological Imagination:
Whether he wants it or not, or whether he is
aware of it or not, anyone who spends his life
studying society and publishing the results is
acting morally and usually politically as well.
The question is whether he faces this condition
and makes up his own mind, or whether he con
ceals it from himself and from others and drifts
morally.->7
There

are two aspects of this statement that need to be empha

sized

here: first, that Mills is arguing

sociological work is a myth —

that value-neutral

that all sociological work not

only presupposes an explicit or implicit value perspective but

- 39 -

also the results of sociological research have definite
moral and political implications for society. A major task
for the critical sociologist (indeed, the obligation of all
sociologists), then, is to uncover the moral background and
moral implications of all sociological work. Secondly, once
the full extent of this relationship between one's work and
questions of value is explored, sociologists are enjoined to
declare what these values are rather than take the cowardly
route of continuing one's work under the pretense of valueneutrality.
Consistent with his injunction to sociologists to
declare their own value orientation, Mills offers his own view
of what constitutes the proper work of s o c i o l o g i s t s A s was
noted earlier, Mills opens The Sociological Imagination by
depicting the situation of individuals in modern society as
one of feeling trapped, of being carried along by the blind
drift of events. With the encroachment of bureaucratic modes
of organization and thought in all aspects of social life, with
the rise of a "power elite" which exercises effective control
over the course of American society by way of their control
of politics, economics, and the military, Mills sees American
society increasingly becoming a society of m asses, that is, a
society of manipulable individuals. Such a development, Mills
goes on to note, runs directly contrary to the ideals of
American society contained in its democratic heritage . ^ And
for Mills, if there is any ideal worth fighting for —

that

sociologists and, indeed, all intellectuals should defend —
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it is the democratic ideal of a nation of free individuals
making free and rational decisions about the future course of
their nation.

In Mills' own words:

"What he [the sociologist]

ought to do for the society is to combat all those forces
that are destroying genuine publics and creating a mass
society —

or put as a positive goal, his aim is to help

build and strengthen self-cultivating p u b l i c s . Only then
might society be reasonable and free."

(my emphasis)^®

One specific way that sociologists can help enlighten
people (i.e., develop genuine publics)

is to translate,

by

means of the sociological imagination, personal troubles into
public Issues;

that Is, to show people that problems in their

own lives have their source in larger problems in society as
a whole. This would involve, for example, showing that the
impersonal, faceless character of life for many people in
modern society Is basically not the fault of individuals
(the "cheerful robots", as Mills describes such people), but
that this is the result,

in large part, of the encroachment

of bureaucratic modes of organization and thought in modern
society. The scope of reason and freedom has diminished con
siderably, and it Is the principal task of sociologists to
try to enlarge their scope.
In essence,

then, Mills can be seen as an advocate for

the democratic ideal of social order and, ultimately,

for the

individual. Interestingly enough, this very position will
emerge as the predominant one among critical sociologists —
a position which will be called Into question in my critical
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analysis of this aspect of the sociological critique of
American sociology.

(3) Summary and Outline of
Chapters to Follow
Throughout the discussion of the work of Lynd, Sorokin,
and Mills, it has been noted time and again that a principal
focus of their criticism has been the methodological and theo
retical foundations of American sociology. On the whole, I
believe their critical analysis is more insightful, more
thoroughgoing, and more significant than the bulk of the work
done by later critics. These qualities of this earlier work
derive in large part from the willingness of these sociolo
gists to address some of the basic philosophical issues which
underlie the major controversies in sociology. This is not
to say that later critical sociologists do not discuss im
portant theoretical and methodological issues; however,
those critical sociologists who do look into such issues
almost invariably avoid discussing related philosophical
questions. As I hope to demonstrate more fully in the chapters
to follow, the most significant shortcomings of the principal
arguments put forth by these critical sociologists derive
from their reluctance to discuss the more basic philosophical
questions involved.
I believe it is questionable that any insight of any
real significance can be derived from a sociological critique
of American sociology.

62

Put otherwise, I am suggesting

that no significant criticism of contemporary sociology is
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possible unless sociologists are willing to come to grips
with and attempt to resolve the epistemological, metaphysical,
and ethical Issues which clearly underlie the defects in con
temporary sociology which they point to.
In my own reflections on the nature of this critical
movement I will be drawing on essentially two philosophic
sources. First,

there is the work of some of the principal

members of the Frankfurt School who directed much of their
critical attention at positivistic thought in general and,
on occasion,

specifically at sociology.

insight of these

I will argue that the

"critical theorists" into the shortcomings

of current sociological practice and into the larger question
of what is wrong in modern society is generally more profound
than anything offered by critical sociologists. What is par
ticularly interesting about the work of these critical
theorists is that It has had an impact upon some of the major
figures of this critical sociological movement, most notably,
Alvin Gouldner. Nonetheless,

I believe some interesting and

informative differences will emerge In looking at their res
pective critiques of sociology and society.
Secondly, and more importantly, is the criticism of
sociology and the kind of thinking sociology represents offer
ed by a much-neglected twentieth-century American philosopher,
Elijah Jordan. The impact of Jordan's work for the sociolo
gical critique of American sociology goes far beyond the
specific criticisms he levels at sociology in Chapter Two of
his Forms of Individuality. More fundamental are his general
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contributions to an understanding of the nature of modern
society and of its basic constituent elements. Finally, as
Jordan emphasizes throughout his work, a sound understanding
of society is a necessary prerequisite to any meaningful
effort at social reform. It is with this in mind that we
must require of sociologists that in their investigation of
society they bring forth knowledge which will contribute,
rather than detract, from the effort to improve society.
And this requirement can be fulfilled only insofar as sociolo
gists critically evaluate the methodological and theoretical
foundations of their discipline.
Although the bulk of the discussion in the chapters
to follow will be taken up with the presentation of the basic
arguments put forth in the context of the sociological critique
of American sociology, I will present some critical reflections
based upon the work of members of the Frankfurt School and
Elijah Jordan at the end of each chapter. In some instances,
the reader may get the impression that I have left him
hanging at the end of a chapter without having resolved the
issue discussed. This may very well be the case, for my final
judgment of the shortcomings and the promise of the sociolo
gical critique of American sociology will be brought to light
in the concluding chapter, after having considered this criti
cal movement as a whole. It is perhaps a commonplace ob
servation, but true, that all of the issues discussed by
critical sociologists are closely interrelated, and therefore
require that they be treated as interrelated in making a
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critical assessment of them.
Each of the chapters to follow will focus on a basic
issue

discussed in the sociological critique of American

sociology. In Chapter II, the relation between sociological
research and social policy will be discussed. Critical soci
ologists will consider the question of how sociologists have
and should relate to the private and public agencies which
fund sociological research. The charge that mainstream soci
ologists are working hand-in-glove with the established social
order emerges in Chapter II but is given much fuller consid
eration in Chapter III which is on the valuequestion in
sociology. In this

chapter, we will consider what place, if

any, values have in the work of sociologists. Critical soci
ologists argue that values affect all aspects of the work of
sociologists, which, being the case, critical sociologists
are obliged to express their value preferences. In Chapter IV,
then, their preference for the democratic ideal being applied
to both sociology and society will be considered. Chapter V
will build on this analysis by presenting what have been some
other prominent attempts to develop alternative conceptions of
society as a basis

for a new and more significant sociology.

These alternatives

will be found wanting for many of the same

reasons the discussion of issues presented in previous chapters
was found wanting. In a concluding chapter, I will bring to
gether the important shortcomings of this critical movement
and suggest a new direction for developing a new and more
significant sociology.
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^Indeed, as J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach (eds.) bring
out in Radical Sociology, from 1967 through the early 1970's
the Vietnam War, among other social issues, was the source
of disruption at national American Sociological Association
conventions.
2 Ibld,, p.3.
3ln discussing the concept of value here, I want to point out
that I am using the term in a sense adopted almost universal
ly by these critical sociologists, namely, that value is more
or less equivalent to personal preference. Value judgments,
then, are essentially expressions of personal preference.
Later, I will attempt to develop an alternative, objective
conception of value. This will be one of the most crucial
distinctions I will make in reflecting upon the shortcomings
of this critical movement.
4
Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology,
pp.25-26. In a later essay Gouldner provides us with another
brief, insightful synopsis of the sociology of sociology.
He says, "... our ^sociologists'J circumstances compel us to
examine ourselves. We now require 'a sociology of sociology’,
a sociology that can deepen the sociologist's awareness of
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"Remembrance and Renewal" in
For Sociology, p.77.
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^Alvin Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp.170-171.
^Ibid.,

p. 168 .

■^As we will see shortly, the work of just one critical soci-
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ologist, Alvin Gouldner (and, indeed, his book Enter Plato
by itself), encompasses the three different manifestations
of this critical movement: what I refer to as the sociology
of sociology, critical sociology, and radical sociology.
^2As Larry and Janice Reynolds (eds.) state in the preface
of one of the major anthologies in the sociology of sociology
"The sociology of sociology may provide more accurate per
ceptions of where we now stand and why. With such knowledge
in hand, real alternatives for the future can be evaluated."
The Sociology of Sociology, p.5.
!3see Roscoe C. Hinkle Jr. and Gisela J.Hinkle, The Develop
ment of Modern Sociology.
*^Don H. Zimmerman, "Ethnomethodology", The American Sociolo
g i s t . 13(Feb. 78), p.11.
^ t .R. Young, "The Politics of Sociology: Gouldner, Goffman,
and Garfinkel", The American Sociologist, 6 ( N o v . 71),
pp.279-280.
^Involvement in social life is not only crucial for a valid
methodology, but as we will see, some critical sociologists
go as far as to argue that a radical sociology entails the
personal involvement of sociologists in various social
movements.
17
Alvin Gouldner, "The Politics of Mind", For Sociology,
pp.84-85.
1®See J. David Colfax and Jack L.Roach (eds.), Radical
Sociology. It includes an account of the origin and activi
ties of the "Sociology Liberation Movement".
^ D a v i d Horowitz (ed.), Radical Sociology: An Introduction,
p. v.

2 ^J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach (eds.), Radical Sociology
pp.341-418.
---------------21Alfred McClung Lee, Sociology For W h o m ? , p.5.
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This is a point which Dennis Foss fails to appreciate in
wrongly assigning 1949 as the original date of publication
of Knowledge For W h a t ? . Dennis Foss, The Value Controversy
in Sociology, p.23.

2 ^Robert S. Lynd, Knowledge For What?, p.ll 6 .
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Ibid., p. 178 .

2 ^As I hope to show, Lynd's attempt to spell out an objective
ground or base for value Judgment runs contrary to the views
of the vast majority of later critical sociologists who see
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value judgment as necessarily subjective and therefore com
pletely arbitrary.
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27 Ibld., p. 3 2 .
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3°Ibid., p.202 .

3lIbid., p.241.
32Ibld.t p. 250 .
33pitirim Sorokin, Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology, p. 315 .
3^The reason I emphasize this point here is that I will later
point to evidence of an unwillingness on the part of contempo
rary critical sociologists to get involved in any discussion
of such difficult (yet crucial, I would argue) philosophical
issues as does Sorokin.
35
^As Sorokin clearly states in the Preface: "The purpose of
these essays is to expose the nonscientific and half scien
tific elements in modern sociology and related disciplines."
Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology, p. v. Moreover,
Sorokin clearly acknowledges the underlying philosophical
issues here in arguing that the defects he discusses at
length largely derive from a faulty theory of cognition —
what he calls empiricism "in one of its primitive variations"
(i.e., positivism and operationalism). p.279 .

36 Ibld., p. 298 .
37with perhaps one significant exception: the charge that
Parsons and Shils, in developing their theory of social
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explicitly says at one point: "...in an unpublished mimeo
graphed manuscript, Similarities and Dissimilarities Between
Two Sociological Systems, I have shown by a long series of
parallel quotations from my works and the volumes of Parsons
and Shils that their basic definitions and concepts are
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even in wording." Ibid., pp.14-15.
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and Arthur Vidich and The New Sociology, edited by Irving
Louis Horowitz.
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4lAs Mills succinctly puts it, "The aim to preserve rurally
oriented values and stabilities is indicated in the implicit
model which operates to detect urban disorganization; it is
also shown by the stress upon community welfare. The communi
ty is taken as the major unit, and often it sets the scope
of concern and problematization." "The Professional Ideology
of Social Pathologists" in The Sociology of Sociology, edited
by Reynolds and Reynolds, pp.136-137.
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School.
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J Later, we will see that the work of classical sociological
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approach to the study of society for these critical sociolo
gists .
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34Ibid.. p. 5 .
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This commitment to a particular moral and political position,
for Mills, is of a relativistic nature: "Not every social
scientist accepts all the views I happen to hold on these
issues, and it is not my wish that he should. My point is
that one of his tasks is to determine his own views of the
nature of historical change and the place, if any, of free
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and reasonable men within It." Ibid., p. 192.
59This Is a point which Howard Press, In his intellectual
portrait, C. Wright Mill s, continually emphasizes in attempt
ing to characterize Mills' politics.
C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, p. 187 .
^ T h i s point has direct bearing on arguments put forth by
members of the Frankfurt School, in particular Max Horkheimer's
Eclipse of Reason and Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional M a n .
Although on the surface their arguments are quite similar,
I will later try to demonstrate the superiority of Horkheimer
and Marcuse's treatment of this problem of the constriction
of reason and freedom in modern society.
Part of the point being made here is captured in T.B.
Bottomore's characterization of Gouldner's "reflexive soci
ology" as "...the sociologist contemplating his own navel."
T.B. Bottomore, Sociology as Social Criticism, p.44.
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CHAPTER II
SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND SOCIAL POLICY
Among the first issues to be addressed by critical
sociologists was the close relationship which they argued had
grown up between sociological researchers and the public and
private agencies which provided funds for their research.
This relationship was taken as evidence of the complicity of
mainstream sociologists with representatives of the established
social order -- that researchers were allowing their work to
be dictated by powerful interests in our society whose primary
concern is the maintenance of the status quo. That is to say,
other than scientific considerations have been involved in
the selection of topics for research and in the process of
carrying out the research. This very serious charge goes to
the heart of the canons of empirical research, and it will be
the focal point of what critical sociologists see as wrong
with sociological research.
(1) Project Camelot: The Initiation of the Debate
Over the Proper Relationship Between Sociological
Research and Social Policy.
An important facet of the development of sociology in
America has been the increasingly close relations that have
been built up between the sociological profession and the
federal government. With the growing involvement of the
federal government in the formulation and implementation of
social policy, there has been a subsequent growth in the need
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for comprehensive, accurate knowledge about our society and
its problems —

knowledge which ultimately could serve as a

guide for those who make social policy. Hence, since the
passage of the National Health Act in 1946 (from which came
the National Institute of Mental Health), the federal govern
ment has allocated larger and larger amounts of money to basic
and applied research in the social sciences .1
Official recognition of the importance of social
science research, however, has generally been overshadowed by
the high regard in which the natural and physical sciences
have been held. The natural and physical sciences have always
received the bulk of government research funds. Nonetheless,
by the mid- 1960 's the social sciences, and sociology in par
ticular, had come a long way toward gaining an equal footing
with the so-called "hard" sciences.
This newly-won status was exemplified by hearings in
Congress concerning a proposal to set up a National Social
Science Foundation (NSSF) apart from the National Science
Foundation (NSF) which has been a principal source of funding
for social science research although, again, the bulk of the
grants went to research projects in the natural and physical
sciences. Moreover, there was discussion in Congress of a
proposal, which grew out of testimony of sociologists con
cerning the establishment of NSSF, that a Presidential
Council of Social Advisors be set up, modeled after the exist
ing Council of Economic Advisors.
In general, one can notice a direct correlation between
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the increase in the number of social programs in the 6 0 's and
the increase in federal money for social science research. A
sociologist who has looked into this phenomenon notes,

"The

Kennedy-Johnson years were boom times for social science
researchers. Federal expenditures for such research more
than quadrupled in the years between i960 and 1966, rising
from $73.1 million to $325.1 million ."2 But just as the
policies of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations were to
come under attack from social critics, so too were sociolo
gists criticized who, having carried out research under gov
ernment sponsorship, were indirectly tied to these policies.
Critical sociologists charged that sociological re
searchers,

in accepting government funds for their research,

had by and large surrendered their autonomy and become instru'
ments of government policy. This charge was given credence
by a scandal which grew out of a U.S. Army-sponsored research
project entitled

"Project Camelot". The years of debate and

discussion which ensued upon the cancellation of this illfated project would serve to bring tb the fore many important
Issues concerning the question of the proper relationship be
tween the sociological profession and its sources of research
funding. Perhaps it was because Project Camelot appeared to
represent such a direct and blatant attempt to influence the
conduct of sociological research that it became the cause
celebre among critical sociologists,

particularly Irving

Louis Horowitz, a former student of C. Wright Mills who was
to become a principal figure in this whole debate.
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Initiated in 1964, Project Camelot was to have invol
ved several noted sociologists from the United States and
abroad in a study of the causes of revolution and insurgency
in underdeveloped and developing countries throughout the
world, with the specific focus of this study being Chile.

3

The

source of the funds for this research, a generous $4-6 million
spread over three or four years, was the United States Army.
The study was to have been done under the aegis of the Special
Operations Research Organization (SORO), an organization nom
inally connected with American University in Washington D.C.
and funded principally by the Defense Department.
The fact that the United States Army was funding this
project was not made clear to social scientists and adminis
trators at the University of Chile in Santiago, whose cooper
ation was needed to carry out this research. During the ini
tial phases of the project, however, a sociologist from the
University of Oslo who had been asked to Join the project,
Johan Gatlung, revealed to University of Chile administrators
that the funding for this project was coming from the United
States Army. In light of the United States' image as an im
perialist power in the world, highlighted just a few months
later by United States' military intervention in Santo Domingo
in May, 1965, Gatlung's revelation led to charges of imperial
ism in the Chilean press, culminating finally in Congessional
hearings in Washington and the cancellation of Project Camelot.
Whether true or not, Chileans regarded Project Camelot
as an unwarranted intervention in their internal affairs; they
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feared that the knowledge gained from this research would
only serve to enhance the effectiveness of the C.I.A.

In Its

efforts to insure the existence of a Chile amenable to Amer
ican interests.

In this country,

the effects of the cancella

tion of Project Camelot went far beyond those sociologists
who had agreed to participate in it. What was at stake here,
ultimately, was the credibility and integrity of the sociolo
gical profession itself. What had begun as one of the most
auspicious and well-financed research projects ever und er 
taken by sociologists,

thus, turned into one of the most con

troversial chapters in the history of the sociological pro
fession in America.
Critical comment on the nature and implications of
Project Camelot appeared almost immediately after its demise
and continued unabated for several years to come.

In the con

text of this critical commentary most of the central issues
surrounding the question of the proper relationship between
sociological research and social policy were raised.

Indeed,

for critical sociologists such as Irving Louis Horowitz,
Project Camelot represented all that was wrong with the exist
ing relationship. The basic position argued by critical soci
ologists is nicely summarized by Herbert Blumer in an article
contained in The Rise and Fall of Project C a m e l o t , edited by
Irving Louis Horowitz. Blumer comments:
The major issue is not that of entrenching
and extending the role of sociology in the
federal government but of protecting the
integrity of sociology as a scientific
di sc ipline....
The threats that appear to me to be of
crucial significance are (l) the restraints
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imposed on the scientific pursuit of truth,
(2 ) a disrespect of the rights of human
beings being studied, and (3 ) an unwitting
corruption of scholars engaging in agencydetermined research.
The criticism that those sociologists involved in Pro
ject Camelot were,

in a sense, instruments of the Defense D e 

partment is later reasserted in an article by Horowitz in which
he compares the corruption of sociologists involved in this
project with the corruption of social scientists brought to
light in The Pentagon Papers which revealed American military
planning to intervene in Vietnam. Clearly hearkening back to
Mills' discussion of the

"bureaucratic ethos" in sociological

research in The Sociological Imagination, Horowitz describes
Project Camelot as being prepared

"...with the same bloodless,

bureaucratic approach that characterizes so much of federally
inspired social science and history."^
In addition, another group of sociologists focused on
the methodological deficiencies in the research design itself.
For example, Marshall Sahlins argues that a conservative bias
was built into the design of the project from the start, a
conservative bias which in many ways reflects that of the
functionalist view of social order. Sahlins notes,
lutionary movements are described as
indications of

'antisystem activities',

'severe disintegration',

lizing processes',

threats to

"...revo

varieties of

'destabi

'legitimate control of the means

of coercion within society', facilitated by 'administrative
errors'. Movements for radical change are in Camelot's view
/T

a disease and a society so infected is sick."
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Considered

along with the criticisms of Project Camelot mentioned above,
this criticism is indicative of these critical sociologists'
fundamental belief that sociological research is a scientific
endeavor —

that the validity of the sociological enterprise,

as with any scientific enterprise, rests upon the degree to
which sociologists are autonomous,

the degree to which their

research is an unbiased pursuit of the truth.
In direct response to the potential threat to the
integrity of the sociological profession which Project Camelot
represented, the American Sociological Association initiated
the process of drafting a code of ethics for the profession.
The drafting of a code of ethics was seen as essential to
insure continued public support for sociological research.
That such an action was viewed as an appropriate response to
this situation is an indication of the degree to which the
blame for Project Camelot was placed upon the individual
sociologists who had agreed to participate in it. As one
sociologist noted in this context:

"Where the issue of pro

fessional ethics entered most significantly in Project Camelot,
it seems to me, was in the initial acceptance of the mission
of the project by social scientists acting in their role as
social scientists.
In general,

I believe it is accurate to say that the

principal focus of the criticism of Project Camelot was
directed at the actions of the individual sociologists in
volved. These sociologists,

it was argued, had:

(l) sur

rendered their autonomy in agreeing to participate in the

project;

(2) had failed to disclose all of the background

information on the nature of the project and its source of
funding to officials at the University of Chile; and (3) had
allowed their conservative bias to enter into the design of
the study. In all of this there is nothing which suggests
any problems with the nature of sociological research itself
or with its philosophical basis. Indeed, In the view of the
critics of Project Camelot, the ultimate problem was that
sociologists involved in it did not adhere closely enough to
the tenets of scientific research.
The serious charges raised by critics of Project
Camelot did not go without rebuttal from some of the socioloQ
gists who had agreed to participate in the study.
Interest
ingly enough, In defending their participation,

these sociolo

gists appealed to some of the very same arguments that critics
used to attack Project Camelot. They denied the contention
that the Army was using them to gather intelligence inform
ation;

rather,

they expressed the belief that they had a sub

stantial amount of freedom,

that their autonomy as scientific

researchers was not as severely curtailed as the critics had
maintained. Moreover,

these sociologists believed that this

research project, with such generous financial support,
represented an unparalleled opportunity to investigate the
phenomenon of social change in a truly comparative sense.
This was the kind of "Big-Range Sociology" that one of the
principal critics of Project Camelot,

Irving Louis Horowitz,

had argued so strongly for in the introduction to The New
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Sociology just a few years prior to this. Hence, although the
two sides of this debate disagreed as to the nature and im
plications of Project Camelot,
basic point; namely,

there was agreement on one

that sociological researchers must seek

to preserve their autonomy which is vital to all truly
scientific work.
Prom reading the numerous charges and countercharges
put forth by critics and defenders of Project Camelot,

I am

at a loss to make any determination of which side is painting
the most accurate picture of the whole situation. The fact
that Project Camelot never got past the design stage further
complicates matters. Many of the criticisms and their rebut
tals are premised on what someone believed would have been
the case if Project Camelot had been carried out.
Nonetheless, one thing can be said for certain:

Project

Camelot was the source of considerable debate and controversy
in American sociology during the 1960's and 1970's. Indeed,
the debate which it engendered raised issues that would be
discussed time and again in later critical analyses of the
relationship between sociological research and social policy.
Let us, then, turn our attention to some of these
other critical analyses of the relationship between sociolo
gical research and social policy.
(2) The Power of Sociological Research

Perhaps the most serious charge brought against
Project Camelot was that it represented an attempt by the
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Defense Department to use legitimate social scientific re 
search as a means of gathering intelligence information about
a foreign country —

the ultimate purpose of that information

being to enhance the United States 1 ability to control the
political situation in that country. Put bluntly,

those soci

ologists Involved in the project were being accused of being
tools of United States'

imperialism. As fantastic as such

criticism may appear at first glance, it, in fact, is repre
sentative of one of the principal arguments put forth by
sociological critics concerning the growing ties between
sociological research and social policy.
Sociologists'

increasing willingness to assist in the

formulation, implementation, and assessment of social policy
was seen as more than Just a reflection of their desire to
assist in the task of social reform. Critical sociologists
charged that such willingness was more a reflection of
( 1 ) sociologists'

interest in gaining access to more funds

for research and (2 ) their interest in having the status quo
preserved in whibh their own positions were relatively secure.^
That is to say, mainstream sociologists were being accused of
working hand-in-glove with the established social order to
help insure that things remain as they are. As Mills had
pointed out in The Sociological Imagination, a "bureaucratic
ethos" predominated in sociological research, which meant
that sociological research came

"to serve whatever ends its

bureaucratic clients may have in v i e w ..."10 Those bureau
cratic clients, according to these critical sociologists,
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were for the most part representatives of the most powerful
interests in our society whose principal concern is with the
preservation of their own privileged position.
Although some of these critics push the beginnings of
sociologists' collusion with the established order back as
far as Elton Mayo's Hawthorne Studies in the late 1 9 2 0 's and
early 1930 's,11 it is not until the 1960 's that such criticism
reached full bloom in an atmosphere in which "the establish
ment" was being attacked from a variety of perspectives by
people involved in the numerous social movements which had
sprung up around this time. Just as Mills had singled out
government,

the military, and business as the master insti

tutions of modern society, the leaders of which constituted
the "power elite",

these critical sociologists focus on the

alleged collusive relationship between sociological researchers
and those who paid for such research in government,
military, and in corporate America.

in the

In all cases, these critics

charge that sociological researchers are wittingly or unwit
tingly working in the interest of their clients which is to
maintain the status

quo. This charge is epitomized in the

following statement

by Martin Nicolaus, who paints a very

dark picture of the

nature of this relationship:

In addition to the general dissemination of
propaganda, professional sociology has the
major specific functions of aiding industrial,
civil, and military authorities in the solution
of manpower control problems of a limited order,
and preparing university candidates for careers
in the official bureaucracies. As a source of
legitimation for the existing sovereignty, and
as a laboratory of refinements in the processes
by which a tribute of blood, labor, and taxation
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is extracted from the subject population,
the professional organization of sociology
today represents the concrete fulfillment
of the charter vision of its founding
f a t h e r s .12
As extreme as Nicolaus'

charges a r e , ^

they are indicative of

the basic position put forth by critical sociologists.
Sociological research and the sociological profession
in general are variously characterized as: part of the "tech
nology of r e p r e s s i o n " , ^ disguising

"the practical and poli

tically oppressive realities of the scientific and social
worlds",

"serving...as the avant-garde of the corporate
1f\
17
reality,...",
"a tool of the Welfare State,...",
and
finally, and most directly,

the "servant of the power elite".

By and large, however, these charges are made in very general
terms, with little in the way of evidence to back them up.
Nevertheless,

in a general sense, I believe there is

considerable evidence to suggest that such characterizations
of contemporary mainstream sociology are not entirely astray.
One may be hard pressed to prove that an actual conspiracy
existed involving members of the power elite and their intel
lectual

"servants",

but one does not have to look very hard

to uncover evidence of the conservatism of much of contempo
rary American sociology. For example, Dusky Lee Smith, in
analyzing the work of Nathan Glazer, Amitai Etzioni, and
Seymour Martin Lipset, cites numerous passages in which these
prominent sociologists clearly defend the status quo —
suggesting by this that nothing is basically wrong with
modern American society. I believe the title of her essay
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aptly describes these sociologists and their work:
shine Boys: Toward a Sociology of Happiness".

"The Sun-

19

An important and highly questionable assumption,

I

would argue, underlying this charge that sociologists have
become the intellectual servants of the most powerful interests
in corporate America is the belief that the knowledge gained
from sociological research is of such strategic value that
whichever groups gain control of this knowledge will have a
tremendous advantage over other groups which may be vying for
power. The nature of sociologists'

strategic function in our

society is well-outlined by J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach
in their introduction to Radical Soci ol ogy :
...the point should not be lost that the
sociology of the postwar period was not as
irrelevant as some of its humanisticallyoriented critics have cha rge d....Sociologists
as consultants, managers, and administrators,
directly or indirectly contributed to govern
mental policy formation and implementation.
Liberal sociologists could not design weapons
systems or develop methods for the transport
ation of raw materials to American industries,
but they could advise the military on ways of
mobilizing support for its programme and
develop, in the name of economic growth and
democracy, rationalizations for the exploi
tation and pacification of the domestic poor
of the Third World. 0
More than anything else, the above passage brings to
light the fact that sociologists quite often serve as apolo
gists for the established social o r d e r .21 Functionalists,
who associate that which is functional with that which is es
tablished, would be an example of such apologists. On this view,
a social problem becomes that which deviates from accepted
social standards, when,

in reality,
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it may be those very

standards which need to be questioned.

22

In addition to sociological research providing ration
alizations for the status quo, a number of critical sociolo
gists have charged that sociological researchers have tended
to pry into the lives of powerless groups of people:
Blacks,

the poor

the working class, etc.. At the same time there has

been relatively little sociological scrutiny of the lives of
the powerful in our society. The knowledge gained from
studying the powerless is said to be of great value to the
powerful who can use this knowledge to enhance their control
over these powerless groups. In Martin Nicolaus'
tic style:

characteris

"Sociology has risen on the blood and bones of

the poor and oppressed;

it owes its prestige in this society

to its putative ability to give information and advice to the
ruling class of this society about the ways and means to keep
people down."

23

Hence, as David Horowitz notes,

"The task of

a radical sociology is to reverse this process,

to study the

structure of social oppression and to bring this knowledge,
and the power it conveys, to the powerless and exploited
Oh

majority.
The truth of such claims aside, what is particularly
significant about them is that they indicate an underlying
belief in the viability of current modes of sociological
research. Rather than question the validity of these modes
of research,

these critical sociologists are more concerned

with the question of who controls this research and of whose
interests it serves. It was to be expected , then, that
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during the 1968 American Sociological Association Convention
in Boston the "Sociology Liberation Movement", with which
some of these critical sociologists were connected, organized
a number of workshops which focused on the question:

"know-

ledge for whom?"
That sociological research has a substantial impact
on the direction of social policy and of society in general
is an assertion made with even greater force by some critics
who argue that the influence of sociological research goes
beyond mere service to the powerful. Sociological knowledge,
which represents an attempt to conceptualize and order social
phenomena,

is argued to possess such power that the mere

recognition of it has the power to influence significantly
the course of major events.

26

This line of argument, which

is particularly emphasized in the work of Robert V. Friedrichs,
amounts to nothing less than assigning the discipline of soci
ology itself a crucial place, if not the most crucial, in
effecting social change.
Friedrichs is not arguing that sociological knowledge
alters society in any direct sense; rather, what is argued is
that this knowledge acts as a kind of self-defeating prophecy.
That is to say, sociological predictions (which constitute the
bulk of this knowledge)
social behavior —

tend to have a negative influence on

people respond to such knowledge by acting

in ways opposite to that which is predicted. For example,
in commenting favorably on a study done on the social impact
of the projections made by Karl Marx and Arnold Toynbee,

Friedrichs makes the following questionable and undocumented
assertion concerning the power of Marx's projections in parti
cular:

"The very truth of much of Marx's analysis of the

nineteenth-century European and American bourgeoisie appears
to have acted in part as a self-defeating prophecy as that
bourgeoisie acceded to modifications in its power vis-a-vis
the proletariat."

27

This whole argument is based On the

incredible supposition that the bourgeoisie,

through a care

ful study of Das K a p l t a l , came to the conclusion that they
would be overthrown unless they gave in to some of the de
mands of the proletariat.
Anticipating Friedrichs' argument,
comments in an earlier article that:
of something as a scientific problem,

John R. Seeley

"The very

'recognition'

instead of some other

kind of problem, marks a shift, an implicit act of legislation
so profound as to deserve the title revolutionary...a change
that by itself threatens to shake the foundations of the
present society and to erect a new one of unforeseeable
po
characteristics— ..."
This, again, highlights the potential
ly powerful influences of sociological work on society in
general.
Significantly, however, none of these and similar
claims are ever factually substantiated,

outside of some

general observations on contemporary American society.

I

know of no revolutionary change in the structure of American
society which has been the result of the recognition of some
social problem as a scientific problem. Moreover, one is
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left to wonder just who it is who recognized the scientific
nature of these problems since the vast majority of people
rarely have occasion to peruse the reports of sociological
findings tucked away in various professional Journals and
monographs.2^
In the context of this discussion of the power of
sociological research, we find also the straightforward a s 
sertion that this research has made and can potentially make
valuable contributions to the solution of our s o c ie ty ’s prob
lems. In one of Talcott Parsons'

several attempts to spell

out what he believes to be the proper job of the sociologist,
he attributes sociological research with having made substan
tial progress toward the solution of poverty and juvenile de
linquency ,"^0 in spite of the fact that these problems are as
serious today as they were at the time that Parsons made this
comment.
The argument is also made that the reason we have
failed to solve some of these major social problems is because
leaders in government and people in general have failed to
appreciate the advances toward solving such problems that
have been made in recent and past sociological research. This
argument is typified by the following extremely positive as
sessment of the potential impact of sociology:

"Having achiev

ed a quantum advance toward solving major social problems,
sociologists, with characteristic reticence, have allowed
their accomplishments to remain u n no tic ed.

What that

"quantum advance" is is not specified In this article and In
many articles of Its kind, with the possible exception of
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Melvin Turnin's discussion of our government's failure to in
stitute racial policies based on the many significant studies
of race relations dating all the way back to Myrdal's The
American D i l e m m a , published in 19^2.
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In contrast to the above sanguine assessments of the
accomplishments of sociological research,

there have been

some critics who have argued that sociological research has
failed to come up with any findings relevant to the solution
of major social problems.
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For these critics,

the problem is

not that sociological research has gone unnoticed but that it
is largely irrelevant, which means that its findings could
confer on no group any substantial power because these find
ings are themselves flawed by having been arrived at on the
basis of an inadequate,

invalid methodology. Certainly, one

would have to look hard in M i l l s ' The Sociological Imagination
to find any positive comment on the predominant modes of soci
ological research;

indeed, in terms of the knowledge needed

to correct the major ills of our society,

these predominant

modes of research represent precisely the wrong way to go
about acquiring such knowledge for they preclude the use of
the "sociological imagination".
As was noted in the Introduction,

the thrust of Mills'

critique of contemporary sociology is directed at its method
ological and theoretical foundations and not at sociologists
themselves, as is largely the case with those critical soci
ologists who pose the question:
these critics,

"sociology for whom?". For

the moral culpability of sociologists is what
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is at issue —

it is a question of whose side are we on, the

powerful or the powerless, or in Gouldner's terms,
dogs" or the "underdogs".

the "over-

34

For those critics to adhere more closely to Mills 1
argument, however,

this is to miss the point that sociolo

gical research may be incapable of rendering an accurate pic
ture of modern society and social behavior.

I believe the fail

ure to address the question of the adequacy of the predominant
methodological approaches in contemporary sociology is a fund
amental shortcoming of the sociological critique of American
sociology —

it reflects,

in the final analysis, either the

inability or the unwillingness of most of these critical
sociologists to address the crucial philosophical Issues of
the validity of empirical sociological research.

35

The ques

tion of who controls this research, with which we opened this
section,

is minor in comparison to the question of whetheror

not predominant modes of sociological research are capable
of uncovering significant knowledge about society.

(3) The Question of the Adequacy
of Sociological Research
Within the context of the sociological critique of
American sociology there was at least one prominent attempt
to confront the issue of the adequacy of predominant modes
of sociological research. Some critics directed their attention
to what they believed to be the artificial nature of largescale survey research which utilizes a questionnaire or inter
view format,

the results of which are usually presented in
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quantitative terms. Such an approach,

it was argued,

tends

to distort the object of investigation by introducing some
foreign element into the natural flow of social life. Soci
ologists administering questionnaires or conducting inter
views inevitably have some kind of effect on those individuals
or groups they are studying, an effect which is frequently
glossed over in analyzing the results of such research.
Moreover, as Sorokin had earlier pointed out, such research
may yield answers to the question of people's attitudes and
beliefs toward their's and others' social behavior, but it
cannot give us any insight into the actual behavior of people.
What people say about their behavior and what they actually
do are all too often entirely different.
niques,

In short,

these tech

the hallmarks of so-called ’’objective" social re

search, were seen as inadequate approaches to the study of
social life.
With the rejection of the scientific,
approach,

"objective"

these critical sociologists maintain that the only

true approach is a subjective one in which sociologists a t 
tempt to study social behavior from the perspective of the
individuals and groups being studied. Drawing on Max Weber's
empathetic approach, as encompassed by his notion of ve rs t e h e n .
and on the more recent development of a phenomenological soci
ology, emphasis comes to be placed on the personal involvement
of sociologists in whatever aspect of society they happen to
be studying. It is argued that only on the basis of actual
involvement in the ongoing process of social life can sociolo
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gists come to understand it most adequately. With this in
mind, Jack Douglas claims,

"...the finest sociological studies

of groups have been done by people which at some point had
been totally involved insiders or had committed the sin of
going native (becoming
Douglas,

'too-involved')

but then re tu r n e d .

then, discusses William Foote Whyte's classic study,

Street Corner S o c i e t y , as one prominent example of this.
To some critical sociologists,

personal involvement

meant more than merely having sociologists immerse themselves
in whatever aspect of society they happen to be investigating.
Personal involvement, for them, also means actively assisting
the individuals,
study.

groups, or communities that they intend to

For example, in response to increasing difficulties

sociological researchers were having in gaining the cooper
ation of ethnic and minority groups in the inner-city,

two

researchers suggest the establishment of what they call
"research communes". These research communes would give
community residents a voice in all aspects of the research
process:

in the design phase, in carrying out the research,

and in the publication of its results. ^ Despite the potential
hazards such an approach poses to the reliability and valid
ity of such research, in gaining the fuller cooperation of
the people they are studying, these researchers argue that
such an approach will in fact enhance reliability and val
idity, as they apparently found in their study of Boston's
Chi n a t o w n .
Even more directly, another sociologist suggests that
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those interested in doing research in poor and oppressed com
munities should take a hand in attempting to alleviate the
plight of people trapped in these communities. Rather than
follow the usual procedure of a sociologist going into a
community, collecting his data, and then leaving the community
in the same state in which he found it,

"Institution Formation

Sociology proposes that sociologists initiate the organization
of new institutions and simultaneously study the institutions
that are created. These new institutions should be organized
to help meet the social needs in areas of society where no
institutions exist to solve the problems that people face and
cannot resolve by themselves ."^0 In studying the formation
of these institutions the usual questionnaire or interview
format would be dispensed with in lieu of the use of tape
recorders, movie cameras, and other such devices which can
capture

"the natural interaction of the institution as it

o c c u r s . ..4l
Throughout the rest of our exposition and critical
analysis of the sociological critique of American sociology
we will see this emphasis on the personal involvement of soci
ologists in the society which they study surface in a number
of different contexts. In general,

the virtues of personal

involvement, of focusing on the everyday lives of individuals,
of being a forthright and courageous individual oneself, are
held in high esteem by these critical sociologists. More than
one critical sociologist has equated such virtues with human
ism. For example, Alfred McClung Lee speaks of "humanist"

research methods in terms of the virtues of personal involve
ment:

"...a humanist social scientist has to have a sufficient

sense of empathy and of participation to gain understanding
through joining in the emotions and the activities of those
observed to the extent that might be possible or practical.''
On this view,
dividual,
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then, the closer sociologists get to the in

the closer they get to a valid research methodology

and to a humanist perspective.
This discussion

of the need for personal involvement,

for studying social behavior in its

natural setting, really

does nothing to improve sociological research, much less
constitute the only true humanist perspective. Advocating
increased personal Involvement of sociologists in those a s 
pects of social life they are investigating, in itself, offers
no guarantee that such research will be any more valid or
ultimately more significant than conventional modes of re
search. This is not to take anything away from their often
insightful criticisms of conventional research techniques
such as the questionnaire and the interview,

but the question

they fail to confront adequately is whether or not the de
ficiencies in these conventional techniques can be overcome
by adopting their alternative approach.
I maintain that
on a

just as the affect of a sociologist

group of people to which he is administering a question

naire or conducting interviews is largely unknown, so too,
the affect of the participant observer (the major form of
personal involvement of sociologists)
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on the groups he is

studying is largely unknown. That there is a great deal of
uncertainty concerning the question of the appropriate degree
of participation and detachment necessary to a successful
participant observation study is evident from reading these
studies themselves.
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Although we may believe, along with these critical
sociologists,

that such an approach will yield more insight

into the nature of social life, particularly into the actual
behavior of individuals and groups,

there still exists no

guarantee that this will be the case.
Even more difficult to sustain, I believe, is the
claim that through personal involvement in the everyday lives
of people sociologists can acquire knowledge of the motives
which prompt people to behave in certain ways.
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The desire

to see social reality from the point of view of those being
studied is not a realizable goal, unless,

that is, we are to

believe that sociologists can somehow enter the minds of these
people. And even if sociologists claimed to have acquired
such knowledge,

there is no way that one could be sure they

had in fact uncovered the mental processes that lie behind
social behavior.
Finally,

this emphasis on personal involvement clearly

implies an individualistic view of the nature of society —
that, as Robert Lynd commented,

individuals are seen as

"the central powerhouse of culture".
modern,

In the context of our

corporate social order such a view of society must be

seen as narrow and, ultimately, mistaken. Such an individual
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istic view of society precludes the kind of "Big-Range Soci
ology" that C. Wright Mills had in mind in writing The Soci
ological Imagination. For Elijah Jordan, as well as for Mills,
the study of the major institutions of modern society is the
starting-point for a significant sociology.
The above-mentioned shortcomings of this alternative
to the predominant modes of sociological research are indica
tive of the shallowness of the sociological critique of Am eri 
can sociology as a whole. Although these critics were willing
to address the important question of what constitutes a valid
approach to the study of society, in the context of which they
did offer some insightful criticisms of some of the convention
al techniques in contemporary sociology,

they presented an

alternative which is clearly as flawed as the approaches it
was designed to replace. This alternative,

in fact, repre

sents no fundamental departure from mainstream sociology;

in

deed, it can be derived almost entirely from the work of Max
Weber who, interestingly enough,

is revered alike by both

critical and mainstream sociologists. This
moreover,

"new" approach,

does not challenge the underlying philosophical

tradition on which sociological research has always been
based, namely,

the empiricist tradition. Finally, the indivi

dualistic, subjective view of society which this alternative
approach presupposes is extremely narrow;
account the tremendous institutional,

objective growth of

modern society which, I will argue later,
fact of modern society.
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it leaves out of

is the most crucial

(4) The Essential Weakness of the
Argument for Increased Autonomy

If the Project Camelot controversy revealed anything
to critical sociologists it was the need to guarantee that
sociologists conduct their research in an atmosphere of com
plete autonomy. In the eyes of most of these critics, the
basic defect of contemporary sociological research was that
it was increasingly becoming an instrument of the private
and public interests which supported it. Being a mere in
strument of external interests, it thus violated the cardi
nal principle of all scientific endeavor:

that scientific r e 

search must be an unfettered search for the truth. So, more
than anything else,

these critics argued that sociologists

need to be freed and need to free themselves from the corrupt
ing effects of having any external interest dictate the nature
and aim of sociological research. As Irving Louis Horowitz,
perhaps the leading advocate of increased autonomy among
these critics, simply put it:

"Social science needs autonomy,

freedom of inquiry being its most vital outcome. Any incur
sion upon autonomy in the name of Big Sociology,

or Impor

tant Sociology, or even to serve governmental operations,
would constitute a direct assault on the very basis of social
science itself.
The stress placed upon autonomy in sociological re
search is not only designed to address the problem of that
research being used to enhance the position of powerful groups
in our society, but also,

it is designed to insure that this
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research complies with the canons of all truly scientific
work. In other words,

basic to this whole line of argument

is an abiding faith in the validity of a scientific method
ology. Contrary to the criticism directed at some of the
predominant modes of sociological research which are discus
sed above, the advocacy of complete autonomy for sociological
research guarantees a place to all modes of research, however
flawed they may be.
What is at issue, then, is not the validity of these
various methodological approaches but the extent to which
the domain of sociological research as a whole is organized
along democratic, pluralistic lines. In commenting on the
proposal to establish a National Social Science Foundation
which would serve as the principal source of government fund
ing for research in the social sciences,

Irving Louis Horowitz

stresses the imporatnce of operating this foundation in a
strictly democratic fashion:

"It i s ...extremely important

that the pluralistic basis of social science research fa
cilities be strictly maintained. Care should be taken to pre
vent the multiple forms of social science research from be
ing smothered or obscured by the development of a monolithic
agency committed to a single,

limited orientation."

ii 6

To

make room for all kinds of research techniques may open the
way for some more significant approaches to the study of
society, but it will also insure the continued use of con
ventional research techniques,

the adequacy of which has been

seriously questioned by both early and contemporary critical
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sociologists.
The advocates of increased autonomy for sociological
researchers further maintain that along with increased auto 
nomy will go the adoption of a more critical stance on the
major social issues of the day. No longer having to bow to
the wishes of any particular public or private interest group,
sociological researchers would be free to design more contro
versial research projects. Although there can be no doubt
that increased autonomy would give sociologists the freedom
necessary to investigate more controversial topics,

this is

by no means an inevitable consequence of increased autonomy.
Quite the contrary,

I believe a good case can be made

that increased autonomy would have just the opposite effect,
for there does not appear to be any aspect of current empiric
al research which incorporates anything of a critical per
spective. Being basically descriptive in nature, empirical
research can, at most, help us explain existing social be
havior,

but to suggest that this can serve as a basis for

a critical approach to society is to stretch empirical re48
search beyond the limits of its applicability.
What is more,
by accepting all modes of sociological research as legitimate,
these critical sociologists sidestep the more important ques
tion of the validity of these various modes of research and
whether,

in fact, they should have a place at all in the

study of society.
Significantly,

two sociologists,

in commenting on the

code of ethics that was being drafted by the American Sociolo-
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gical Association in direct response to the Project Camelot
incident, do not agree that increased autonomy will have such
a salutory effect on the sociological profession. To the
contrary,

they believe the principal function of this code,

which emphasizes maintenance of a "value-free" image of soci
ology and protection of the members of the sociological pro
fession from any external threats to their professional auto
nomy, would be to serve as a symbolic gesture to the public
in order to allay any fears that sociology is not a legitimate
scientific discipline. So, instead of opening up the prospect
of a more critical, controversial sociology,

"...the Code

appears to be based on the role of the sociologist as
cratlc social scientist'."

49
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That is to say, the adoption of

this code of ethics would only serve to protect the image of
sociology as a scientific endeavor and obscure the fact that
the work of sociologists is largely governed by outside in50

terests.

That these sociological critics would be staunch ad 
vocates of increased autonomy for sociological researchers
is understandable in the context of their overall approach to
this question of the relationship between sociological research
and social policy. Throughout,

the focus of their criticism

has not been on the inadequacies in the predominant methodolo
gical approaches in sociological research;

rather, they have

directed their criticism at individual sociologists who have
chosen to sell their talents to the highest bidder,

so to

speak. If sociology has gone astray, according to this view,
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it is not because of problems with respect to its methodolo
gical and theoretical foundations but because sociologists
themselves have not adhered to the canons of truly scientific
work. Although greater autonomy would not necessarily
alleviate this problem,

it would help insure that this re 

search is carried out with far less outside interference.
That, in itself, would undoubtedly be a positive step, but
as I have continuously pointed out, it does not guarantee
that future sociological research will be any more significant,
more valid, or, much less, critical. Only a detailed critical
analysis of the methodological foundations of contemporary
sociological research will tell us how significant, how valid,
and how critical this research is and can be. Ultimately,
such critical analysis would take us into the more funda
mental question of the adequacy of empiricism as a theory
of knowledge.

(5) The Inflation of the Power
of Sociological Research
Even more wrong-headed,
that mainstream sociologists,

I believe,

is the argument

through their research, provide

important information to the centers of power in our society
who then use this information to enhance their control over
our society. This argument rests on the unsubstantiated
assumption that current sociological research provides ac
curate, useful information about social behavior in general
and,

in particular, about the poor and oppressed classes of

our society.
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If anything, however,
has been largely irrelevant.

I believe sociological research
It has been irrelevant because

its focus has been on peripheral aspects of society. This is
the essence of Mills' charge that "abstracted empiricism" re 
duces society to a matter of beliefs, attitudes, opinions, and
the like, leaving out of account the larger social structure.
Moreover,
al

sociologists,

the questions so frequently posed by critic
such as,

"whose side are we on?" or "sociolo

gy for whom?" must also be seen as largely irrelevant,

for

unless sociologists first straighten out some fundamental
problems with respect to the way they go about obtaining their
knowledge of society,
on.

51

it will not matter whose side they are

The argument that sociologists have wittingly or u n 

wittingly served as tools of the power elite I also find very
weak for similar reasons.
These critical sociologists imply that if sociologists
of

the "stature and courage" of an Alfred McClung Lee or an

Alvin Gouldner were to have their way that sociology would
come to stand for something significant rather than kow-tow
to the powers that b e . This theme emerges with even more
force in these critics'

treatment of the value question,

which we will take up in the next chapter. In the following
chapters I intend to present further evidence to support my
contention that the fundamental problem with contemporary
American sociology is not that it is controlled by corrupt
sociologists,

but that it is the very discipline of soci

ology that requires alteration. Ultimately, sociologists'
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contribution to social policy stands or falls on their
ability to render an accurate picture of the nature of our
modern corporate social order.

NOTES
•'■This is not to say that private sources of research funding
have not also been important for the development of American
sociology. However, in the case of government-sponsored
research there is more of a direct link with social policy,
and it is this link between sociological research and social
policy that is of primary concern to critical sociologists.
^Benjamin Chinitz, "The Management of Federal Expenditure of
Research on Social Problems" in The Use and Abuse of Social
Science, edited by Irving Louis Horowitz, p.71.
■3

^For a more detailed account of the history of Project Camelot
see: Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.), The Rise and Fall of Project
Camelot, pp.l- 6 7 .
^Herbert Blumer, "Threats From Agency-Determined Research: The
Case of Camelot" in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot,
edited by Irving Louis Horowitz,'p p .156-157.
^Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Pentagon Papers and Social Science"
in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, edited by Irving Louis
Horowitz, p.37*4.
^Marshall Sahlins, "The Established Order: Do Not Fold, Spindle,
or Mutilate" in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, edited
by Irving Louis Horowitz, p.77. See also: Irving Louis
Horowitz, Professing Sociology, p.299.
^Robert Nisbet, "Project Camelot and the Science of Man" in
The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, edited by Irving Louis
Horowitz, p.3l8.

8For example, articles by Robert Boguslaw and Jessie Bernard
in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, edited by Irving
Louis Horowitz, pp.107-127 and 128-152.
q
2h The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, Alvin Gouldner's
analysis of the origins of the conservative bias in the work
of Talcott Parsons is indicative of such criticism. Gouldner
argues that Parsons' functionalism owes much to the fact that
Parsons had a secure position at Harvard during the Great
Depression in the relatively insulated environment of Cambridge,
Massachusetts, away from the poverty and social strife that
was characteristic of this time.
•^C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, p.101.
^ D a n i e l Cohn-Bendit, et. al., "Why Sociologists?" in Radical
Sociology, edited by J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach, p.61.
As the authors clearly note: "He closed the epoch of social
philosophy and speculative systems concerning the society as
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a whole, and opened the glorious era of empiricism and of
scientific data collection. At the same time, in selling his
services to the management of an enterprise, Mayo initiated
the age of large-scale collaboration with all of the powers
of the bourgeois world — which was then hard put to ration
alize a capitalist system strongly shaken by the crisis of
1929."
12Martin Nicolaus, "The Professional Organization of Sociolo
gy: A View Prom Below" in Radical Sociology, edited by J.
David Colfax and Jack L. Roach, p. 45 .
■^And this is by no means the most extreme of Nicolaus'
charges. His "Text of a Speech Delivered at the A.S.A.
Convention, August 26, 1968 " (in The Sociology of Sociology,
edited by Larry T. and Janice M. Reynolds, pp.27^-278)
gives an even harsher assessment of the function of profession
al sociology. For example: "Sociologists stand guard in the
garrison and report to its masters on the movements of the
occupied populace. The more adventurous sociologists don the
disguise of the people and go out and mix with the peasants
in the "field" returning with books and articles that break
the protective secrecy in which a subjugated population wraps
itself, and make it more accessible to manipulation and
control." p.276 .
l2*T.R. Young, "Transforming Sociology: The Graduate Student",
The American Sociologist, 9(Aug. 74), p.135.
■^John Horton, "The Fetishism of Sociology" in Radical Soci
ology, edited by J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach, p. 171 .
^ D u s k y Lee Smith, "Sociology and the Rise of Corporate Cap
italism" in The Sociology of Sociology, edited by Larry T.
and Janice M. R e y n o l d s , p .80.
^ A l v i n Gouldner, "Romanticism and Classicism: Deep Structures
in Social Science" in For Sociology, written and edited by
Alvin Gouldner, p.335.
^ A l e x Thio, "Class Bias in the Sociology of Deviance", The
American Sociologist, 8 (Feb. 73), p.9.
19Dusky Lee Smith, "The Sunshine Boys: Toward a Sociology of
Happiness" in The Sociology of Sociology, edited by Larry T.
and Janice M. Reynolds, pp.371-387i
^ J . David Colfax and Jack L. Roach, "Introduction: The Roots
of Radical Sociology" in Radical Sociology, edited by J. David
Colfax and Jack L. Roach, p. 6 .
2 1 As Alvin Gouldner comments in this regard:

"It has become
the essential role of the sociologist-as-liberal-technologue
to foster the optimistic image of American society as a
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system whose major problems are deemed altogether solvable
within the existing master institutions if only enough
technical skills and financial resources are appropriated."
The Coming Crisis of Western Sociol og y, p.501.

22This argument is perhaps brought out most clearly by soci
ologists such as Alex Thio who question the traditional ap
proaches to deviance (and criminology). They suggest that
the customs and laws of a society may themselves be con
sidered deviant rather than the people who violate them —
the larger implication being that it is society which is
wrong and not those individuals who deviate from society. See:
Alex Thio, "Class Bias in the Sociology of Deviance", The
American Sociologist, 8 (Feb. 73), pp.1-11. In criminology
this point of view is forcefully expressed by Richard Quinney,
Critique of the Legal Order, 1974.
^ M a r t i n Nicolaus, "Text of a Speech Delivered at the A.S.A.
Convention, August 26, 1968 " in The Sociology of Sociology,
edited by Larry T. and Janice M. Reynolds, p.27b. Also see:
Charles H. Anderson and Jeffrey Royle Gibson, Toward a New
Sociology, p.16.
o 2i

David Horowitz, "Preface" in Radical Sociology: An Intro
duction , edited by David Horowitz, p.5.

25j. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach, "Introduction: The Roots
of Radical Sociology" in Radical Sociology, edited by J. David
Colfax and Jack L. Roach, p.9. It is significant also that a
major figure in the sociological critique of American soci
ology, Alfred McClung Lee, would write a book entitled
Sociology For Whom?
c:oThis, however, is to underestimate the power of sociology in
the eyes of Alvin Gouldner, for "...one implicit task of
sociology in the modern world is not simply to study society
but to conceptualize and order it: that is, to conceptually
constitute social objects and to map their relationships with
one another...."
"In short, much of sociology -- from the elementary text
book to the work of Talcott Parsons — is engaged in consti
tuting social worlds, rather than simply in researching them."
The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, p.84.
^^Robert W. Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology, p. 188 .
pQ
John R. Seeley, "Social Science: Some Probative Problems"
in Sociology on Tri al , edited by Maurice Stein and Arthur
Vidich, p.57.

2 9 m general, I believe the truth is more adequately served
with regard to this whole line of argument when Dennis Wrong
comments, "Neither I, nor any sociologist, nor all sociologists
together, have that much influence or power, though we have

some."
"On Thinking About the Future", The American Sociolo
g i s t , 9(Feb. 7*0 , PP. 29-30.

^ Ta l c o t t Parsons, "The Editor's Column", The American Soci
ologist, 2 (May 67 ), p. 63 .
^ L e o n a r d Reissman, "The Solution Cycle of Social Problems",
The American Sociologist, 7(feb. 72), p.7. Even more
sanguine is the following assessment of the potential of
sociology by Jack Douglas: "The complexity of social problems
in a technological and urbanized world makes the effective
application of sociological knowledge to our social problems
the crucial determinant of our society1s future." Preface in
The Relevance of Sociology, edited by Jack Douglas, p.vii.
^^Melvin Tumin, "Some Social Consequences of Research on Race
Relations", The American Sociologist, 3(May 68), p.117.
33as Peter Park points out: "...it is indeed doubtful that
sociologists have begun to solve the problems that have
received their intense attention: crime, racial strife,
juvenile delinquency, mental disorder, alcoholism, drug addic
tion, rebellions at home and abroad, alienation, and anomie."
"The Cretan Dictum: A Functional Analysis of Sociology", The
American Sociologist, 2(Aug. 67 ), p.155.
^Gouldner's terminology is to be found in his article,
"The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State"
in The Sociology of Sociology, edited by Larry T. and Janice
M. Seynolds, p7240. In that article he critically analyzes
Howard Becker's essay entitled, logically enough, "Whose
Side Are We On?", which appears next to Gouldner's article
in the same anthology (pp.204-217).
^^The collection of essays entitled A Critique of Empiricism
in Sociology, edited by Kewal Motwani, does deal with the
question of the adequacy of an empirical methodology. Signifi
cantly, however, these essays were, for the most part, written
prior to the development of this critical movement by such
prominent sociologists as Robert Maclver and Pitirim Sorokin.
3^Jack Douglas goes as far as to make the following charge
with respect to the effect of scientific social research:
"In one sense, of course, scientific analysis of our every
day, concrete experience is detrimental to that experience:
it destroys that experience or transforms it into something
different."
"The Relevance of Sociology" in The Relevance
of Sociology, edited by Jack Douglas, p. 187 .
37lbld., p. 198 .
qQ
This, of course, is not all that different from radical
sociologists arguing for the necessity of all sociologists
getting involved in various social movements aimed at over- 86 -

throwing the established social order.

■^Richard M. Hessler and Peter Kong-ming New, "Research as a
Process of Exchange", The American Sociologist, 7(Feb. 72),
pp.13-14.
^°Henry Etzkowitz, "Institution Formation Sociology", The
American Sociologist, 5(May 70), p.120.
^ Ib:Ld., p.120. Etzkowitz, however, overlooks entirely the
problem of how these mechanical devices will be able to cap
ture this "natural" interaction without either being used
covertly or having some effect on this interaction.
4P

,

Alfred McClung Lee, Sociology For Wh o m ? , p.63.

43
-Wore often than not, the question of the appropriate degree
of participation and detachment is left to the judgement of
the Individual researcher. And even when there is some attempt
to spell out some standard or model in this regard it is
often just as vague as Hortense Powdermaker's description of
how she gained insight into the religious life of Southern
Blacks by participating in their church services. She says,
"It was one way of having an important part of Negro life
seep into "my bones",..." (my emphasis), Stranger and Friend;
The Way of an Anthropologist, pp.172-173.
^Ind e ed , as we will see, Jordan calls into question the sig
nificance of such knowledge. Ultimately, he argues that know
ledge of the motives of individuals is not important to a
sound understanding of social life.
4S
^Irving Louis Horowitz, "Social Indicators and Social Policy"
in Professing Sociology, edited by Irving Louis Horowitz,
p. 333“
Ixfi
HOIrving Louis Horowitz, "International Social Science Research
The Case for a National Social Science Foundation" in Profess
ing Sociology, edited by Irving Louis Horowitz, p.252.

^?And, Indeed, as some sociological critics have pointed out,
empirical research does a rather poor job even in its purely
descriptive function -- a point for which we have already seen
ample evidence in the work of such earlier critics as Sorokin
and Mills.
jiQ

In One-Dimensional Man (p.ll4), Herbert Marcuse argues that,
rather than being critical, sociology's empirical methodology
is inherently conservative in the sense that it cannot trans
cend the established social order and see that order as but a
passing stage in world history.
49

Dean S. Dorn and Gary L. Long, "Brief Remarks on the Associ
ations' Code of Ethics", The American Sociologist. 9(Peb. 74),
p.34.
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5^In this context, one sociologist has suggested that the
salvation of sociology lies in its becoming more profession
al in the sense of directing its attention more toward clients
and less toward colleagues. Although behind this proposal is
the well-intentioned desire to make sociology more accessible
to non-sociologists, there is nothing in it to guarantee that
the beneficiaries will be the people rather than certain
powerful interests in our society, as some critics have charged.
Nelson Foote, "Putting Sociologists to Work", The American
Sociologist, 9(Aug. 7^), p.13^.
^ T h i s is why I would tend to agree with Melvin Tumin who,
in his article, "In Dispraise of Loyalty" in The Relevance
of Sociology, edited by Jack Douglas, criticizes all attempts
to make sociology into a partisan tool of any group however
powerful or powerless that group may be. The only loyalty of
sociologists should be to the pursuit of truth. Yet, I would
argue, this is precisely what contemporary sociological re
search seems incapable of doing, for it is by and large res
tricted to a very limited portion of reality , namely,
summary descriptions of people's attitudes and opinions
about their own and others' behavior in society.

- 88 -

CHAPTER III
"LET'S BE HONEST": THE VALUE QUESTION
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY
(l) Max Weber's "Science as a Vocation" as
the Key to the Debate Concerning the
Value Question in Contemporary Sociology
At the center of critical sociologists' analysis of
contemporary American sociology is the claim that sociology
is a science. In the previous chapter, critical sociologists
discussed the need for greater autonomy in sociological
research -- autonomy, or that freedom to pursue the truth
wherever it may lead, being an essential condition for scien
tific work. A related and even more widely discussed facet
of sociology's claim to scientific status is the principle of
value neutrality. A scientific study of society is said to
be distinguished from other approaches, such as a philosophic
al one, in that its methodology is based on empirical obser
vation ’
which does not and cannot Include any element of eval
uation .
The Job of the scientist is to describe, explain,
classify phenomena dispassionately; to allow any preconceptions
or prejudices to influence any aspect of one's work is to
diverge from this scientific ideal. Indeed, the eradication
of all preconceptions and prejudices was seen by Emile
Durkheim, a major figure in the early development of sociology, as basic to this new discipline, which he argued was
distinctive precisely because It was a scientific study of
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society.1
Another major figure in the early development of soci
ology, Max Weber, was no less insistent that, as scientists,
sociologists must be value neutral. As he noted in his famous
essay "Science as a Vocation", the historical and cultural
sciences may help us "...to understand and interpret political,
artistic, literary, and social phenomena in terms of their
origin [i.e., explain them^ ...But they give us no answer to
the question, whether the existence of these cultural phenop

mena have been and are worth whi l e.

Nor, in Weber's view,

should social scientists take it upon themselves to attempt
to provide the answer to that question during the course of
their work.
If Durkheira and Weber can be cited favorably by de
fenders of value-neutral, scientific sociology, these two
important figures in the history of sociology can also be,
and have been on numerous occasions, cited favorably by cri
tics of value-neutral sociology. In contrast to sociologists
today who blindly follow the injunction against making value
judgments, D.J. Gray, in his hard-hitting article,

"Value-Free

Sociology: A Doctrine of Hypocrisy and Irresponsibility", notes
that although Durkheim and Weber conducted their research as
objectively as possible, neither of them refrained "...from
offering their most reasoned judgments."3 Among the two,
Weber is clearly the more central figure in this debate for
both mainstream and critical sociologists. Indeed, one can
trace the arguments of both sides in this debate back to that
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single essay of Weber's,

"Science as a Vocation".

In "Science as a Vocation" Weber stipulates what he
believes are the basic preconditions that must be met for
any study to qualify as scientific. Among these precondi
tions is the principle that the realm of fact and the realm
of value constitute two entirely separate and distinct realms.
The scientist's proper work is in the realm of fact —

Inves

tigating the causes of natural or social phenomena, develop
ingclassificatory schemes to organize this
the

knowledge,

like. This work, to be scientific, must be

and

carried on

without any admixture of values such as racial prejudices,
political biases, or religious beliefs.
Although the work of scientists may be

used by poli

ticians to achieve certain ends, it is not the Job of the
scientist to say what those ends should be. This pertains
with special force to the scientist who Is also a teacher.
The classroom Is not the place for a teacher to express his
4
political views, however well-reasoned they may be.
In
Weber's words:
One can only demand of the teacher that he
have the intellectual integrity to see that
it is one thing to state facts, to determine
mathematical or logical relations or the
Internal structure of cultural values, while
it is another thing to answer questions of
the value of culture and its individual
contents and the question of how one should
act in the cultural community and in poli
tical associations. These are quite hetero
geneous problems. If he asks further why
he should not deal with both types of
problems in the lecture-room, the answer is:
because the prophet and the demagogue do not
belong on the academic platform.5
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Value judgments have no place in either scientific work or
in classroom lectures precisely because value judgments, in
the eyes of Weber and those who adhere to his position, are
essentially nothing more than a reflection of personal op
inion. The validity of personal opinion, being entirely rela
tive, is thus not scientifically demonstrable.

"Scientific

pleading is meaningless in principle because the various value
spheres of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with
g
each other."
Defenders of the ideal of a value-neutral sociology
have appealed to the above interpretation of Weber's stance
on this issue. Talcott Parsons, in one of his many commen
taries on the sociological profession which appeared in The
American Sociologist during his editorship (1965-1967), cites
Weber in the following context:
The basic valuatlonal position of the soci
ological profession is that classically
formulated by Max Weber as 'value-neutrality',
which is not to be interpreted as neutrality
toward all values, but lending clear primacy
to the values of the intellectual enterprise
as such and refusal to let it be dominated
by other values, notably those, on the one
hand, of immediate practical interests, on
the other hand, those of a particular 'world
view' at religious or political levels .7
Philip Hauser, a former President of the American
Sociological Association, adopts a similar argument in criti
cizing members of the "Sociology Liberation Movement" who,
during the late 1960 's and early 1970 's insisted that the
A.S.A. take a stand against the Vietnam War. In criticizing
this "actionist" orientation, Hauser set down six premises

- 92 -

which, taken together, constitute what he calls the "Weberian
Q
model". These premises clearly emphasize that sociology, as
a scientific endeavor, should have nothing to do with value
judgments. Value judgments, being expressions of personal be
liefs and convictions, are perfectly appropriate insofar as
one is a religious person, a citizen, a politician, and indeed,
just a human being, but in scientific endeavors of any kind
they have no place. For the sociological profession to take
a stand on the Vietnam War would only serve to undermine its
hard-won scientific status.
There is, however, another side to Weber's argument,
brought out most influentially in Alvin Gouldner's essay
"Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology", which is
the basic reference-point for critical sociologists ' attack
on value-neutral sociology. Gouldner argues that what most
contemporary sociologists refer to as the "Weberian model",
in fact, represents a one-sided interpretation of Weber's
stand on this issue. Contemporary sociologists tend to gloss
over those aspects of Weber's argument in which he does ac
knowledge the importance of taking a definite value position
in the sociologist's capacity as citizen or member of a poli
tical party, although maintaining that his professional work
must be considered separately from this. Thus, the same Weber
who denounces the practiceof making political speeches in
the classroom, asserts:

"When speaking in a political meeting

about democracy, one does not hide one's personal standpoint;
Indeed, to come out clearly and take a stand is one's damned

d u t y .

As Gouldner goes on to argue In this regard, then, to

adopt Weber's argument for value neutrality by no means en
tails the disavowal of any and all value judgments, for soci
ologists are also citizens, also human beings, and as citizens
and as human beings they will form opinions and adopt certain
value orientations. So, as Gouldner asserts, it is a mistake
to interpret Weber's doctrine of value neutrality as simple
indifference to all values, as many contemporary sociologists
appear to have d o n e . ^
Where Gouldner and other critics of the doctrine of
value neutrality disagree with Weber is in his belief that
social scientists can successfully isolate their scientific
work from the other activities of life which inevitably in
volve values. For Gouldner, it is not possible for a soci
ologist to cut himself off from his connections with family,
country, and indeed, his very humanity. That is to say, every
one carries with himself a certain value orientation which,
in the sociologist's case, will inevitably have some effect
on his work as a sociologist, whether this effect manifests
Itself in the selection of research topics, the way the re
search is carried out, or the statement of the results.
A value-free sociology is thus seen as a myth, a myth
which only serves to hide the fact that all aspects of the
work of sociologists are tinged with implicit and explicit
value commitments.
Given the broad definition of values (i.e., any
personal opinion, belief, conviction, etc.) which underlies
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the critics' view here, one would be hard-pressed to dispute
their claim that values enter into all of our life activities.
If this be the case, then there appears to be only one viable
alternative to continuing the charade that the work of soci
ologists is value-free. This alternative, stated by Gouldner
in specific reference to Weber's argument, clearly sets forth
the predominant position among critical sociologists general
ly:
If sociologists ought not to express their
personal values in the academic setting,
how then are students to be safeguarded
against the unwitting influence of these
values which shape the sociologist's selection
of problems, his preferences for certain
hypotheses or conceptual schemes and his
neglect of others. For these are unavoidable
and, in this sense, there is and can be no
value-free sociology. The only choice is
between an expression of one's values, as
open and honest as it can be,...and a vain
ritual of moral neutrality.il
By declaring his values openly, the sociologist can retain
some degree of objectivity, whereas, those sociologists who
hold on to the myth that their work is value-neutral must
surrender any claim to objectivity.
Overriding this apparent disagreement between Gouldner
and Weber is, I believe, a basic agreement on the value of
objective, scientific research In sociology. Both the de
fenders of the doctrine of value-neutrality, such as Weber
and Parsons, and those who espouse what I will call the "let's
be honest" position, formulated by Gouldner and other contem
porary critical sociologists, concur in the belief in the
efficacy of an objective, scientific approach to the study of
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social phenomena. However, whereas mainstream sociologists
merely enjoin their fellow sociologists to be dispassionate
in their research and teaching, critical sociologists see
such an injunction as futile, maintaining that the only al
ternative is for sociologists to declare openly their values
and by doing so significantly neutralize the potential bias
ing effects of these values on their research and in their
teaching.
This concurrence of views goes beyond the overriding
belief in the efficacy of an objective, scientific approach
to the study of society. Underlying both sides of this de
bate is the notion that values are synonymous with personal,
subjective beliefs, opinions, convictions, etc.. As such,
values are relative —

they are the exclusive property of

each individual and their applicability cannot extend beyond
the individual. Put otherwise, critical and mainstream soci
ologists alike subscribe to the notion that the realm of fact
and the realm of value are entirely separate and distinct.
The validity of any value Judgment, thus, cannot be demon
strated scientifically. The most sociologists can do, as
critical sociologists argue so forcefully, is to acknowledge
those values that influence their research and teaching with
the hope that that part of their work which represents factu
al contributions to our understanding of modern society can
be salvaged from that part which merely reflects the personal
12
views of any particular sociologist.
The above discussion of Weber's "Science as a Vocation"
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and the interpretation of that work by mainstream and critical
sociologists provides the essential frame of reference for
the entire debate concerning the value question in contempo
rary sociology. Most significantly, there appears to be an
underlying area of agreement on some crucial points in this
debate. For the most part, those who criticize value-neutral
sociology do not call into question the validity of an ob
jective, scientific approach to the study of society. More
over, value judgments are viewed as representing no more than
the expression of personal biases; hence, value judgments are
relative —

their validity cannot be demonstrated scientific

ally.
I believe the existence of such a wide area of agree
ment among critical and mainstream sociologists on this fun
damental issue is indicative of the shallowness of this critic
al movement as a whole. As I hope to point out further in
the rest of this chapter, the criticism of value-neutral
sociology goes no further than the injunction to "be honest"
and declare one's values. There is no questioning of soci
ology's status as a scientific discipline, nor is there any
significant attempt to discuss the basic philosophical issues
that are obviously involved here -- most directly, the concept
of value and the validity of a relativistic theory of value.
On both these points I hope to shed some light by presenting
an alternative, objective conception of value that could point
the way toward a more significant sociology, which is, after
all, the basic goal of the sociological critique of American
sociology.
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(2) Origin and Nature of the Criticism
of the Doctrine of Value Neutrality
The place of values in sociology has been a question
that has given rise to considerable debate and discussion
throughout the history of sociology. One can find a clear
statement of the doctrine of value neutrality in one of the
1 *3

early essays of Auguste Comte, J not to mention the later
discussions of this issue contained in the work of Durkheim
and Weber which have already been touched upon. In early
American sociology this doctrine of value neutrality was
largely dropped in favor of an emphasis on social reform as
an important practical aim of sociology. Although one con
temporary critic has argued that "the founding fathers of
American sociology were ideological protagnoists for corpor14
ate capitalism",
one cannot deny their clear commitment to
social reform. But American sociologists' desire to gain
respect and recognition as a scientific discipline and pro
fession required that they drop this social reform emphasis
and develop more along value-neutral l i n e s . ^
In spite of the steady drift toward a strictly scien
tific, value-neutral approach to the study of social phenome
na, some prominent American sociologists have challenged this
trend. They argued forcefully for the adoption of certain
value orientations in the work of sociologists. Among these
are included the two most influential forerunners of the
sociological critique of American sociology, Robert S. Lynd
and C. Wright Mills, whose work we have already discussed.
However, as important as their discussion of this issue is,

it cannot begin to compare in volume and intensity with the
criticism of the doctrine of value neutrality produced in
the I960 's and 1970's by critical sociologists.
What sparked this outpouring of criticism at this
time is not easy to delineate in specific terms, but I believe
it is possible to link the resurgence of this issue with two
general conditions.
First, one could reasonably argue that during the
1950's a strictly scientific, value-neutral approach to the
study of society reached its fullest development. Pitirim
Sorokin's Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology (1956) amply
documents (albeit in a critical vein) social scientists' emu
lation of the work of scientists in other fields. Given this
increasing scientific emphasis in sociology, I believe it was
to be expected that a reaction would set in against this
trend —

a reaction which was helped along considerably both

by Mills' and Sorokin's criticism of this trend and by the
tradition of social reform which had been a strong element in
the early development of sociology in America.
Second, and more importantly I believe, the doctrine
of value neutrality became a central target for critical soci
ologists because the events and mood of the country at this
time demanded it. The civil rights and anti-war movements,
in particular, called into question some basic social policies
of our country, policies which sociologists, among other
academics, had become associated with. Since the scientific,
value-neutral approach precluded any kind of critical analysis
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of these social policies, several sociologists perceived the
need to break with such an approach. The time had come for
sociologists to take a stand on these pressing social issues
and this required a reassessment of the doctrine of value
neutrality.
Among the first and most important discoveries made
by sociologists who began reassessing the doctrine of value
neutrality was that it was, in fact, a myth. So-called "value
neutral" sociological research and theory were discovered to
contain numerous implicit value presuppositions. All facets
of the work of sociologists, from the initial choice of topic
to be investigated to the theories which these investigations
provided evidence for, were found to have been influenced by
the value orientations of the sociologists involved.
as Howard

Hence,

Becker clearly notes in the following passage,

is nolonger a question of having

it

values or not having values

This dilemma, which seems so painful to so
many, actually does not exist, for one of
its horns is imaginary. For it to exist,
one would have to assume, as some apparently
do, that it is indeed possible to do research
that is uneontaminated by personal and
political sympathies. I propose to argue
that it is not possible and, therefore, that
the question is not whether we should take
sides, since we inevitably will, but rather
whose side are we on. 17
For example, choosing to focus one's research on members of
an oppressed minority group rather than investigate the insti
tutional policies which may have helped create and perpetuate
the oppression of this minority group reflects a value
preference on the part of the researcher: that the plight
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of this minority group is better understood by focusing on
members of it rather than on the larger circumstances with
in which it exists.
So, those who claim that their work is value-free do
not, in fact, escape "taking sides", as Becker puts it. This
point is further emphasized in D.J. Gray's provocative ar
ticle,

"Value-Free Sociology: A Doctrine of Hypocrisy and

Irresponsibility". At one point Gray comments that:
...while sociologists may congratulate
themselves on their newly attained
"scientific" status, the fact is that
as opposed to being truly value-free,
rather, they have become but professional
handmaidens of the going value system.
In effect, by refusing to make value
Judgments themselves, they have tacitly
accepted the values of others. No longer
truly intellectuals, they have assumed
a new role as employees, consultants, or
technicians serving the present establish
ment which, on the matter of values, is by
no means shy.l8
In the view of critical sociologists, then, value-neutral
sociology is not only a myth, but it also serves to conceal
mainstream sociologists' basic commitment to maintaining the
status quo.
The implicit conservatism of value-neutral sociology
is no more clearly evident than in Talcott Parsons' structuralfunctionalism, certainly the dominant theoretical perspective
in American sociology during the 1950's and the early i96 0 's.
The conservatism of Parsons' framework is a principal theme
in one of the most important and most influential books to
come out of this critical movement, Alvin Gouldner's The
Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. A good portion of the

- 101 -

book is devoted to a discussion of Parsons' personal back
ground as it relates to the development of his structuralfunctionalist framework. Gouldner takes note of Parsons' re
latively tranquil life in Cambridge, Massachusetts, isolated
from the real horrors of the Great Depression, in addition to
the fact that he had a secure position at Harvard during these
turbulent times, as two aspects of his personal background
which, in part, explain both his implicit and explicit defense
of American capitalism. Although the existence of this link
between Parsons1 personal background and his contributions to
sociological theory is really never proven by Gouldner, there
can be no doubt about the inherent conservatism of the function
alist perspective itself.
The nature of this conservatism is well-captured by
Gouldner in attempting to account for the emphasis in func
tionalism on the adoption of a common morality rather than
any kind of fundamental socioeconomic change as the key to
future social stability. What this amounts to, according to
Gouldner, is a commitment "...to the present society, with
all its dilemmas, contradictions, tensions, and, indeed, with
all its immorality....It [functionalism] is committed to
making things work despite wars, inequities, scarcity, and
degrading work, rather than trying to find a way out."1^
That which is already established being associated with that
which is functional, anything which challenges the existing
social order, thus comes to be looked upon as deviant.
essence:

?n

"Functionalists,...constitute the sociological
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conservation corps of industrial society."

21

—

and this is

true in spite of all the claims to value neutrality.
Value neutrality is not only considered the hallmark
of scientific sociology but it is also considered essential
to professional sociology, as reflected in the American Soci
ological Association's Code of Ethics. As a basic component
of this code, this doctrine of value neutrality again reveals
its conservative implications. Some sociologists charged that
the A.S.A. 's move to adopt a code of ethics almost immediately
following the Project Camelot scandal was a calculated move
designed to allay the public's fear that sociologists were
in fact social advocates rather than value-neutral, scientific
researchers they professed themselves to be. What this amount
ed to is explained by Gouldner in the following terms:

"What

seems more likely is that it [the adoption of a value-free
position^] entails something in the way of a tacit bargain:
in return for a measure of autonomy and social support,
many social scientists have surrendered their critical im
pulses .1,22
In surrendering their critical impulses, valueneutral sociologists have clearly allied themselves with the
established social order, for "...the man who attempts to
stay 'above or beside' the battle by not taking sides on
social issues, actually, by the consequence of such 'non
choice' becomes an ally of the existing power structure —
and has, thus, taken sides after all."

23

In attempting to locate the source of this inherent
conservatism, few critical sociologists have focused on the
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nature of empirical sociology itself; rather, they have, for
the most part, sought an explanation for this inherent con
servatism in the personal backgrounds of individual sociolo
gists. In one form or another, the argument has been that
mainstream sociologists and their professional association
have been primarily concerned with their own survival. Thus,
Gouldner suggests that the conservatism built into Parsons'
theoretical framework derives from his desire to see a capi
talist social order preserved, which had provided him with a
secure existence even during the Depression. In a similar
vein, the motive behind the American Sociological Association's
adoption of a code of ethics is argued to be mainstream soci
ologists' concern with guaranteeing continued public support
for their research efforts. Significantly, no attempt is made
to prove these charges; they are usually presented as possible
explanations and left at that.
Although C. Wright Mills had argued that this conserva
tive orientation in mainstream sociology is rooted in the very
nature of empirical sociology (in its bureaucratic ethos),
this line of argument was largely dropped by later critical
sociologists. The reason it was dropped, I believe, derives
from a general reluctance of these critical sociologists to
discuss philosophical questions of any kind. Clearly, an
examination of the nature of empirical sociology and its in
herent value implications would encompass a discussion of
some basic epistemological and ethical issues. This reluctance,
which will be noted time and again in the chapters to follow,
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constitutes what I contend is one of the basic shortcomings
of this critical movement as a whole.
Members of the Frankfurt School, who have commented
extensively on the epistemological and ethical implications
of the predominant empirical-positivistic mode of thought in
contemporary social science, clearly perceived the connection
between empirical sociology and a conservative value position.
In its emphasis on collecting data on people's attitudes and
opinions, empirical sociological research can do no more than
reflect the established order (or, better, reflect the propa
ganda about the established social order). These attitudes
and opinions are said to constitute the empirically real; any
attempt to uncover the true nature or basis of the established
social order is considered futile. As Max Horkheimer puts it,
"The so-called facts ascertained by quantitative methods, which
the positivists are inclined to regard as the only scientific
ones, are often surface phenomenon that obscure rather than
oh
disclose the underlying reality."
Thus, the ideological
conservatism of sociology's empirical methodology is disclosed,
for insofar as this methodology goes no further than a de
scriptive analysis of the status quo, it cannot come to tran
scend that status quo and come to see it as it truly is —

as

Just another phase in the historical development of a society.

25

Put otherwise, empirical sociology can provide no base for a
critical analysis of the established social order. So, in
the view of these members of the Frankfurt School, the absence
of any kind of critical analysis in mainstream sociology (hence,
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its inherent conservatism) derives primarily from its founda
tion in empiricism and not from the personal backgrounds of
individual sociologists.
Among the few instances in which critical sociologists
do acknowledge that empirical sociology does entail a certain
value orientation is an argument put forth by Robert W.
Friedrichs. As does nearly every other critical sociologist,
Friedrichs exposes the doctrine of value neutrality as a myth,
arguing that all sociological work has value implications.
Taking a different tact, however, Friedrichs goes on to argue
that the specific nature of this value orientation is an out
growth of mainstream sociology's empirical methodology. In
stark contrast to the argument that this value orientation is
basically conservative, Friedrichs asserts that it is in fact
revolutionary. He maintains that the very discovery of stable
sequences of behavior (i.e.,

"social lav/s") in sociological

research influences the social behavior which these "laws"
describe (for example, that Marx's discovery of the relation
ship between labor and capital influenced the bourgeoisie in
the twentieth century to modify their control of the proletariat

26

). In this vein, Friedrichs comments:
Though the great mass of Western sociologists
remain completely unaware of the fact, the
person who enters upon social research is
committing himself to the dialect of change,
to frustrating the continuity of the rhythms
that course through social existence, to
freeing the future from the past. What he
has been viewing as a neutral delineation
of things as they are appears instead to
involve our implicit commitment to change
per s e . 27

Friedrich's argument rests upon two highly question-

able assumptions:

(l) that empirical research can indeed un

cover basic continuities in social life, and (2) that the
results of such research have a profound effect on future
social behavior.
As Sorokin, Mills, and others have argued, a basic
problem with empirical research is its tendency to consider
only relatively trivial aspects of society; as such, it can
give us no insight into basic continuities in social life as
Friedrichs contends. Even more questionable is the assumption
that the results of such research have a significant impact
on subsequent social behavior. If anything, the work of socipQ

ologists has largely been ignored by the general public,
with a couple of possible exceptions being David Riesman's
work in social psychology and C. Wright Mills' discussion of
the power elite.
In short, although Friedrichs does focus on the nature
of empirical sociology and its connection with a certain value
orientation, his argument rests on a couple of assumptions
which, as was pointed out in the previous paragraph, are of
doubtful validity. Indeed, these assumptions underscore
Friedrichs' underlying commitment to empirical sociology.
In contrast, we have seen that Adorno, Korkheimer, and Marcuse,
three prominent members of the Frankfurt School, are prepared
to reject mainstream sociology's empirical methodology be
cause they argue that such an approach cannot uncover the
true nature of modern society.
In general, critical sociologists' treatment of the
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value question In contemporary sociology betrays their un 
wavering commitment to sociology's empiricist foundations and,
in particular, to Max Weber's view of the place of values in
sociology. Along with Weber, underlying the criticism of the
doctrine of value neutrality is the implicit conviction that,
in an ideal sense, values have no legitimate place in any
phase of a sociologist's work. However, given the fact that
sociologists are human beings as well as scientists, their
work cannot help but reflect to some degree their personal
beliefs, biases, convictions, etc. (i.e., their values). That
values, and the wrong kind of values at that, have influenced
the work of sociologists is thus seen as a matter for which
sociologists themselves must take personal responsibility.
As one critical sociologist puts it:

"...If a sociologist

practices rhetoric (preaching a biased truth), but identifies
himself (to self and/or others) as a scientist (the carrier
of unbiased "truth"), he renders his rhetoric immoral, the
immoral rhetoric of identity deception.
From this view, then, the problem sociologists con
front is not one that derives from the philosophical found
ations of their discipline; rather, it is a problem which
must be dealt with personally by each sociologist. The only
way to neutralize to some extent the unavoidable effect of
values on a sociologist's work is for that sociologist to
acknowledge them openly —
sociologists:

hence, the basic injunction to all

"let's be honest".
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(3) The Basic Solution to the Problem
of Values in Sociological Work:
"Let's Be Honest"
As we have seen, critical sociologists argue that
value-neutral sociology is a myth, an illusion, which more
often than not conceals an implicit conservative bias. In
one way or another, then, values enter into all aspects of
sociological work. So, rather than falsely deny their exist
ence, sociologists must somehow deal with the question of
how these values influence sociological research and theory.
In this regard, critical sociologists have overwhelmingly re
commended one basic solution to this problem, a solution which
leaves the fundamental tenets of empirical sociology intact.
This solution, as I have already indicated, can most aptly
be characterized by the injunction:

"let's be honest".

Enjoining one's fellow sociologists to be honest about
their values is not unique to the sociological critique of
American sociology. Earlier statements of this position by
Robert S. L y n d ^ a n d C. Wright Mills capture all of the
essential aspects of its later use. For example, as Mills
notes:
There is no way in which any social scientist
can avoid assuming choices of value and
implying them in his work as a whole....In
creasingly, research is used, and social
scientists are used, for bureaucratic and
ideological purposes. This being so, as
individuals and as professionals, students
of man and society face such questions as:
whether they are aware of these uses and values
of their work, whether these may be subject to
their own control, whether they want to seek
control of them. How they answer these
questions, or fail to answer them, and how
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they use or fail to use the answers in their
work and in their professional lives determine
their answer to the question: whether in their
work as social scientists they are (a) morally
autonomous, (b) subject to the morality of
other men, or (c) morally adrift. 31
Clearly, for Mills, as for later critical sociologists, moral
autonomy is preferable to the other two alternatives —

the

other two alternatives being those which apply to those soci
ologists who hold on to the myth that their work is valueneutral. As both Mills and later critical sociologists argue,
the work of mainstream sociologists is, in reality, either
ideologically aligned with or a tool of the established social
order. To be morally autonomous, on the other hand, requires
that sociologists take definite positions (whatever they may
be) on the kinds of questions that Mills poses above.
Although the above passage from Mills contains the
basic elements to be found in later expressions of the "let's
be honest" position, I believe these later expressions have
a significantly different emphasis. Whereas Mills' remarks
are directed at the sociological profession as a whole, cri
tical sociologists focus more on the integrity of individual
sociologists.
Among critical sociologists, Alvin Gouldner has been
one of the staunchest advocates of the "let's be honest" posi
tion. In his 1962 essay,

"Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-

Free Sociology", Gouldner comments on Max Weber's strong op
position to teachers expressing their political opinions
(i.e., value preferences) in the classroom:
If sociologists ought not to express their
personal values in the academic setting,
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how then are students to be safeguarded
against the unwitting influence of these
values which shape the sociologist's
selection of problems, his preferences
for certain hypotheses or conceptual
schemes, and his neglect of others.
For these are unavoidable and, in this
sense, there is and can be no value-free
sociology. The only choice is between
an expression of one's values, as open
and honest as it can be,...and a vain
ritual of moral neutrality. 32
In these terms, a sociologist has only two options open to
him: either being forthright in declaring what his values or
biases are or being wittingly or unwittingly hypocritical and
cling to the myth of value neutrality.
In the work of Gouldner and other critical sociologists
these two options, honesty or hypocrisy, are linked with other
personal characteristics such as courage, passion, and coward
ice. Those sociologists who are unwilling to acknowledge that
their work is influenced by value considerations in any way -those who hide behind the myth of value neutrality —

are ac

cused of being cowards. These are the same sociologists who shy
away from becoming personally involved in any controversial
social issue. As one critical sociologist argues,

"Although

greed and sloth may account for a significant number of those
who choose to remain on what they think is dead center, I am
personally convinced that cowardice is the most important
single explanation."
Those sociologists who are willing to reflect upon
their work and openly acknowledge those values that have
influenced their work are deemed courageous. As Gouldner
observes,

"The pursuit of awareness,...remains rooted in
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the most ancient of virtues. The quality of a social sci
entist's work remains dependent on the quality of his man
hood. "34
Not only is courage said to be involved in the very
pursuit of awareness (or "Reflexive Sociology", as Gouldner
labels this pursuit), but courage and, indeed, passion, are
also involved in taking clear positions on controversial
social issues. It is because of a lack of these qualities
that Gouldner, for example, criticizes Howard S. Becker's
attempt to define the proper job of the sociologist in his
article,

"Whose Side Are We On?". Gouldner argues that,

although he seems to favor having sociologists take up the
cause of the "underdogs" or underprivileged people in our
society, Becker does not declare his own sympathies. That is
to say:

"...while Becker invites partisanship he rejects

passionate or erect partisanship. In the very process of
opposing the conventional myth of the value-free social
scientist, Becker thereby creates a new myth, the myth of the
sentiment-free social scientist.

Continuing in this vein,

Gouldner calls into question Becker's motivation in suggest
ing that sociologists identify with and become advocates for
the poor and oppressed. He charges that Becker's concern with
the plight of the underdogs is really only "...part of a titillated attraction to the underdog's exotic difference...."
Moreover, Gouldner maintains that the "real" reason for
Becker's failure to state his position clearly is due to the
vested interest he has in guaranteeing continued funding for

- 112 -

such research, which a strong statement of support for the
underdogs on his part may jeopardize by antagonizing those
who control such funds.

37

In sum, then, Becker's work is

viewed as self-serving and lacking a true and passionate com
mitment to the alleviation of suffering among the poor and
oppressed; and these shortcomings derive from defects in
Becker and not from defects in the discipline of sociology
itself.
The kind of personal criticism Gouldner directs at
Becker is manifest throughout this critical movement. The
worth of a sociologist's work is often judged in terms of the
degree to which it reveals a courageous, passionate commit
ment to a particular value position —

usually one which is

critical of the established social order. Hence, in Enter
Plato much of Gouldner's criticism of Plato's social theory
focuses on what he perceives as shortcomings in Plato's char
acter —

that he does not measure up to the emotion-filled,

full-blooded individual that social thinkers, in Gouldner's
view, ideally should be. Plato's lack of courage and passion
are linked to what Gouldner sees as the overriding conservative
implications of his basic concern with social order. This last
point applies with equal force to Gouldner's treatment of
Talcott Parsons in The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology.
Finally, one critical sociologist has even applied this type
of analysis to graduate students in sociology. They are char
acterized as "dry, small-gauge humans" because they do not
use "...concepts imbued with emotion; concepts eliciting
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sustained lines of political activity;..."

39

The realisation of a more significant sociology, then,
hinges upon a change in the character of sociologists -- that
they become courageous, forthright social scientists. As
Alfred McClung Lee notes,

"The future of sociology as a sci

entific discipline in the service of humanity...rests on the
creative scientists, upon their curiosity, courage, integrity,
40
and concern for the human condition."
In addition to the injunction to declare one's values
openly, some of these same critical sociologists called for
the establishment of a new field of inquiry, a sociology of
values, in which values people hold would become an object
of study just as people's beliefs, attitudes, and opinions
have been objects of sociological investigation. In the main,
this sociology of values parallels Emile Durkheim's "science
of ethics" which was designed to investigate the changing
moral foundations of society. Both of these approaches are
basically empirical and descriptive in nature -- their object,
like that of all sociological research, being to analyze and
explain, not to advocate or recommend. Irving Louis Horowitz,
a principal spokesman for this sociology of values, comments
in this regard,

"...that the future of social science as a

whole, as well as in its parts, is intimately connected to
the development of a science of ethical judgment. This is a
necessary compliment to the sociology of knowledge -- a soci
ology of ethics that would render information about why men
value what they value under given life conditions.
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In connecting the sociology of values with the soci
ology of knowledge, Horowitz is clearly indicating what the
main purpose of such an investigation will be: it will simply
be to bring an increased awareness to sociologists of what
values shape their work and how they shape it. With this,
we come back again to the basic assumption contained in the
"let's be honest" position: the recognition that, as human
beings, we all carry around with us certain value preferences
which will manifest themselves in one way or another in all
that we do.

42

(4) Advocating the Adoption of a Particular
Value Commitment as an Alternative
Solution to the Problem of Values
in Sociology
To overcome the continued adherence to the illusion
that the work of sociologists is and can be value-neutral,
critical sociologists have offered essentially two alterna
tive courses of action. The first alternative is the "let's
be honest" position which we have just finished discussing.
A second alternative, which we will discuss presently, is
very simply the advocacy of a certain value commitment as an
appropriate guide for all sociologists to follow. That is to
say, on this view, sociologists are urged to embrace a parti
cular value position rather than continue to seek in vain
for a way in which one can avoid altogether the contaminating
effects of values.
If there is one value position that most critical
sociologists explicitly or implicitly endorse it is the
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democratic principle of individual freedom as it applies both
to society and to sociology itself. The classic argument for
the adoption of this value position is presented in The Soci
ological Imagination. As was noted in the Introduction, Mills
was concerned with the growing predominance of "masses" (or
"cheerful robots" in the specific case of white-collar workers)
in modern society. These are the kind of people who are easily
manipulated into supporting whatever political-economic system
happens to be established, even if that system adversely affects
their own lives.
To counter this trend, Mills advocated the cultivation
of "publics", or those people who constitute the informed,
questioning, free citizenry of a truly democratic social order.
It was by means of the "sociological imagination" that Mills
hoped to cultivate publics, for this sociological imagination
would help translate "personal troubles" into "public issues"
and thereby open people's eyes to the fact that their own in
dividual problems derive from larger problems in the society
as a whole. In Mills' own words:

"What he [the sociologist^

ought to do for society is to combat all those forces which
are destroying genuine publics and creating a mass society -or put as a positive goal, his aim is to help build and
stregthen self-cultivating publics. Only then might society
4^
be reasonable and free."
For Mills, sociologists' involvement in the creation
and maintenance of a truly democratic social order must begin
with the sociological profession itself. Classic social
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analysts such as Max Weber, who Mills argues had made the
values of freedom and reason a central part of their work,
should be emulated by contemporary sociologists. Moreover,
sociologists should always be committed to the free and open
discussion of their work -- the free exchange of ideas being
crucial to the further development of sociology. For Mills,
then, increased democracy in the sociological profession is
seen as a necessary condition for the realization of a more
significant sociology.
This call for greater freedom in society, as well as
in sociology, was to become a rallying point for critical
sociologists during this turbulent period in American history.
One must remember that during the 1960's the academic commun
ity in general was being increasingly pressured to take de
finite positions on controversial social Issues. No one felt
this pressure more than did these same critical sociologists
who had rejected the doctrine of value neutrality as a per
nicious myth. Drawing upon Mills'

(and, indeed, Max Weber's)

observation of the growing influence of the"bureaucratic
ethos" in society and in sociology, these critical sociologists
embraced the democratic principle as a counter to bureaucratic
domination. They did so in much the same terms that Mills
used in expressing his commitment to the democratic principle.
First of all, there was much discussion of bringing
greater freedom to the sociological profession itself. In
the previous chapter, we saw that the principal reaction of
critical sociologists to the Project Camelot controversy was
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to argue for greater autonomy for sociological researchers -that they be freed from the real and potential manipulation
exercised by those public and private agencies which fund
sociological research,. This point is forcefully stated by
John H. Kultgen in his provocative article entitled "The
Value of Value Judgments in Sociology":
Sociology should be autonomous, a selfgoverning polity. Only then will it
succeed in its primary aims and, more
important, be an enterprise in which
self-respecting moral agents can partici
pate .
My reaction to the value-free scientist
ready to serve any master is disgust. This
is a moral judgment which I consciously
make and recommend to sociologists. 44
Just as Mills believed that the realization of a more
significant sociology ultimately rested upon autonomous,
creative social scientists willing to investigate large,
controversial issues —

that is, sociologists who do not al

low their investigations be dictated by pre-determined, bureau
cratic methods of research —

so too these critical sociolo

gists maintain that a significant sociology rested upon the
degree to which sociologists are truly autonomous.

45

To cite

one prominent example, Alvin Gouldner's proposal to establish
"theoretical communes" in which free and rational discourse
replaces mechanical research techniques as the guiding prin
ciple of operation is based upon the view that a significant
sociology is first and foremost an autonomous sociology.
More important, however, in the eyes of these critical
sociologists is the obligation to contribute to the realiza
tion of a truly free society -- a society run by self-governing
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publics (to paraphrase Mills' vision of such a society). One
way in which sociologists can contribute to greater democracy
is to make the results of their work more accessible to the
people in general. Sociologists should serve the people, not
the special interest groups which pay for much of the research
which sociologists do.
Unfortunately, in the view of most critical sociolo
gists, the latter has more often than not been the case. This
is to pose the question which Alfred McClung Lee chooses as
the title of one of his critiques of contemporary sociology,
Sociology For Wh o m ? . His answer to that question captures the
general sentiment of critical sociologists:

"The excuse for

the existence of sociologists is not simply the maintenance
of academic employment and research funding [as mainstream
sociologists would see it[] . The chief excuse is the answering
of the question,

'Sociology for whom?' in this manner: Soci46
ology for the service of humanity."
And, as Lee goes on to
indicate,

"In serving humanity, sociologists act principally

as critics, demystifiers, reporters, and clarifiers...they
try to report more accurate information about the: changing
social scene and with it help to clarify ways of under
standing human relations and of coping with personal and
47
social problems."
In addition to acting as educators of the masses,
adherence to the democratic principle also brings with it a
commitment to the realization of those social conditions which
allow greater human freedom. This particular point is brought
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out clearly In Dennis Foss's attempt to spell out a new ori
entation for the sociological profession. Foss draws upon
basic tenets of democracy laid down in the United States
Constitution in defining his new orientation:

"Ultimately,

then, what is proposed is: the optimization of alternatives
open to every individual compatible with the equal optimization
of alternatives open to all -- each individual's freedom
should be continually increased up to the point that it begins

hg
to interfere with the optimization of freedom for others."
Sociologists are thus enjoined to work toward the
"optimization of alternatives" for everyone in our society.
In a similar vein, and in equally general terms, two sociolo
gists suggest that the "dignity of man"principle become the
guide for sociological practice. A man's dignity is defined
"...in terms of his ability to pursue alternative courses of
action —

to have available significant choices. The idea of

alternatives, when defined in terms of significant structural
choices, emphsizes man's effort to control his own destiny.
We shall leave off our discussion of this commitment
to the democratic principle here and take it up again in more
detail in the following chapter where we will consider the
equally strong and related commitment to the individual. Al
though I will comment more extensively on their vision of a
truly free society in the next chapter, it is important to
note here that none of these critical sociologists gets much
more specific than the above general statements. The gener
ality and vagueness of their position, I believe, ultimately
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derives from a weakness in the philosophical basis of their
overall approach to the value question —

a topic we will

get to shortly. However, before taking up this shortcoming
in the sociological critique of American sociology, let us
look briefly at a few more prominent examples of specific
value commitments urged by critical sociologists.
In addition to being staunch advocates for the demo
cratic principle, critical sociologists also express sympathy
for the plight of the poor and oppressed. Alvin Gouldner, for
example, urges his fellow sociologists to take a stand against
the suffering of these people. This position is most clearly
ennunciated in the context of his stinging attack on Howard
Becker's reflections on this subject, which was briefly dis
cussed earlier in this chapter. Gouldner charged that Becker
himself fails to answer the question posed in the title of
his article,

"Whose Side Are We On?". This failure on Becker's

part Gouldner takes as evidence of his lack of courage to de
clare his value position openly and honestly. To avoid being
accused of the same fault, Gouldner makes clear his own com
mitment: that sociologists support the "underdogs".
sential point about the underdog," says Gouldner,

"The es

"is that

he suffers, and that suffering is naked and visible. It is
this that makes and should make a compelling demand on u s .
Gouldner argues, moreover, that this kind of "feelingful
commitment" will open up aspects of society for study which
have previously been totally neglected.

51

By adopting the

standpoint of the underdog, one such new area of investigation
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which would be opened up is the critical scrutiny of the
"power elite" who, in the view of most critical sociologists,
are directly responsible for the plight of the underdogs.
Another prominent value commitment critical sociolo
gists have embraced is that of a Marxist vision of a good
society and of how such a society can be realized. Critical
sociologists, by and large, subscribe to the notion that
Marx's work can be divided into two distinct periods:

(l) the

philosophical-humanistic, early Marx (or, the "youthful Karl"
as Friedrichs prefers to call him) and (2) the later scienti
fic, economic determlnist Marx. If passages from the early
Marx are used to support these critical sociologists' basic
commitment to the free development of all individuals, the
later Marx is uniformly denounced as an economic determlnist
who denies the possibility of significant human freedom.
This indicates that the commitment to Marx is really second
ary to the overriding commitment to human freedom.
There was, nonetheless, a group of critical sociolo
gists who adhered quite closely to Marx's recommendations
for social change. These critical sociologists enjoined their
fellow sociologists to get involved in revolutionary move
ments —

that they, in a sense, take up the position of the

vanguard of the proletariat. As J. David Colfax and Jack L.
Roach, the editors of an anthology entitled Radical Sociology,
assert:

"At the present time,...we would argue that the imme

diate and primary task of the radical sociologist is to con
tinue to raise public and professional consciousness through
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radical research and practice as well as to engage in radical
52
organizing on and off campus."
The Sociology Liberation
Movement's attempts to prod the American Sociological Associ
ation into making a statement condemning United States' in
volvement in Vietnam represents such an effort to raise public
and professional consciousness.
On the surface, the various value commitments espoused
by critical sociologists, from the commitment to democracy to
advocating the overthrow of capitalism, appear to be expressed
forthrightly and consistently. Nonetheless, underlying these
arguments is the view that values are, at base, merely ex
pressions of personal attitudes, convictions, preferences,
and the like; as such, they are entirely relative.

53

Indeed,

built into the argument for greater democracy and freedom in
society and in sociology is a pluralistic and relativistic
notion of values.
What at first glance appears to be a clear commitment
to a particular value position, then, is clouded by the simul
taneous adherence to the view that one's values are no more
than expressions of personal preference and so cannot be demon
strated to be more or less valid than the values of someone
else. Since there is no way of objectively determining which
value commitments sociologists should adopt, the most sociolo
gists can do is be honest about what value commitments they
adhere to. As C. Wright Mills says in the context of making
the point that all sociological work has moral implications:
"The question is whether he [the sociologist] faces this
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condition and makes up his own mind, or whether he conceals
it from himself and others and drifts m o r a l l y . S i g n i f i 
cantly, the question is not whether the value position a
sociologist adopts is valid or right.
The overriding relativism of critical sociologists'
view of the nature of values not only serves to compromise
their own value commitments, but I believe it is also large
ly responsible for the characteristically vague way in which
these commitments are stated. Such statements rarely go be
yond high-sounding, impassioned pleas for increased freedom
or the occasional call to sociologists to become actively in
volved in movements designed to overthrow the existing cap
italist social order.
(5) Philosophical Considerations of the Problem
of Values in Sociology: The Need for an
Objective Base for Value
The disagreements between mainstream and critical
sociologists concerning the question of the place of values
in sociology appear to be deep and strong. The repeated harsh
denunciations of sociologists who espouse the doctrine of
value neutrality can be taken as an indication of this. The
basic arguments presented by each side do seem to express
clearly opposing positions: mainstream sociologists arguing
that, as a scientific discipline, sociology must be valuefree; and the critics charging that value-free sociology is
a myth, that values inevitably find their way into all aspects
of sociological work.
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However, for all the fury of this debate and the
seemingly irreconcilable positions each side defends, I be
lieve there exist some significant similarities. This is a
point for which evidence has already been presented in the
discussion of critical and mainstream sociologists' inter
pretation of Max Weber's "Science as a Vocation". That sim
ilarities exist, indicates that perhaps mainstream and cri
tical sociologists do not differ all that much on this issue,
which leads one to conclude that the criticism of the doctrine
of value neutrality does not represent a significant challenge
to mainstream American sociology.
Most significantly, both sides of this issue hold a
similar view of the nature of values; namely, that values
are merely expressions of personal opinion, bias, prejudice,
and the like. That is to say, values are universally seen as
subjective, as having their locus within the individual; and
hence, they are also relative.
Given such a conception of values one can readily
understand how both positions in this debate can be defended.
For mainstream sociologists to allow such subjective values
to enter their work would mean giving up a basic goal of all
scientific endeavor: achieving objective, reliable results.
Hence, as defenders of sociology's status as a scientific
discipline, mainstream sociologists are perfectly justified
in arguing that sociology must be value-free. On the other
hand, those who criticize the doctrine of value neutrality do
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so on the basis of the very same subjective conception of the
nature of values. It is argued that because sociologists are
human beings as well as social scientists, it is impossible
to eliminate values entirely from their work because values
are an inherent part of being human. So, rather than falsely
espouse value neutrality, these critical sociologists take
what they believe to be the more truthful, realistic stance
of advocating a policy of honesty —

that sociologists open

ly acknowledge their values so that the potential biasing
effects of these values can be understood and neutralized to
some extent.
Although the achievement of truly objective results
is ruled
remains

out in the critics'
a principal goal for

view, objectivity, nonetheless,
them, just as it is for main

stream sociologists. As one sociologist notes:
Objectivity or value freedom do not define a
science. If they did, not only sociology
but physics, chemistry, and all the rest
would fail the test. What defines a science
is the attempt to be objective, a commitment
to try to filter out ideology from empirical
knowledge, even while it is clear that the
attempt ultimately fails and the commitment
is basically in vain. 55
It is precisely this attempt "to filter out ideology from
empirical knowledge" that the "let's be honest" position is
designed for.
In those cases where critical sociologists have gone
beyond the call for greater self-awareness and advocated the
adoption of a particular value commitment, these value com
mitments, in line with the predominant view of the nature of
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values, have tended to be subjective and relative. From
Alvin Gouldner's call to oppose human suffering, to Alfred
McClung Lee's "existential humanism", to Dennis Foss's
"optimization of alternatives", each position is presented
as just one of many acceptable value commitments sociologists
can adopt.

As any mainstream sociologist would also assert,

Dennis Foss points out that:

"...the value of the orientation

[the optimization of alternatives^] is assumptive and not
demonstrable."
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Built into each position is a vagueness and

a relativism which guarantees that it will never present a
serious challenge to mainstream sociology and its conservative
bias.
In short, in spite of all the high-sounding rhetoric —
advocating greater freedom and fighting against bureaucratic
domination and human suffering -- these critical sociologists
have no well-defined view of a better society to oppose to
the conservative view presented in mainstream sociology that
they find so inadequate.
To my knowledge, none of these critical sociologists
makes any serious attempt to address such important questions
as those posed by Gideon Sjoberg and Ted R. Vaughn in the
following passage -- questions which go to the heart of what
is perhaps the most serious shortcoming of this critical
movement:
In recent years social scientists have sought
to formulate ethical codes or ethical guidelines
by which their actions, particularly those in
the research context, can be evaluated. Despite
the emergence of, and attempt at, codification
of these norms in the scientific community,
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almost no attention has been given to such
fundamental (and corollary) questions as:
What Is the ultimate moral basis of the
scientist's conduct? What is the ultimate
standard by which the scientist is to
justify and evaluate his actions? 53
This is to point to the need for a base or ground both for
judging the value of a sociologist's work and, ultimately, for
judging the adequacy of the conception of the kind of society
toward the realization of which sociologists should be working (i.e., the appropriate goal orientation of sociologists).

5'

To suggest the necessity of attempting to resolve this complex
and difficult issue of what constitutes a sound base for value
judgment is also clearly to indicate the necessity of address
ing some long-standing philosophical questions.
Despite the obvious importance of philosophy, many
critical sociologists have explicitly disavowed any discussion
of the relevant philosophical issues. One of the most widelycited essays on the value question, Alvin Gouldner's "AntiMinotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology", begins with
such a disavowal. Gouldner says,

"I do not wish to enter into

an examination of the logical arguments involved, not because
I regard them as incontrovertible but because I find them less
interesting to me as a sociologist. Instead what I will do
is to view the belief in a value-free sociology in the same
manner that sociologists examine any element in the ideology
fin
of any group."
Ultimately, it is this failure to address
the underlying philosophical issues which is indicative of
the shallowness of the sociological critique of American soci
ology as a whole.
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In clear contrast to critical sociologists' disavowal
of philosophy, critical theorists of the Frankfurt School have
argued that philosophy must be the basis of any truly critical
analysis of society or sociology. As was brought out earlier
in this chapter, some of these critical theorists perceived
that the explanation for the inherent conservative bias in
mainstream sociology lay in its philosophical underpinnings
rather than in the social and psychological backgrounds of
individual sociologists.
With its methodology, and the theory built upon it,
rooted in empiricism, critical theorists argue that sociolo
gists can do no more than reflect the given reality —

there

is no way that an empirical approach to the study of society
can disclose anything more than how Individuals, groups, or
societies perceive themselves. Any judgment on the accuracy
or propriety of these perceptions is left totally out of ac
count, for to make such a judgment presupposes insight into
the true nature of society and such an insight is precisely
what the empiricist tradition denies we can attain. The point
Is, as Theodor Adorno asserts:

"In tabooing the inquiry into

the essence of things as an illusion, as a demand that method
is incapable of fulfilling, one is a priori shielding the es
sential relationships, those which really determine the nature
of society, from cognitive analysis."

61

In the view of these

critical theorists, only by means of a dialectical approach
can one hope to disclose the true nature of the present social
order, that is, come to see its inherent contradictions and

- 129 -

the tendencies within it which point in the direction of a
new social order.
What is at issue here, ultimately, are two different
views of the nature of knowledge and reality. Sociologists,
basically following Kant's lead, have maintained that all
knowledge derives from experience, with our minds imparting
a certain order to this experience (specifically, by way of
the categories of the understanding for K a n t ) . On this view,
then, knowledge is based entirely on the appearance of things,
on individuals' perception of things; what things are in them
selves (or, what society is in itself, what is its true nature)
belong to the realm of the unknowable. To base a study of
society on such a view of the nature of knowledge and reality
is to rule out the possibility of knowing society as it real
ly is and of defining what society could or should be, for
all one can know is what society appears to be as this is
usually reflected in the countless studies of the attitudes
and opinions of individuals.^
For the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School
the above view of the nature of knowledge and reality can
encompass no critical dimension, for in rejecting the possi
bility of ever coming to know the true nature of society there
can be no ground or basis for criticism. Rather, as Marcuse
argues so eloquently in "The Concept of Essence", reality
consists of appearance and essence. The job of the philosopher
(and, indeed, of the sociologist) is to penetrate appearances
and get at the essence of things, which means coming to see
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things both as they really are and as they are capable of
becoming. All genuine thinking requires that one transcend
the given reality, ^ the present social order, and look upon
it not as an absolute (as the functionalists tend to do) but
as a moment in the historical development

of society. A

given society can only properly be understood as an outgrowth
of the past and as containing tendencies which point in the
direction of a new social order in the future.
Ultimately, in the view of these critical theorists,
it is in terms of a conception of the as yet potential, future
64
utopian
social order that criticism of the present is possi
ble —

that the shortcomings and problems of present-day

society become visible. This conception constitutes the
ground or base for the Frankfurt School's critical analysis
of modern society.
A close reading of the work of Adorno, Horkheimer,
and Marcuse, three major figures of the Frankfurt School, does
reveal the broad outlines of a philosophical or critical base.
Among the three, Marcuse clearly goes the farthest in attempt
ing to define this base in specific terms. Early on in OneDlmenslonal Man Marcuse describes this base in the following
terms:
In order to identify and define the possibilities
of an optimal development, the critical theory
must abstract from the actual organization and
utilization of society's resources, and from
the results of this organization and utili
zation. Such abstraction which refuses to
accept the given universe of facts as the
final context of validation, such "transcending"
analysis of the facts in the light of their
arrested and denied possibilities, pertains
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to the very structure of social theory. It
is opposed to all metaphysics by virtue of
the rigorously historical character of the
transcendence. The "possibilities" must be
within the reach of the respective society;
they must be definable goals of practice.
By the same token, the abstraction from the
established institutions must be expressive
of an actual tendency -- that is, their
transformation must be the real need of the
underlying population. Social theory is
concerned with the historical alternatives
which haunt the established society as
subversive tendencies and forces. 65
What is particularly important to note about the above state
ment

is the emphasis placed on the concrete, factual nature

of thedefinition of this "optimal

development". The good

society is to be defined in terms of actual tendencies in the
present society, that is, of what society is capable of becom
ing. For example, one important tendency in modern society
that Marcuse frequently calls attention to is that of automa
tion. Automation, he argues, has the potential of liberating
people from necessary labor so that they may develop to their
fullest potential as whole persons rather than have to waste
their energy and talents performing menial tasks. The social
critic, then, has the task of revealing these inherent tenden
cies and working to further their realization.
In general terms, I believe one could accurately charac
terize these critical theorists' view of a truly humane social
order as consisting of three basic elements:

(l) that the

natural and industrial resources of the society are used toward
the end of providing the necessities of life for everyone;
(2) that the toil and misery of necessary labor be reduced to
a minimum; and (3) that genuine freedom is maximized for every-
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one. The real fruit of this humane social order will be the
"whole person", the person who Is able to develop all of his
capacities to the fullest.
Although critical sociologists talk a lot about in
dividual freedom being the integral aspect of a future, better
society which a more significant sociology is to have a hand
in bringing about, their view of freedom is primarily a nega
tive one. On their terms, freedom means essentially freedom
from bureaucratic domination, freedom from all forms of social
and sociological domination. Critical theorists do include
this negative freedom in their conception of genuine freedom.
After all, it was because of the strongly bureaucratic, man
ipulative nature of Soviet communism that they came to reject
it, along with American corporate calitalism, as contrary to
their vision of a humane social order.
But much more important than negative freedom is
"positive" freedom, that is, freedom for an individual to de
velop as a whole person. Such freedom requires the development
of a social order which provides significant opportunities for
everyone. Among other things, this would require the establish
ment of a more just property system. In the context of sociolo
gy itself, it would require the adoption of a view of reality
which most critical sociologists express vehement opposition
to. As Marcuse sees it:
...This real context in which the particular
subjects obtain their real significance is
definable only within a theory of society.
To say that this meta context is the
Society (with a capital "S") is to hypostatize
the whole over and above the parts. But this
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hypostatization takes place in reality, is_
the reality, and the analysis can overcome
it only by recognizing it and by compre
hending its scope and its cause. Society
is indeed the whole which exercises its
independent power over individuals and this
Society is no unidentifiable "ghost". It
has its empirical hard core in the system
of institutions, which are the established
and frozen relationships among men. 66
It is statements such as the one above which have
earned for Marcuse denunciations from some critical sociolo
gists for being overly pessimistic and anti-individual. None
theless, we should take note of what this statement implicitly
suggests: that the resolution of the value question in soci
ology requires a sound conception of social life and society
as its basis. This is to make the important point, as I have
emphasized all along, that what is wrong with contemporary
American sociology derives primarily from a faulty methodo
logical and theoretical base.
That a sound basis for value judgment requires a more
adequate conception of society (i.e., of the facts) than those
that have been offered in sociology and in the history of
social thought in general is a principal theme running through
the work of Elijah Jordan. Critical sociologists (as do main
stream sociologists)

separate the world of fact and the world

of value, with the world of value having its locus in the biopsychological individual and the world of fact refering to
that world outside the bio-psychological individual. Jordan
argues, on the contrary, that:

"The relation between fact and

value is one of constitutional mutuality,..."

Value is the

meaning of a fact. One judges something in terms of the
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larger system of relations in which it stands, that Is, in
terms of the meaning or implications something has to the
larger natural and cultural order of things. That larger
natural and cultural order of things must be properly under
stood in order to make correct Judgments about how things
fit in this larger whole, of how they contribute to or de
tract from this life whole.
Ordinarily, ethical or value questions are thought
to involve the acts of individuals, the judgment of which is
based on the perceived beneficial or detrimental effect of
these acts on other individuals or on the particular individ
ual involved. There is little in the work of critical soci
ologists that would suggest any fundamentally different view
of ethics. Indeed, by maintaining that values are both sub
jective and relative, they place themselves clearly within
the framework of an individualistic ethics.
Jordan takes issue with such a view of ethics because
it is founded upon an inadequate conception of the person or
individual. Persons, considered as separate and distinct biopsychological entities, are not an appropriate base for ethics;
they cannot be considered the real actors of modern society.
Rather, as Jordan points out, the real actors are "instru
mented or embodied persons"; that is, institutions or orders
of objects directed toward some human end. It is through In
stitutions that bio-psychological individuals act to achieve
ends. A doctor, for example, achieves the end of healing the
sick through the medical institution which encompasses the
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schools, the laboratory facilities, the drugs, the hospitals,
etc. that are organized in such a way (or, at least, should
be) to facilitate the end of healing the sick.
Ultimately, then, to judge things properly one must
focus on this institutional structure and how it serves to
enhance or detract from a sound social order. In Jordan's
words:

"...we shall have to redefine the person in terms of

a corporate structure of interinstitutional relations if our
ethical theory is to have conformity to the fact that is
necessary to give it validity and to ground its formulas as

,
.,68
law.
This redefinition of the person represents nothing
less than a redefinition of society —

that society Is

essentially an organized system of institutions. It Is this
fact which forms the essential basis of value -- the value
of some aspect of society being the meaning that aspect has
for the larger whole of which it is a part.
In the second chapter of his Forms of Individuality
Jordan addresses the question of where sociological thinking
stands with respect to this redefinition of the person and
society. He argues that sociological thought Is inadequate
because its focus on bio-psychological individuals and how
they are held together in groups by subjective ties fails to
take into consideration the objective development of the vast
institutional structure of modern society. Although critical
sociologists vehemently reject many aspects of contemporary
American sociology, they tacitly accept the subjective view
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of society described above. Indeed, many critical sociolo
gists go even further in emphasizing the subjective, as can
be clearly seen, for example, in Alfred McClung Lee's "exist
ential humanism". But, again, such an emphasis overlooks the
fact that the lives of individuals are bound up with a larger
institutional order, and that it is this larger institutional
order on which sociologists need to focus.
In Chapter V we will come back to Jordan's conception
of society and discuss it in greater detail in the context of
a presentation of some alternative conceptions of society
offered by critical sociologists. For now, let us just note
how this all relates to the resolution of the value question
in sociology.
In contrast to the subjective and relativistic view
of values, Jordan is arguing that objective, sound judgments
of value can be made, but they can only be made on the basis
of a sound understanding of society. Therefore, the ultimate
resolution of the value question rests upon a thoroughgoing
reexamination of the most fundamental aspect of sociology's
theoretical base; namely, the conception of society with
which it connects. Unfortunately, such a reexamination has
taken up but a small portion of the voluminous writings of
critical sociologists.
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CHAPTER IV

THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL
IN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIETY

(1) Origin and Nature of the Basic Value
Commitment of Critical Sociologists
In the last two chapters, what has emerged from our
analysis of critical sociologists'

view of the proper rela

tionship between sociological research and its sources of
funding and their view of the proper place of values in soci
ology is a commitment both to increased autonomy in the prac
tice of sociology and to increased involvement in the struggle
to realize a more humane, democratic social order. The values
of freedom of inquiry, of openness to all methodological and
theoretical perspectives, of education of the public about
important social issues are universally acknowledged as
essential elements of a significant sociology. A significant
sociology, on this view,

is one committed to furthering and

sustaining a truly democratic social order.
Critical sociologists maintain that mainstream Amer
ican sociology not only contains an inherent conservative
political bias, but that it also places too much emphasis on
the Comtian notion that knowledge of society and the practical
application of such knowledge is to be left solely in the
hands of experts, an intellectual elite. Critical sociologists
see the predominant positivistic methodology and the function
alist theoretical framework lending support to such an elitist
view of the practical implications of the study of sociology.

-
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That is to say, critical sociologists are charging that the
education of the masses

(the electorate in a democratic so

ciety) has never been a principal concern of mainstream soci
ologists .
It is precisely in this area of general social edu
cation that critical sociologists believe sociology could
have its greatest practical import. In terms reminiscent of
C. Wright Mills' earlier statement of this position,

Irving

Louis Horowitz comments:
The originating basis and ultimate purpose
of sociology, as of any scientific discipline,
is the formation of intelligent publics who
are in a position to utilize that which they
have learned and, as a matter of fact, who
define the learning process precisely as the
utilization and central sifting of information
...Hence, the purpose of learning sociology
is the transformation of unformed and
uninformed men into decision-making creative
persons. 1
So, rather than feed information to those in power In govern
ment, the military, and business,

critical sociologists urge

their colleagues to turn their attention to the underprivileged
masses and help them come to understand their plight and of
what can be done to rectify this unjust situation.

2

In order for sociologists to carry out this task de
scribed above they must, in the view of critical sociologists,
first put their own house In order;

that Is, the sociological

profession must be made more democratic. One aspect of this
call to bring greater democracy to the sociological profession
has already been discussed at length. In discussing the re
lationship between sociological research and social policy
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in Chapter II, It was noted that critical sociologists gener
ally favor giving sociological researchers more autonomy in
order to check the undue influence of private and public
funding organizations over the conduct of social research.
More autonomous sociological researchers,

it was further

maintained, would be more likely to engage in more signifi
cant research;

they would not be afraid to tackle research

topics which involved delving into controversial social issues.
Greater democracy in sociology also means accepting,
on a more or less equal footing, all of the various methodolo
gical and theoretical approaches that sociology has to offer.
V/hatever harsh words these critical sociologists express to
wards quantitative methods,
subjects for criticism,

functionalism, or other popular

they almost invariably agree that

such methodological and theoretical approaches have a legiti
mate place in sociology. What critical sociologists protest
is the attempt to present any particular approach as the only
legitimate one. As Alfred McClung Lee asserts:
sociologists [i.e.,

"...humanist

critical sociologists] do not throw out

the triplet babies -- system,

theory, and quantification --

with their intellectual bath water. To humanist sociologists,
system,

theory, and quantification are useful tools,

but they

are not a "holy trinity" that should be permitted to dominate
O
sociological research and thinking.'0
According to the above view,

the sociological profes

sion is being urged to adopt a pluralistic approach toward the
practice of sociology -- sociologists should both accept and
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utilize various methods and theories In Investigating social
phenomena and reporting their findings:

"...it is evident

that wisdom as well as common sense, dictates an awareness
that sociology is not a monolithic entity,
4
style, and a series of options."

but a history, a

That no one methodological or theoretical approach or
no one school of thought be allowed to dominate the work of
sociologists Is a principle which has a direct counterpart in
the democratic society toward the realization of which this
democratic sociology aims. The domination of an intellectual
elite in society is viewed as being just as repugnant and u n 
acceptable as the domination of any particular school of
thought In sociology. The implications of supporting or re
jecting such elitism are clearly set forth by T.B. Bottomore
in the following passage:
If the aim of sociology is taken to be the
discovery of the hidden mechanism of social
life, which is then communicated in the train
ing of a small elite of 'social engineers',
this does entail the production and repro
duction of a form of domination. But if the
aim Is seen as the diffusion through society
of an understanding of how social relation
ships are established, persist, or can be
changed -- as a kind of public enlightenment -then Its effects can well be seen as liberating.^
Likewise, Richard Flacks,

In criticizing what he sees

as Alvin Gouldner's preoccupation with reforming sociology
rather than society,

takes a definite anti-elitist stance.

With C. Wright Mills clearly in mind here, he states that:
"...the purpose of sociology is above all,

to strive to

improve the capacity of ordinary people to understand social
reality,

to locate themselves historically, and to comprehend
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the consequences of existing or potential social patterns."

6

It should come as no surprise to find these critical
sociologists drawing upon major arguments presented in Mills'
The Sociological Imagination in defending the democratic
alternative to established sociology and society. As I have
noted on several previous occasions, Mills' work has had a
tremendous influence on this critical movement as a whole,
and that influence is no more evident than with respect to
this call for greater democracy in sociology and society.
Certainly a major aspect of The Sociological Imagina
tion is Mills' effort to free sociology (i.e., free the "soci
ological imagination")

from the dominant styles of work; namely,

"abstracted empiricism" and

"grand theory".

In Mills' view,

sociology needs to be freed from the dominance of these de
fective styles of work so that it can more effectively carry
out its educational function,

thereby enhancing the prospects

of realizing a truly democratic social order. Logically enough,
as Howard Press notes in his critical review of Mills'

life and

work, the ideal of Jeffersonian grass-roots democracy greatly
appealed to Mills.

Indeed,

if one had to characterize his poli

tical position it would be that of a"radical democrat".^
The importance of America's democratic heritage for
later critical sociologists is also clearly in evidence.
Some of their proposals can be traced directly to principles
laid down some 200 years ago in the founding of our system
of representative democracy. Among the best examples of this
is Dennis Foss's

"new" orientation for the profession. At
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one point, Foss describes this new orientation in the follow
ing terms:
Ultimately, then, what is proposed is: the
optimization of alternatives open to every
individual compatible with the equal opti
mization of alternatives open to all —
each individual's freedom should be con
tinually increased up to the point that it
begins to interfere with the optimization
of freedom of o t h e r s . 8
Here are presented two basic principles of American democracy:
that individuals be allowed to pursue whatever life-course
they desire and that this freedom be limited only to the extent that it harms or hinders others.
Another

9

"radical democrat", Alfred McClung Lee, also

draws heavily on this democratic heritage in arguing for his
"humanist-existential" value orientation.

"The rough humanist-

existential paradigm calls for a man-centered sociology in
the service of human needs and goals as they are popularly
defined. Thus,

it is democratically oriented by its very

nature."10 Maximum individual autonomy and popular partici
pation in the shaping of public policy are the key elements
of Lee's conception of the democratic alternative.
"people power", ultimately,

It is

that Lee presents as the panacea

for what ails both sociology and society.11
In addition to drawing upon Mills 1 work and the demo
cratic tradition in America,

critical sociologists also connect

with a major theme in the work of members of the Frankfurt
School. The critical theorists of the Frankfurt School main
tain that the development of modern civilization as a whole,
including both capitalist and communist worlds,
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is in the

direction of increasing domination of the individual. There
is the economic and political domination of the ruling classes
over the underprivileged masses, and there is also the domi
nation of certain modes of thought -- modes of thought which
contain no critical perspective and which often serve as
rationalizations for the status quo. In the face of this,

the

proper job of the social critic is to oppose this trend, to
make criticism rather than rationalization of the status quo
central to one's work. Similarly,

critical sociologists see

this as the proper function of sociology:

"In summary terms,

a responsible sociology has the dual task of developing a
critique of all forms of social oppression and of all forms
of social science that serve to support such oppression."

12

Put simply, this view holds that the only responsible soci
ology is a critical sociology.
In opposing these various forms of domination,

criti

cal sociologists can be seen (and clearly want to be seen) as
coming to the rescue of the beleaguered, dominated individual.
They oppose mainstream sociology's
of man",

1^

"oversocialized conception

in which the individual is lost sight of in the

overriding concern with studying the larger social order. In
Alfred McClung Lee's terms,

critical sociologists should try

"to identify and to grasp opportunities for the magnification
of the Individual's potential In society."1^ Or, as Alvin
Gouldner states In presenting his view of the proper role of
the social critic:

"The critic affirms the creative potenti

alities of the Individual, and he opposes these to the con-
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formifcy demands of established i n s t i t u t i o n s , ...

Although critical sociologists' defense of the indi
vidual,

their opposition to social, political, and economic

domination, and their advocacy of the democratic alternative
all connect with arguments put forth by members of the Frank
furt School,

there are significant differences which,

I believe,

point to serious shortcomings in the position of critical
sociologists. Most significantly,

this individualistic-demo

cratic orientation leads to a rejection of any holistic,
objective conception of society as inherently conservative
and inadequate. But it is precisely a holistic, objective
conception of society that members of the Frankfurt School,
and, indeed, Elijah Jordan maintain is more in line with the
reality. On this fundamental point, among others, we shall
see significant differences emerge as we proceed to discuss
the various facets of these critical sociologists'

individual

istic-democratic orientation in light of the Frankfurt School
and Jordan's critical observations on the validity of such an
orientation.

(2) Domination of the Individual in
Mainstream Sociological Thought

Among the most important premises Anderson and Gibson
lay down in setting forth their conception of a new, more
significant sociology in their text, appropriately entitled
Toward a New S o c i o l o g y , is the following:

"Individuals as

members of groups define the form and content of society and
history. As architects of society and history,
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individuals

are capable of changing the structure of society and the
course of history."10 This could serve as a major premise
of the sociological critique of American sociology as a
whole.1^ Critical sociologists argue that a fundamental short
coming in the work of mainstream sociologists is the neglect
of the individual. From the work of Auguste Comte to that of
Talcott Parsons,

the emphasis has been on how social struc

ture and social processes shape the individual rather than
the other way around.
The social determinism of mainstream sociology runs
contrary to the democratic alternative which critical sociolo
gists advocate, for their call for increased democracy in the
practice of sociology and in society presupposes that indi
viduals,

in the words of Robert Lynd,

be seen as

carriers, perpetuators, and movers of culture..."
through a sound education
of these individuals)

l8

It is

(i.e., through changing the minds

that radical social change can be effect

ed, and this is a task for which the
pecially designed. From Mills'
to Gouldner's

"the active

"new sociology" is es

"sociological imagination",

"reflexive sociology",

to Lee's humanistic soci

ology, the focus is upon bringing to individuals a greater
awareness of their plight and of what they can do to improve
their situation.
Whereas critical sociologists maintain that their
individualistic orientation is the core of radical,
humanistic sociology,

critical,

the social deterministic orientation of

mainstream sociology is characterised as conservative,
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con

formist, and ultimately, anti-humanistic. Any sociologist
who deigns to investigate the nature of social order or who
goes as far as to adopt a holistic perspective is thereby
accused of committing himself, wittingly or unwittingly,
a conservative political position. Alvin Gouldner's

to

treat

ment of the work of Plato and Parsons is a case in point.
comparing their views of society, Gouldner notes,

In

"In both

views,...men are viewed as lacking reality, or true hu ma n
ness apart from their involvement In or dependence upon God
or Society.

This

"God or Society", Gouldner argues,

rep

resents nothing more than the sanctification of the status
quo; hence the charge that there is a conservative bias built
into their theories. Finally, Gouldner maintains that the
overriding concern with order in the work of Plato and Parsons
po
precludes a concern for freedom, happiness, or equality. w
That all sociological theories which deal with the
question of social order and which adopt a social (as opposed
to an individualistic)

theoretical perspective must be regard

ed as inherently conservative is certainly open to question.
Indeed, the charge that Plato's

"God" is actually a glorified

symbol of the status quo is an Interpretation seriously
challenged by members of the Frankfurt School, among others.
In their discussion of the relation of the Individual and
society, members of the Frankfurt School point out that Plato's
view of this relation —

that individuals achieve the best life

possible in the context of the larger social order -- Is pre
mised on the realization of a just, well-ordered society,

- 154 -

which is not to be equated with the status quo.

p1

In addition to being viewed as conservative,
and anti-humanistic,

conformist,

social theories which place society above

the individual are generally considered part and parcel of
the economic and political domination of the individual in
modern society. Domination of the individual In a theoretical
sense is held to be just as serious as other forms of domina
tion. In this regard, Robert Friedrichs notes that:

"Manip

ulating symbols of man rather than man himself may indeed be
a greater actual threat to the traditional image of the human
ity of man than any steps that have been taken to date to
"control" him physically."

22

In what sense mainstream sociology

threatens the "humanity of man" is suggested by Alvin Gouldner:
"...an objectivistic sociology that seeks to establish natu
ral laws and which views men as objects in exactly the same
way as a natural science does, already rests upon a thingified
conception of man that is inherently antithetical to the goal
of human e m a n c i p a t i o n . " ^
The significance of the above observations by two
prominent critical sociologists lies in the fact that they
relate directly to another main theme in the work of critical
theorists of the Frankfurt School. These critical theorists
are particularly concerned with the domination of certain modes
of thought which preclude or "eclipse", in Max Horkheimer's
words, critical modes of thought. The lack of critical think
ing -- thinking which ultimately derives from some vision of
a better society -- means the continued dominance of modes of
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thought which are designed to do no more than clarify,
gorize, and explain

(i.e., rationalize)

cate

the existing social

order, but never challenge it.
Clearly, a major target for such criticism is posi
tivism, particularly as this mode of thought is manifested
in the social sciences.

"The entire Frankfurt School tradi

tion (from Horkheimer to Habermas)

has constituted a sustained

attack on positivism because it implies a subordination and
capitulation to the reality of existing social forms, namely,
capitalism.

.,24

Moreover, as Gouldner likewise points out in

drawing upon this tradition:

"...positivism itself was ground

ed in a specific ideology and politics:

the politics of "what

is". It is the tacit affirmation that "what is", the status
q u o , is basically sound;

that it only needs to be fine tuned

through the use of new social science and of a "positive"
appreciation of "what is", scientifically formulated by the
new sociological priesthood."

25

Evidence of the inherent con

servatism of the predominant methodological and theoretical
approaches of mainstream sociology presented in the last two
chapters could be cited in support of the above argument.
£ 0 , an important segment of the structure of domination
in modern society is that of thought which stresses adaptation
to the ways things are. On this view,

freedom for the indi

vidual to achieve a better life is premised on the elimination
of such modes of thought as positivism, which, at base, can do
no more than reflect the established social order. On this
much there is general agreement between critical sociologists
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and critical theorists. Disagreement becomes manifest when
one looks at their respective views of hew the emancipatory
potential of society can be realized.
It is important to note that in drawing upon the work
of members of the Frankfurt School,
by and large,

critical sociologists have,

favored the work of the most contemporary figure

connected with this school,

Jurgen Habermas, as opposed to the

work of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse who could reasonably
be said to have constituted the core of the school. 'That cri
tical sociologists would focus on Habermas gives us a fairly
clear indication of their view as to how radical social change
is to be effected. Commenting on the two principal views of
social change among critical theorists,

John Sewart says of

Habermas's view:
The model critically adopted by Habermas
for the practical realization of critical
theory is Freudian psychoanalysis. Habermas
finds within psychoanalysis an emancipatory
project of therapy....
The goal is to further self-reflection
and self-knowledge in the patient and ulti
mately explain and remove unnecessary forms
of domination. 26
Refering to this later as Habermas's

"talking therapy", Sewart

brings out the strong psychological overtones of this view of
radical social change.
Habermas's

"talking therapy" ties in directly with

critical sociologists'

persistent call for the development of

greater self-awareness and self-reflection among sociologists
generally. This theme is perhaps most clearly exemplified in
Alvin Gouldner's call for a "reflexive sociology".
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27

Although both Habermas and Gouldner acknowledge the need for
more concrete economic and political change,

they view the

lack of self-awareness among social scientists and people gen
erally as the major obstacle to true human emancipation. As
Trent Schroyer points out in his reconceptualization of
critical theory along lines laid down by Habermas:

"...the

scientistic image of science is the fundamental false con
sciousness of our epoch.

If the technocratic ideology is to

lose its hold on our consciousness, a critical theory must
lay bare the theoretical reifications of this scientistic
image of science."

28

On the other hand,

John Sewart aptly characterizes

the other prominent view of social change contained in critical
theory as following along more traditional Marxian lines with
its emphasis on changing material conditions. Although there
can be no doubt that the critique of positivism is a focal
point of discussion for the Frankfurt School as a whole,

the

vision of the free society which they are striving to realize
points to the existence of a significant difference between
Habermas and other principal members of the Frankfurt School.
Whereas Habermas sees the reform of language as the
basic prerequisite to emancipation,

29

Marcuse,

for example,

sees change in the material organization of society as es
sential. With Marcuse's work in mind,

John Sewart notes,

"Critical theory must determine the "concrete roads" leading
its agents of revolutionary praxis to the realization of a

*^0

just society."^

Among these"concrete roads", Marcuse
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focuses particularly on automation and its potential for free
ing people from necessary labor.31 In addition, Marcuse argues
that the provision of basic life necessities to all people
must be considered a fundamental prerequisite to the reall32
zation of a just and humane social order.
That critical sociologists would tend to favor
Habermas's views over those of someone such as Marcuse is
congruent with their commitment to cultivating greater selfawareness among sociologists in particular and people in
general. Critical self-awareness -- the ability to overcome
dominating and uncritical modes of thought such as exempli
fied in positivism —

is viewed as the key to human emancipa

tion. Alvin Gouldner's program for an emancipatory sociology
is a prominent example of this line of reasoning:
It is the function of the emancipatory social
sciences to liberate man's reason from any
force, In or out of himself, symbolic, or not,
in the psyche and in society, that cripples
and confuses reason. It is the special
function of the social sciences continuously
to dissolve man's opaqueness to himself; to
help him understand those forces that act
upon him that he ordinarily finds unintelligi
ble; and to help him transform these natural
forces that use him as an object Into
^
humanly controllable forces under his co n tro l.
Although there Is some recognition here of the need for larger
changes in society, the thrust of Gouldner's program (indeed,
of this critical movement as a whole)

is aimed at the psycho

logical demand for greater self-awareness.
The view of true human emancipation which emerges
here is primarily a negative one, negative in the sense that
emancipation Is seen entirely as that condition in which
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individuals are freed from the bonds of all forms of domination.
It is the self-reliant,

self-determined individual,

thesis of the "cheerful robot",

the anti

that is the ideal outcome,

the fruit of an emancipatory sociology. 3ecause Marcuse is
pessimistic about the possibility of realizing a society of
completely self-determined individuals he is denounced as a
34
doomsday theorist by Alfred McClung Lee.
Significantly,

this view of the individual and of

emancipation clashes greatly with the basic position of the
Frankfurt School, a position which is likewise committed to
the emancipation of the individual. Rather than defend the
separate and distinct,

self-determined individual,

critical theorists defend the so-called
conception of man". As they point out:
sidedly sociology,

these

"over-socialized
"No matter how one-

due to its posture within the division of

labor of the sciences, may have overemphasized the primacy
of society over the individual,

still thereby it offers a

necessary corrective for the illusion,

that it Is due to his

natural disposition, his psychology, and out of himself alone
that each single human being has become what he is."
ether words,

35

In

"Human life is essentially and not merely

accidentally social l i f e . " ^
On the basis of this different view of the relation
between the individual and society put forth by these critical
theorists,

the conception of how true human emancipation is

achieved changes considerably from the conception offered by
critical sociologists. Rather than emphasize negative
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freedom (i.e., the individual's freedom from constraints
imposed by society), these critical theorists argue that the
truly free individual and a just social order go hand in
hand:

The most important consequence to be drawn
from insights into the interaction of the
individual and society -- and to be sure,
just that which positivistic sociology
avoids — is that the human being is capa
ble of realizing himself only within a
just and humane society. This insight is
already contained in the Platonic theme,
that functional social coherence is the
precondition for the actualization of the
Idea implanted in every human being. Only
the just society will permit the human
being to realize his Idea. 37
Critical theorists are particularly skeptical of the
notion that a progressive, free society can be constructed on
the basis of the kind of individualism these critical sociolo
gists espouse. The free individual, unrestrained by larger
social forces, in the view of members of the Frankfurt School
is in fact not only a myth but also part and parcel of the
ideology of capitalism —

the "rugged individualism" of the

free market. As Max Horkheimer points out, however,
so-called

these

"rugged individuals", even those who rise to the

top, are subordinate to the demands of the larger economic
order:

"In the era of free enterprise,

the so-called era of

individualism,

Individuality was most completely subordinated
og
to self-preserving reason."
Moreover, as Horkheimer goes

on to note:
The absolutely isolated individual has
always been an illusion. The most esteemed
personal qualities, such as independence,
will to freedom, sympathy, and sense of
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justice, are social as well as individual
virtues. The fully developed individual
is the ccnsumation of a fully developed
society. The emancipation of the indi
vidual is not an emancipation from society
but the deliverance of society from atom
ization, an atomization that may reach its
peak in periods of collectivization and mass
culture. 39
That is to say, no just, humane society is going to result
from the kind of program of increased self-awareness advocated
by critical sociologists. Without addressing the underlying
economic, political, and social injustice of the prevailing
social order,

the emancipated individual they speak of will

remain,

in the words of members of the Frankfurt School,
40
"absolute cliche".

the

Critical sociologists fail to see that the individual
is bound up with a larger institutional order, which means
that no program of social change that places the emphasis on
changing individuals,

in the absence of basic institutional

change, can be effective. There are also considerable
grounds for challenging critical soc iologists' abiding faith
in democracy as both the means to and the end of a truly just
society. From C. Wright Mills to Alfred McClung Lee, critical
sociologists have persistently advocated the dissemination of
sociological knowledge among the general populace so that
individuals may participate more fully in a democratic
decision-making process and thereby become self-determining,
free individuals living in a social order of their own making.
Yet aside from the questionable assumption that sociological
knowledge can indeed enlighten the public in a significant
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way,

ill

~ this optimistic assessment of democracy flounders on

its disregard for the necessity of institutional change.
Although democracy does address the evils of authori
tarian rule and does bring the masses into the political
process, democracy does not encompass, as Elijah Jordan
perceptively notes:

"...suggestions as to the nature or the

structure of the state, no hint as to how the functioning of
the institutions of life are to be organized into a corporate
ly integrated whole, no picture at all of that order which
is the ground of all meanings in political or public life.
Put otherwise,

n42

critical sociologists' promotion of the demo

cratic ideal amounts to nothing more than a program to in
crease social and self-consciousness while leaving intact
the institutional framework of modern society.

In the end,

the inadequacy of this position derives from their inability
to see (and even disdain for the notion)

that this larger

institutional order is the fundamental reality.

In contrast,

it is this very insight into the larger order of things, along
with a recognition of the inadequacy of individualism,

that

Jordan opens his Forms of Individuality:
It seemed strange that the system of practical
principles whose primary purpose is to exalt
the individual should nevertheless produce a
complete submergence of the individual in what
appears to be sub-human or super-human mecha
nism; and this contradiction impressed me
with the idea of the possible transference of
the will-life from the human individual,
considered as an instrument and ground of
values, to the super-human corporate individual
[i.e., the institution^... ^3
By and large, critical sociologists have been content
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merely to advocate greater democracy, greater individual
freedom in lieu of any real discussion of what constitutes a
free and just society. That is to say, for all the effort
devoted to glorifying the individual and emphasizing the power
of the free individual to initiate beneficial social change,
little of any substance is said about the institutions of such
a society —

the kind of economy, government, or education

that would make up a just society. These critical sociologists
appear to be saying that the problem of organizing the complex
institutional network of modern society in such a way as to
provide a meaningful, decent existence for all people can be
solved by merely granting individuals greater personal freedom.
Ultimately,

in the view of critical sociologists,

it

is the free and open expression of opinion that emerges as
both the mechanism and end of social change.

"In the end,

there is probably no more powerful mechanism of social change
than people's talk."

And not just any kind of talk, but for

Gouldner, it is manly, face-to-face talk. But
or any other kind of talk for that matter,

Just how this,

is to result in

or be considered the end of a free and just society is never
made clear.

(3) The "Endless Dialectic"
In light of critical sociologists'

belief in the

efficacy of the free and open expression of opinion, John
Seeley in his article,

"The Making and Taking of Problems:

Toward an Ethical Stance", aptly characterizes the program of
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social change advocated by critical sociologists generally:
As we begin to bring these beginnings
together we would initiate, I should
think, an appropriate endless dialectic
in which the claims and cogencies of long
and short perspectives, undying general
principle and proximate practical pro
posal, present locations, desired future
states and transition possibilities (all
in their actual interpenetration) and the
respective claims of knowing, and doing,
acting and reflecting, could be brought
into never-ending collision and cohabi
tation. (my emphasis) 45
As stated in one way or another by nearly all of the major
figures of this critical movement,

the hoped for result of

the sociological critique of American sociology is to initiate
an "endless dialectic".
Although only Seeley makes use of this specific term,
the essential meaning of his recommendation is conveyed by
slightly different terminology by other critical sociologists.
Robert Friedrichs,

for example,

prefers the term "dialogue"

to dialectic because of the Marxian overtones of the latter
t e r m . ^ Among other expressions used are:
"continuing dialogue",^

and "creative c o n f u s i o n " T o

Alvin Gouldner alone adds:
"energizing tensi on " , ^

"an ensuing debate
these,

"reflexive rational social inquiry",'’0

and a "contestful friction of m i n d s " . ^

The use of such terminology indicates that the way
sociologists ought to assist in bringing about a new social
order and the kind of society this is to be involves a process
of conflict, of debate,

of talk. And, significantly,

this is

to be an endless process of dialogue and debate, for as Alvin
Gouldner recommends:

"We want to understand our social world
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and ourselves and others in It, so that we may change it In
ways that enable us to understand It still better,

to have

fuller rational discourse in it, so that we may better be
able to change it, and so on £and so on, and so on,..."^ ."53
That the statement of their program of social change
emphasizes discussion and debate helps explain,

in part,

critical sociol og ist s’ preoccupation with changing sociology
rather than changing society itself.

54

Moreover,

the emphasis

on discussion and debate is clearly revealed in the meaning
they attach to the term "dialectic", which, although borrowed
from Marx and Hegel,

is used in a much different sense.

The "endless dialectic" that John Seeley talks about,
and that other critical sociologists refer to in various
guises, essentially entails nothing more than continuous
discussion and debate. Contradictions arise and are resolved
all on the level of communication, of talk. Alvin Gouldner
uses such terms to characterize his purpose in writing The
Dialectic of Ideology and Tech nol og y:
The study here is part of an effort to lay
a basis for developing a third form of
discourse that eludes the pretentiousness,
false consciousness, and limits of both
social science and ideology, as we have
lived them historically. It is a probe
toward a more transcending form of discourse
that we might call reflexive rational social
inquiry, toward a critical theory that
wonders about itself and about the w o r l d . 55
In contrast,

for both Hegel and Marx, the dialectic involved

much more than discussion and debate -- it described a process
of broad historical change.
For Marx, the dialectic is inextricably linked to his
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materialism. Social change is engendered by contradictions
arising in the economic system. Marx argues that in nine
teenth-century Surope the contradictions inherent in the
dominant capitalistic economic system (that, for example,
the rich were getting richer and the poor poorer) had reached
a point where revolution was inevitable and capitalism would
be overturned and eventually supplanted by communism.

56

£ 0,

for Marx, dialectical social change entails a fundamental re
ordering of the economic structure and not merely a process of
discussion and debate, as critical sociologists would have it.
Certainly, capitalist ideology (to which conservative, ma in 
stream sociology lends support, in the view of critical soci
ologists) will have to be overturned along with capitalist
economic structure,
nomic structure,

but the priority clearly lies with eco

for as Marx asserts,

"The mode of production

of material life conditions the social, political, and IntelC*7
lectual life process in general."-''
Logically enough, critical sociologists reject what
they see as she economic determinism built into Marx's view
of dialectical social change. Critical sociologists typically
distinguish the young, philosophical Marx from the old,
scientific-deterministic Marx. The latter is criticized for
being anti-individual,

for supporting the notion that the

"social" takes precedence over the individual, albeit that
the"social" would involve a fundamental re-crdering of eco
nomic relations. Alvin Gouldner and Robert Friedrichs,
particular, disavow the sc-called later Marx.

in

In the Intro-

duction to The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology Gouldner
says that he prefers the label "Maoist" to "Marxist" because
he sees the spirit of the Chinese cultural revolution more
congruent with his own view of social change. Likewise,
Friedrichs shies away from the use of the term dialectical
because he does not want his position too closely associated
with that of Hegel and Marx.^®
To argue as I have —

that critical sociologists'

notion of dialectical social change neglects

the Marxian

emphasis on economic structure -- does not mean that we must
reject their view of social change merely because it runs con
trary to that of Marx. Indeed, as twentieth-century Marxists,
particularly members of the Frankfurt School, have maintained
Marx's theory of social change leaves something to be desired
especially as regards the nullifying effects of an increasing
standard of living and the Influence of mass culture in de
laying the onset of the proletarian revolution which was to
sweep the capitalist world. Nonetheless, we should not lose
sight of the valuable and valid point that emerges from a
comparison of these two distinctive views of the dialectic;
namely, that critical sociologists fail to address the crucia
question of how the material structure,

the relations among

institutions, are to be organized and ordered. When we re
call, as Elijah Jordan points out, that the lives of indi
viduals are bound up with these institutions,

that it is

through these Institutions that Individuals achieve their
ends, then we must agree that this Institutional system

cannot be ignored in any proposal that aims at bringing about
a just and free society.
As I have maintained throughout this chapter with res
pect to critical sociologists'

support for the individual and

for democracy, nothing concrete is ever proposed concerning
the make-up of a future, more humane social order. Everything
is left undetermined, a matter of endless debate and discussion.
Again, we can see evidence of that blind faith in the efficacy
of merely opening things up --- that somehow by incorporating
free and open discussion in sociology and in society as a
whole the conservative, anti-individual tendencies in main
stream sociology and in the established social order will be
eliminated.
Such a program of social change as critical sociolo
gists envision presupposes the soundness of sociol og y’s method
ological and theoretical base. The only obstacle to signifi
cant social change on this view lies in sociologists'
of autonomy —

lack

their inability or unwillingness to engage in

free and open discussion,

to participate in the "endless

dialectic". As I have emphasized all along, however,

this is

to overlook entirely the more basic and important question
of the adequacy of that methodological and theoretical base.
Elijah Jordan,

in particular,

calls into question some of

the predominant conceptions of society that sociologists have
adopted and finds them wanting for not having incorporated
the organized system of institutions which society manifestly
is.
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There have been some attempts to spell out an alter
native conception of society as a basis for a more signifi
cant sociology. This represents perhaps the most significant
development within the context of the sociological critique
of American sociology, and yet we will see that these alter
native conceptions of society fail to go much beyond the
conception of society upon which mainstream sociology rests.
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CHAPTER V
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS 0? SOCIETY
(l) Introduction
Throughout my analysis of major themes in the soci
ological critique of American sociology I have continually
noted the failure of these critical sociologists to address
basic methodological and theoretical issues. Instead, these
critics have chosen to focus their attack either upon indi
vidual sociologists, their professional association, or a
particular theoretical orientation such as functionalism.
Critical sociologists have portrayed certain individual
sociologists as cowardly figures hiding behind the doctrine
of value-neutrality yet all the while implicitly supporting
the established social order. Sociologists' professional
association, the American Sociological Association, has, on
occasion, been singled out for its conservatism and Its re
luctance to take definite positions on some of the controversial
issues of our time. And, finally, sociologists espousing a
functionalist orientation (or any holistic orientation for
that matter) have frequently been denounced as arch-conserva
tives supporting the Increasing social domination of the
Individual.
Yet, for all this criticism, some of which is ex
pressed in harsh terms, seldom is there given any indication
that perhaps the problem with sociology, the reason for its
conservative bias, lies much deeper than individual sociolo-
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gists, their professional association,
retical orientation.

or a particular theo

In each of the preceding chapters it

has been suggested that the undesirable aspects of mainstream
American sociology do, in fact, derive from flaws In the
methodological and theoretical base of sociology.
In the last chapter we saw that some critical soci
ologists have attempted to spell out a new direction for
sociology, one 'which is based upon the principles of democracy.
This attempt was shown to be neither new nor adequate.

In

arguing for a more democratic sociology and a more democratic
society, emphasis was placed on

"opening things up", on

making room for various methodological and theoretical per
spectives, on defending the individual against social domi
nation. This pluralistic,

Individualistic emphasis in the

sociological critique of American sociology not only does
not represent a significant advance over mainstream sociology
'out it also has its basis in an inadequate view of the nature
of society. •
In this chapter on alternative conceptions of society,
the analysis initiated In the previous chapter will be con
tinued In that other prominent alternative conceptions of
society developed by critical sociologists will be discussed.
That some critical sociologists perceived the need to move
in this direction is based upon the recognition that a sig
nificant sociology must derive from a sound understanding of
the nature of society.
Among the most prominent examples,
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in addition to

the democratic alternative discussed in the previous chapter,
are the following. First, and most pervasive,
example; namely,

is a negative

the criticism of functionalism as an inade

quate theoretical framework.

In rejecting functionalism,

crit

ical sociologists indicate the need for developing alterna
tive, more adequate conceptions of society,

conceptions

which we will find implicit in their criticism.

In addition,

rhree others will be presented and critically analyzed: a
phenomenological-existential view, a Marxist conception of
society, and a synthesis of the views of Marx, Weber, and
Mead.
All of these attempts to spell out an alternative
conception of society ultimately fail to come up with a
sound view of the nature of society.
show, critical sociologists'

Indeed, as I Intend to

efforts in this direction have

not gone much beyond mainstream sociology.

In contrast,

some

insights of an economist into our modern economic system will
be presented and it will be suggested that critical sociolo
gists adopt a similar view in developing an alternative con
ception of society as the basis for a more significant soci
ology. In line with this, a more thoroughgoing and valid
alternative to the predominant view of society held by
mainstream sociologists will be presented.
What this chapter will suggest, above all else, Is
that the key to a more significant sociology lies with a
philosophical reassessment of the theoretical and methodolo
gical base cf mainstream sociology, a philosophical reassess-
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ment which I have contended is contained in the work of the
Frankfurt School and in the philosophy of Elijah Jordan. To
their credit, some critical sociologists did perceive the
need to move in this direction, as we will see in this chap
ter; however,

they generally failed to come up with any sig

nificant alternatives. This chapter,

then, will set the stage

for the concluding chapter in which we will review this fail
ure of critical sociologists to address those basic philo
sophical issues which lie at the heart of the problems in
mainstream sociology that they point to.
(2) The Alternative Conception of Society
Implicit in the Criticism of Functionalism

If there is one sociologist and one theoretical per
spective that has been the principal target for critical
sociologists,

it Is Talcott Parsons and his structural-

functionalism. In each of the previous chapters Parsons and
his theoretical perspective have been singled out for cri
ticism.

Indeed,

critical sociologists'

rejection of so-called

mainstream sociology can largely be read as a rejection of
Parsons' functionalism.

In this chapter criticism of Parsons

work will also be discussed,

but it will be discussed with

a view to what clues this criticism gives into alternative
conceptions of society which are implicit in it.
Among the first, and certainly most influential,
critical analyses of Parsons' work is that given by C. Wright
Mills in The Sociological Imagination. Calling Parsons a
"grand theorist", Mills proceeds to argue that he has devel

oped a theoretical framework which is at a level of general
ity and abstractness far removed from the actual 'workings of
society. Moreover,

grand theory can give us no insight into

the problems which confront the individual and society, for
as Mills comments:
In The Social System Parsons has not been
able to get down to the work of social
science because he is possessed, by the
idea that the one model of social order
he has constructed is some kind of univer
sal model; because, in fact, he has fetlshlzed his Concepts. What is 'system
atic ' about this particular grand theory
is the way it outruns any specific empiri
cal problem. It is not used to state more
precisely or more adequately any new
problem of recognizable significance. It
has not been developed out of any need to
fly high for a little while in order to
see something in the social world more
clearly, to solve some problem that can
be stated in terms of the historical real
ity in which men and institutions have
their concrete being. Its problem, its
course, and its solutions are grandly
theoretical. 1
To get down to earth,

for Mills, entails developing

some understanding of the structural features of society,
which essentially involve the basic institutions of society.
Parsons, in contrast,

limits his analysis to "the institup

tionalizatlon of values."

This kind of criticism points in

the direction of an entirely different view of society, one
which sees society as constituted essentially of institutions
within which individuals have their being.^ This is to argue
that the problem with P ar s o n s ' functionalism derives princi
pally from its underlying conception of society as something
held together by common values.
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Although Alvin Gouldner directed his criticism more
at Talcott Parsons himself than at his theoretical framework
he did, on occasion, suggest that an inadequate conception
of s o c i e t y is the key to the problems with Pa r s o n s ' theoreti
cal framework. In reference to Parsons' analysis of Kills'
The Power E l i t e , Gouldner notes that Parsons overlooks the
importance of property and wealth as a source of power in
u
our society.
Then, in what I believe has to be considered
one of G o u l d n e r 's most insightful criticisms, he argues,
It is clear, ...that, from Parsons' formu
lation of the social system, elements in
men's biological constitution and physio
logical functioning, as well as features of
their physical and ecological environment,
are excluded. So too are the historicallyevolving cultural complexes of material
objects, including tools and machines, even
though these are man's own unique and dis
tinctive creations, the very products and
the mediating elements of his social inter
action and communication, and even though
they also include those instruments of
transportation which make possible the very
interchanges among social parts that con
stitute their interdependence. 5
This would seem to indicate that Gouldner, along with Mills,
believes that a structural, materialist view of society is
more adequate.
Although the passage above certainly suggests that
Gouldner supports such an alternative conception of society,
the thrust of his work as a whole has beer, in an entirely
different direction. As was brought out in the last chapter,
Gouldner, along with other major figures in the sociological
critique of American sociology, have sought to restore the
individual to a central place in sociology and in society.
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They have argued against any holistic perspective;

that is,

any perspective which views society as a system and which
concerns itself with the problem of social order. Such a
perspective,

it is argued,

is necessarily conservative, anti

individual, and in their view, false.
So, at the same time that Gouldner can make the above
comments concerning the importance of the material structure
of society, he also attacks Parsons for having conceived of
the individual as

"an entirely

'social' creature, as an empty,

hollowed out container that depends entirely upon experience
in the training by social systems,..."^ Parsons fails to see,
as Gouldner goes on to point out, that human beings are not
mere social products -- that

"Human beings are as much en

gaged in using social systems as in being used by them. Men
are social-system using and social-system-building creatures."^
Such criticism points in the direction of an alternative con
ception of society which places more stress on the individual
and his ability to change society.
Fart and parcel cf the criticism that functionalism
omits the individual is the criticism tnat functionalism can
not account for social change and social conflict.

It is be

cause the individual is downplayed and social order is em
phasized that the crucial elements of conflict and change
are left out cf account. Hence, Parsons'

functionalism is

seen as the exemplar of conservative sociological theory -that it is at base a rationalization for the status quo,

that

it is committed to the present society despite the dilemmas,
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contradictions, and tensions within it.
This connection between P a r s o n s ' neglect of the indi
vidual and the conservative bias built into his theoretical
framework is brought out in his concluding statement of an
essay appropriately entitled,

"The World View of Talcott

Parsons". The author comments:
In conclusion, I would say that Parsons
exhibits a consistent tendency to gloss
over the horrors of industrial society
with bland phrases, tricks of definition,
thinly disguised cliches and arrogance;
and to abolish all individual values
ether than those which serve the "total
system". The Parsonian world does not
provide for any possibility cf a discon
tinuity between the individual's day-today life inside the system and its effects
n
upon the inner world of his own personality.
Or, as Alfred McClung Lee charges,

"Instead of being focused

on the dynamic relations of individuals and groups to social
process for the benefit of people,

they [the majority of

sociologists, meaning primarily sociologists with a function
alist orientation^] are preoccupied with the maintenance of
'social equilibrium'

in its ramifications —

in other words,

with how to maintain the status quo.""
The crucial elements of the alternative conception of
society which emerges from this criticism of P a r s o n s ' func
tionalism

are the individual and conflict. That is to say,

according

to this view,

sociologists stand more to gain

by

viewing society as consisting of individuals whose relations
are often filled with tension and conflict.

In characterising

George Herbert Mead's view of society, Alvin Gouldner captures
the essence of this alternative conception of society:
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"Mead,

...rejects an image of the social world as a given, neatly
arranged static order;
changing, open-ended,

both view it instead as a tensionful,
loosely stranded,

somewhat indeterminate

and fluid pr oc es s.
Among critical sociologists generally this individ
ualistic,

conflict view of society is expressed in a couple

of different forms. Some critical sociologists turned to a
phenomenological-existential perspective, while others turn
ed to the "early" Marx as an alternative to mainstream soci
ology. We will see that these two alternatives are largely
congruent with the alternative conception of society that
emerges from the criticism of Parsons'

functionalism.

(3) The Phenomenological-Existential Alternative
In large part,

the adoption of a phenomenological-

existential perspective by some critical sociologists reflects
a dissatisfaction with mainstream sociology's scientific
methodology.

It is argued that the widely-used survey re

search techniques,

such as the questionnaire and the inter

view, are superficial; no real attempt is made to understand
a person's social behavior from the perspective of that
person. To understand social behavior truly,

sc the argu 

ment goes, requires the adoption of an empatnetic or partic
ipant observation approach.
Jack Douglas,

in his collection of critical sociolo

gical essays entitled The Relevance of Sociology, aptly char
acterizes the -distinctive nature of this phenomenological-
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existential perspective:
Science as we have known it tends to be
abstractionist and comparative, to seek
the general in the particular. Yet man's
everyday existence is concrete and par
ticular, this immediate existence full
of uncertainty and contingency, which
concerns us most about man. And it is
this realm of experience which we can
understand most fully through poetic
and artistic forms of knowledge.11
Such an approach to studying social behavior is embodied in
a radically new methodology known as

"ethnomethodology", which

came on scene in the 19o0's. As two practitioners of this
new method describe it, ethnomethodologists study social
phenomena by focusing on "...embodied, sensuous, human activ
ity, in talk and in actions."12
Rather than consider further the specifics of an
ethnomethodological or phenomenological approach to social
research,

let us turn to the more relevant question of the

alternative conception of society embodied in the phenomeno
logical-existential perspective. Of course, arguing that the
most valid approach to understanding social behavior involves
adopting the perspective of the individual or group you are
studying clearly Implies an emphasis upon psychological fac
tors. As Jack Douglas notes,

in pointing out the need for

personal involvement and participation in social research,
"...social behavior is meaningful behavior and...any valid
and worthwhile explanation of social behavior will involve
social meanings as the fundamental causal va ria bl es.m1^
Underlying the phenomenological-existential perspec
tive, then, is a view of society which emphasizes individual
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self-determination and creativity as opposed to the view
which stresses the structural aspects of society. Alvin
Gouldner sees such a view of society expressed in the work
of Erving Goffman. He calls Coffman's a "radically different
and comprehensive theoretical model,...
a challenge to the functionalists'

nl4

, which presents

focus on the larger social

order. Mors specifically, Gouldner notes,

"...Goffman's

image of social life is not of firm, well-bounded social
structures,

but rather of a loosely stranded,

criss-crossing,

l 11
swaying catwalk along which men dart precariously." ^
This emphasis upon the individual and upon the perva
sive feature of conflict is best displayed in the work of
Alfred McClung Lee.

Indeed, we should recall that Lee h i m 

self labeled his distinctive approach a humanist-existential
perspective. In Sociology for Whom? Lee indicates his agree
ment with the sophist Protagoras's maxim:

"man is the measure

of all things". Along these lines, Lee points out that his
humanist-existential perspective "...is concerned primarily
with individuals, with human expression and creativity, with
human society and socializing, and with people's ability to
persist and tc flourish."1^
Although the charge that mainstream sociology,
particular Parsons'
bias has merit,

in

functionalism, has a built-in conservative

turning to an individualistic,

conflict per

spective is no real remedy for this problem. To focus on
individuals,

to attempt to see life from their point of view,

however accurate one may be, still leaves out of account
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important aspects of society which any sound alternative to
mainstream sociology must include. Insight into the nature
of modern society, as we will see Zlijah Jordan argue,

be

gins with the manifest fact that society is an organized
system of institutions. This,

I believe,

is the essential

starting-point for the development of a more significant soci
ology, not the phenomenological-existential alternative which
is based on an inadequate view of the nature of society.
Some critical sociologists turned to Marx for an
alternative theoretical perspective, and in so doing they
would appear to have been sensitive to the kind of short
comings of the phenomenological-existential alternative
brought out above. Yet,

interestingly enough,

the predomi

nant position among those who turned to Marx was to focus on
the so-called

"early Marx" who is said to be concerned less

with socio-economic structure and more with the individual
and the problem of alienation.

(4) The Marxian Alternative
to Mainstream Sociology
The promise of developing a radical alternative to
mainstream sociology out of the Marxian tradition is aptly
set forth by Richard Flacks. He notes that more fundamental
than research Into the nature of the power structure

"...is

the task of making a theory -- a theory that will comprehend
the operation of society in its totality, links the present
with the past organically, and reveals the necessary contra
dictions and unravelings of the established social order.
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Such a holistic approach to understanding modern society, I
believe, represents one of the more significant attempts to
develop an alternative to mainstream sociology.

It certainly

suggests a radically different approach from those discussed
previously in this chapter in which the individual was empha
sized over and above social structure.
A structural Marxist approach is predominant among
the essays contained In J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach's
(eds.) volume, Radical Soc i ol og y. For example, L. Paul
Metzger argues for a larger,

structural approach to analyzing

the race problem in contrast to Gunnar Myrdal and others 1
inadequate approach which focuses on beliefs and attitudes.
Racism is seen as an outgrowth of capitalism.
as Colfax himself asserts:

18

In general,

"...there is reason to believe

that a Marxist class-analysis of contemporary society holds
the greatest promise for the transformation of sociological
and social consciousness over the next decade."

19

Herman and Julia Sc hw en din ge r's major study of the
rise of early American sociology, The Sociologists of the
Chair, derives from a structural Marxist point of view. In
the Introduction to their study they note that in the work
of other "radical" sociologists the commitment to radical,
structural change is usually confined to a last paragraph
or sentence in an article and that this commitment is usually
stated In extremely vague terms.

20

This, of course, is a

charge that has been levelled at the sociological critique
of American sociology throughout this dissertation.
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What I have called a structural Marxist view, however,
has really been overshadowed by another view of the signifi
cance of Marx. This is a view which accepts the early Marx
and rejects the later, deterministic-scientific Marx expressed

21
in Ca pi t al .
What is objectionable about the later Marx is,
in Robert Friedrichs' analysis,
took,...a markedly

'systemic'

"that Marx's overall position

tone."

22

This systemic tone is

reflected most clearly in the famous dictum that men's social
being determines their consciousness, which, as Friedrichs
goes on to argue, is a position which ignores
creativity, and existential risk,..."
It is the young Marx,

"spontaneity,

23

the Marx of alienation,

that is

the alternative that Alvin Gouldner eventually turns to. He
sees the later Marx as essentially no different from Parsons
or Plato and their concern with social order. Ac I have
pointed cut previously,

it seems that all holistic,

systemic

views of society are rejected as inherently conservative -that it is only insofar as one connects with the individual
that one can develop a radically new view of society based
on social change rather than social order. This is why the
young Marx who talked about alienation has more of an attrac
tion for critical sociologists such as Gouldner.
In the Preface to The Dialectic cf Ideology and
Technolog?/, Gouldner makes it very clear that he does not
want to be associated with any Marxist school or Marxist
community. He prefers the position of "Marxist outlaw'":
"My own standpoint is essentially that of ridge rider: half
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nil
sociologist and half Marxist, and rebel against them both."
After all, as Gouldner notes,

"...the first commandment of

the dialectic is contradiction, negation, critique.

^ Ulti

mately, the alternative that critics such as Friedrichs and
Gouldner turn to never goes beyond the injunction to be con
stantly negative and critical, especially towards any social
practice or sociological concept which demeans the individual.
This alternative is as vague and ill-defined as the position
of Marxist outlaw described above.
(5) The Marx-Weber-Mead Alternative
Rather than reject the structural perspective of the
"later" Marx, some critical sociologists have sought to com
bine it with certain social psychological insights in an
attempt to develop an alternative conception of society which
could serve as the basis for a more significant sociology.
The clearest example of such a synthesis is to be found in
Irving Zeitlin's Rethinking Sociology. Zeitlin argues that
a synthesis of the work of Karl Marx, Max Weber, George
Herbert Mead, and Sigmund Freud will result in a more valid
conception of society.
The contributions of Marx and Weber to this synthesis
are clearly set forth in the following passage:
The advantage of what I have called the
Marx-Weber model is that it keeps at the
center of our attention the three most
strategic institutional spheres of the
present epoch: the economic, the political,
and the military/-. For there can be no
doubt that today and in the foreseeable
future the most fateful question facing
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mankind is: Who controls
the; means of
production, the means of
political ad,
ministration, and the means of violence?*-®
In addition to the obvious relation of this passage to C.
Wright Mi l l s ' argument in The Power E l i t e , it clearly under
lines the importance of the structural aspects of society.
But such a view, to Zeitlin's way of
missing something:

it is missing a

thinking, is

theory to account for the

interpersonal interaction that goes on within that structure.
"Because the Marx-Weber model is predominantly structural,
...it does not answer our need for a social psychology.
A social psychology is needed to balance off the social de
terministic overtones of Marx's views in particular (again,
as exemplified in the dictum that social being determines
social consciousness) .
In Zeitlin's view, a more adequate conception of
society must give the Individual a larger part to play than
is the case in various structural views. This Is precisely
what he finds attractive about Mead's symbolic interactionism:
The relation of the individual to his world
is an active process. It is only within this
processual relation that things become what
they are. In man this dialectical relation
gives rise to reflection, which is also a
form of action in which the individual con
verses with others and himself and therefore
evokes in himself the same response (meaning)
he does in others. 2 c
The argument that Marx's structural perspective must
be supplemented by or Integrated with a social psychological
perspective also finds its expression in a couple of textbook
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written in the spirit of this critical movement. For example,
William Chambliss and Thcmas Ryther note that:

"Marx's ver

sion of conflict theory remains largely at the level of insti
tutional analysis. However, as far as we can see, it contains
no principles inconsistent with the idea that social struc
ture is a special kind of reality constructed out of shared
20
meanings." ^
Borrowing some terminology from Charles Horton Cooley,
Charles Anderson and Jeffrey Royle C-ibson, in their text.
Toward a New Sociology, assert that:

"Individuals and society

are essentially 'twin-born 1. . . . As does Zeitlin, they
discuss at length the relevance of Marx's work, yet they
argue in the end that Marx's analysis must be supplemented
by Mead's social psychological insights.
Above all else, I believe these critical sociologists
are concerned with not losing sight of the individual in their
alternative conception of society. This explains these attempts
to synthesise two markedly different views of the nature of
society.
(6 ) The Structuralist Alternative
In contrast to these attempts to integrate Mead's social
psychology with Marx's structural perspective, some critical
sociologists have chosen to adhere to a strictly structuralist
point of view. They have not perceived any need to alter
Marx's argument in any fundamental way. In their view, Marx's
structural perspective is the most valid alternative to
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mainstream sociology, as David Horowitz, for example, brings
out in the following passage from his introduction to a col
lection of essays in radical sociology:
...the basic orientation of academic
sociologists is micro-social in character:
academic sociologists are chiefly concerned
with individuals, groups, and institutions
as they are influenced by or integrated into
the prevailing social order. A typical mod
ern 'dictionary' of sociology, for example,
defines 'social system' as 'a social group
or set of interacting persons conceived of
as distinct from the particular persons who
compose i t ... 1
In contrast, radical sociology begins
with a perspective in which the social sys
tem is the distinctive pattern of economic,
political, and cultural relationships ac
cording to which a group organizes the
production and distribution of goods and
services necessary to sustain itself, and
by which it insures the maintenance of its
basic structures.31
This structuralist view, of course, is by no means
only connected with Marx. G. Wright Mills' notion of "big
range" sociology, which Irving Louis Horowitz comments on in
his introduction to The New Sociology, involves a larger view
of society than the predominant group and interpersonal Inter
action focus of mainstream sociology. This larger view of
society is reflected in Mills' Interest in comparative, cross
national research -- an area on which he had begun working
-3 0

jusr prior to his death.'"

Morris Janowitz's analysis of sociological research
on arms control provides a good example of the kind of "big
range" sociology that Mills had In mind. As Janowitz points
out, the important task in arms control research "...is to
inject into sociology -- from the study of small groups to

the analysis of international organizations -- a theoretical
reconceptualization that sees the world as a social unit and
is concerned with the basic transformation of the role of
force within and between nation states."33
I would maintain that those critical sociologists who
saw the need for an alternative conception of society which
emphasized social structure present the only significant
alternative to mainstream sociology. We have seen that the
other alternative conceptions discussed in this chapter, even
those inspired by Marx, are all individualistic at base. They
all derive from the belief in the power of an individual to
determine the course of his own life and that of society as
well.
There are grounds for arguing that insofar as critical
sociologists focus on the individual they are not really
offering anything substantially different from the mainstream
sociology they are seeking to separate themselves from. Both
views are equally subjective. It is in this context that the
following observation by a Soviet sociologist concerning
Parsons' theory of society is entirely appropriate:
In his solution to the problem of social laws,
Parsons proves, as a matter of fact, to be an
even greater "individualist" than the upholders
of traditional Individualism. In his concept
of "normative order", social law is wholly
subjectlvized: it is directly identified with
individual positions and tendencies and is
transformed into a projection of the personal
will of one person upon the personal will of
another. "The theory of social action" proves
upon examination to be merely a reformulation
of a traditional Ideological doctrine (the
theory of society as a"mechanical sum of
atoms").3^
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Indeed, the contention that sociology, at base, presupposes
a conception of society as a mechanical sum of individuals
held together by subjective ties is a principal contention of
Elijah Jordan, on which he elaborates in his critical analysl
of sociology contained in the second chapter of his Forms of
Individuality.
Sc, although critical sociologists stress the poten
tial radical political implications of their brand of indi
vidualism, they essentially do not get beyond the subjective
view of society contained in mainstream sociology. That they
wculd draw upon social thinkers such as Mead and upon demo
cratic and existential schools of thought in constructing
their alternatives clearly indicates their commitment to a
fundamentally subjective and individualistic view of society
a view of society which I will argue, as does Jordan, is in
adequate .
(7) An Alternative to the Conceptions of
Society Held by Both Critical and
Mainstream Sociologists
As has been previously noted, critical sociologists
are, for the most part, reluctant to reject any aspect of
mainstream sociology. They argue that all theoretical and
methodological perspectives (even the most flawed, such as
functionalism) have a legitimate place in sociology along
side the alternative conception of society these critical
sociologists offer. Their alternative, in the last analysis,
can only be considered one among several legitimate sociolo-

gical perspectives.
Contrary to this pluralistic attitude of critical
sociologists, there are grounds for rejecting an individual
istic and subjective view of society, whether such a view be
held by a critical or mainstream sociologist. Critical soci
ologists' rejection of any larger, systemic conception of
society as inherently conservative and anti-individual is
mistaken; it derives from a lack of insight into the nature
of modern society. I believe a true understanding of society,
which can be the only basis for a more significant sociology,
begins with the recognition that institutions are the basic
elements of society and not bio-psychological individuals.
To understand the bases of social order as well as the
potential for social change (something critical sociologists
are particularly interested in), we must focus on institutions.
In analyzing the economy, for example, some economists have
become increasingly aware of how the growth of corporations
on a national and a multinational level has fundamentally
changed our economic system. In light of this fact, David
Bazelon, in his insightful book, The Paper Economy, argues
that all the old economic assumptions and arguments must be
rejected in favor of ones congruent with this tremendous
•j c

corporate development.

Conventional economic thinking has

for too long ignored this corporate development.
In essence, Bazelon is arguing that the individual
entrepreneur talked about in Adam Smith's time no longer
exists as such. Corporations are the entrepreneurs of our
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modern economic system -- they are the economic actors of
modern society. Or, as Bazelon notes, "A 'new man' has en'3n
tered unto the historical stage,...'
Bazelon's analysis applies with equal force to the
nature of modern society as a whole. Elijah Jordan argues
throughout his major works that a basic problem with ethical,
legal, political, and economic thought is that it is largely
rooted in an individualistic and subjective perspective which
is fundamentally out of line with the reality of modern soci
ety. A more significant philosophy and, indeed, a more sig
nificant sociology, must begin with the recognition

that

society is basically an organized system of institutions.
The bases of social order as well as the key to social change
are to be found in this institutional order.
These institutions (or corporations, as Jordan also
refers to organized bodies of objects directed toward a human
end) are the real actors in society. This is not to say that
individuals in the abstract (relation-severing)

sense in

which critical and mainstream sociologists speak of them are
of no significance, as long as we acknowledge that these
individuals are bound up witn a larger natural and cultural
order of objects. By considering the individual apart from
these relations to the natural and cultural world, critical
sociologists take all that which is human away from the individual. It is only as the individual connects-1'with in
stitutions that he can develop as a human being. It Is by
working through institutions that human ends are achieved --

from rearing a child, to building a better transportation
system, to bringing about a better society.
In Jordan's terms:

"Corporations or institutions have,

therefore, a status in human relations that is unique and
peculiar to themselves. They are personal agents objectified;
that is, they are rationally ordered systems of purposes
realized in physical objects and constituted as organic struc
tures. They are, then, in the legal and political sense,
„38
persons.
The "individual" (that separate and distinct biopsychological entity) which critical sociologists go to such
great lengths to defend is, in terms of Jordan's argument,
a myth. A critical, radical, or more significant sociology
cannot be based upon the defense of a myth. A sound critique
of sociology must begin with an examination of the underlying
conception of society which it presupposes. Although some
critical sociologists, to their credit, did perceive the sig
nificance of criticizing this theoretical base, they largely
failed to come up with a sound alternative. Such a sound alter
native, I maintain, is contained in Jordan's view that society
is fundamentally an organized system of institutions. And if
these critical sociologists are serious about making their
discpiine relevant to the constant effort to improve the lives
of people, they must focus on that institutional order, the
true basis for human life.
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Irving Zeitlin, Rethinking Sociology, p. 136 .

2?Ibid., o.vii.
28Ibid., pp.238-239.
29w.illiam J. Chambliss and Thomas E . Ryther, Sociology: The
Discipline and Its Direction, o.xvi.
3°Charles H. Anderson and Jeffrey Royle Gibson, Toward a New
Sociology, p.23.
31David Horowitz, "Introduction", Radical Sociology: An Intro
duction , edited by David Horowitz, p p .6-"7~~
32Irving Louis Horowitz, "Introduction", The New Sociology,
edited by Irving Louis Horowitz, p.4c.
ZZ

-^Morris Janowitz, "Sociological Research on Arms Control",
The American Sociologist, 6 (suppl. issue, June 71), p.26.
3^N.V, Novikov, "Modern American Capitalism and Parsons '
Theory of Social Action", The Sociology of Sociology, edited
by Larry T. and Janice M. Reynolds, pTzcB”

“^The essence of the modern corporation being, in Bazelon 1s
terms: "...that it organizes and directs large masses of men
and material in a more or less limited technological area.
So I suggest that a corporation is a form of industrial or
technological or financial government." The Paoer Economy, p.173.
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36Ibld., p. 172.
3?A connection or relation which is not accidental but
constitutive of the individual.
qo
-^Elijah Jordan , 3uslness 3e Damned, p.2^3.
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and

o n ly

failed

in m a i n s t r e a m

to p e r c e i v e
sociology

t h eoretical base,

bu t

also, in developing some notion of a more significant soci
ology they have largely overlooked the Importance of r e 
defining this base. Their recommendations for developing a
mere significant sociology h a v e .generally revolved around the
notion of merely "opening things up";

that is, make room for

various methodological and theoretical perspectives. Although
such a recommendation does address the problem of having one
particular method or theory dominate the practice of sociolo
gy, it does nothing to correct whatever inadequacies may lie
in these various methods and theories themselves.
In discussing the work of three principal forerunners
of this critical movement in Chapter I, we did get an initial
glimpse of what has been meant all along by the charge that
later critical sociologists failed to discuss the question
of the adequacy of sociology's methodological and theoretical
base. Although weaknesses in each of their arguments were
pointed out, the criticism of sociology contained in the work
of Robert Lynd, Pitirim Sorokin, and C. Wright Mills was
argued to be more profound than anything offered by later
critical sociologists.
Robert Lynd, for example, suggested that a major de
ficiency of the social sciences was its inadequate theoretical
orientation which, he maintained,

largely excluded important

psychological insights. Moreover,

in addressing the value

question in sociology, Lynd did perceive the need to try to
spell out an objective base for making value judgments -specifically,

for determining what is and what is not worthy
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of social scientists' attention. His answer, although certain
ly open to criticism for being vague, is a far cry from the
predominant relativistic position of critical sociologists in
the 6C's and 7 0 's —

a position which I argued on several oc

casions essentially amounts to no position.
Methodological deficiencies in contemporary American
sociology were highlighted in Pitirim Sorokin's Fads and
Foibles in Modern S o c io lo gy . Sorokin attempted to expose the
inappropriate use of concepts and formulas from the physical
sciences and mathematics in sociology. He also raised ques
tions about the use of survey methods in sociological re
search, pointing cut that such methods represented artificial
(and hence, inaccurate) ways of gathering information about
social behavior.

In his view, a more significant sociology

could be realized by adopting a better means of learning about
society and social behavior. This,

I argued, was an important

insight, even though I found fault with the alternative means
of learning about society and social behavior that Sorokin
presented.
Although C. Wright Mills can certainly be considered
the "father" of the sociological critique of American sociology, I maintained that his criticism of sociology went be
yond that of later critics. It went beyond this later criti
cism in that Mills clearly suggested that the realization of
a more significant and more relevant sociology involved a
revision of prevailing method and theory in American sociology.
Mills rejected what he called

"abstracted empiricism" not

just because it was the predominant style of research but
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because it had serious inherent flaws. For one, this style
of research merely focused on the psychological reactions of
individuals in a questionnaire or interview situation. As sueh
it could not uncover anything of significance about the larger
social structure or its history. Such a style of research had
to be rejected, Mills argued,

in favor of the

"sociological

imagination". Thus, we see here the recognition that the path
to a more significant sociology involves a revision of its
methodological base.
Implicit in the "sociological imagination" is also
the recognition that sociological theory likewise needed to
be revised;

it needed to be revised to take into account the

crucial element of social structure —
ultimately,

the nation-state)

that Institutions

(and

be the basic units of investi

gation. As we saw in Chapter V, some later critical sociolo
gists also suggested that the theoretical orientation of
mainstream sociology be revised; however,

the alternatives

they presented tended to stress the importance of the in
dividual and not institutions. Indeed,

these later critical

sociologists by and large rejected any holistic,

structural

view of society as inherently conservative and inadequate.
To the contrary,

I have argued that in order to develop a

more significant sociology we need to focus on social struc
ture as Mills urged.

It Is precisely on this point that the

work of Elijah Jordan, as I argued In the last three chapters,
provides some insights from which sociologists can learn in
attempting to develop a more significant sociology.
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When we begin to discuss specific issues raised by
critical sociologists in the 60's and 7 0 's in Chapter II, the
question of the adequacy of mainstream sociology's methodolo
gical and theoretical base fades into the background. Cri ti
cal sociologists raised the issue of what they saw as an in
appropriate relationship which had developed between sociolo
gical researchers and their sources of funding, as typified
most clearly by the debate over Project Camelot. The basic
position that critical sociologists adopted was to argue that
sociologists should strive to preserve their autonomy,

that

is, not to let any outside influences dictate the conduct of
social research. Not to take away from the importance of
arguing such a position,

it was pointed out that to focus on

autonomy leaves unattended the question of the adequacy of
prevailing research methods themselves. There appeared to
exist an abiding faith in even the most narrowly-conceived
sociological research,
as Martin Nicolaus,

to the extent that some critics,

such

believed that the information obtained

through such research was of strategic importance to groups
seeking power or wanting

oo remain in control of things in

our society.
In criticism of this position put forth by critical
sociologists, I suggested that sociological research has
hardly contributed such significant knowledge. As we sow,
0. Wright Mills and Pitirim Sorokin questioned the very
possibility of getting other than relatively trivial infor
mation from the prevailing modes of empirical research in
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sociology,

primarily having in mind survey techniques which

focus on attitudes and opinions. Such knowledge was character
ized by Sorokin as mere

"hearsay stuff". Members of the Frank

furt School likewise found prevailing research techniques in
sociology to be a very limited tool. Again with the focus on
survey techniques. Theodor Adorno points out in his essay,
"Sociology and Empirical Research",
research suffers from

two defects:

formation

the larger,

relevant to

that empirical social
(l) it cannot uncover in

structural aspects

of

society, and (2 ) it merely reflects prevailing attitudes and
opinions. As Adorno comments:
In general, the objectivity of empirical
social research is one of method, not of
subject-matter. Through statistical pro
cessing, information on a greater or lesser
number of individuals is turned into state
ments which, following the laws of probability,
are generalizable and independent of individual
variations. But the resultant mean values,
objectively valid though they be, nevertheless
remain for the most part objective statements
about individual subjects; in fact, about how
these subjects see themselves in reality.
Society in its objectivity, the aggregate of
all the relationships, institutions and forces,
within whose context men act, is something
vrhich the empirical methods of questionnaire
and interview, with all their possible com
binations and variations, have ignored or at
least regarded as purely accidental....
[Moreover'] By taking more or less standard
ized surveys of numbers of individuals and
processing the results into statistics, they
tend to enshrine already widespread -- and as
such pre-formed -- attitudes as the founda
tion for their perspective on the subject of
their investigations .1
In addition to pointing out some serious shortcomings in
empirical social research,

the above statement also provides

the basis for the charge that the conservatism of mainstream

- 206 -

sociology is. in part, rooted in an approach to studying
society which merely reflects
dual attitudes and opinions)

(through the filter of indivi
the established social order.

So, the prevailing mode of empirical research in sociology
cannot provide the basis for criticism of the existing social
order, much less provide knowledge of significant aspects of
society; and it cannot do this not because of who controls
this research but because these empirical research techni
ques are themselves very limited tools by which to study society.
When some critical sociologists did question the
adequacy of the predominant survey research techniques,
presented an alternative
observation) which,

they

(usually some variant of participant

I argued,

failed to overcome some of the

problems in survey methods they highlighted.
pointed out, as have other critics,

In short, I

that there is no real way

to be sure that the findings of a participant observer are
any more objective or accurate than those of a survey research
er. Moreover,

the principal focus of such an approach is

likewise on individual beliefs, attitudes, motives, and the
like, the only difference being that Individuals and groups
are studied in their natural settings and not with artificial
devices such as a questionnaire. There was still the neglect
of larger historical and structural aspects of society. So,
in their one attempt to address the crucial question of the
adequacy of mainstream sociology's methodological base,
critical sociologists failed to come up with anything signi
ficant, In contrast,

I suggested that the criticism offered
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by Mills and members of the Frankfurt School is more signi
ficant .
In Chapter III critical sociologists' analysis of the
value question was discussed and here the disavowal of any
philosophical issues became even more explicit. On a couple
of occasions critical sociologists,

such as Alvin Gouldner,

were cited as stating an express disinterest in logical or
ethical questions. Critical sociologists were almost univer
sally content with what I called the "let's be honest" posi
tion; that is, it is sufficient for sociologists merely to
declare their value position, whatever it may be. Some criti
cal sociologists did perceive certain value positions as better
than others

(such as working for the elimination of human suf

fering or working for the greater freedom for the individual),
but because they viewed values as both subjective and relative
they really lacked any basis for defending any particular
value position.
In short, I argued that this

"let's be honest" position

and its underlying subjective and relativistic view of value
was a bankrupt position.

It failed to provide either a re

solution of the value question or a basis for a new and more
significant sociology.

In contrast,

I presented the views of

a couple members of the Frankfurt School and Elijah Jordan,
which represented what I consider significant attempts to
define an objective view of value.
Among the members of the Frankfurt School, Max
Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse were perhaps the most insistent
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about the deficiencies of relativism. They also suggested an
objective base for determining what a just society lsj that
is they tried to spell out the conditions necessary for the
realisation of a ju st ,'humane social order. As was noted,
among these conditions was the satisfaction of the needs of
physical survival for all human beings and the elimination
of necessary labor through automation as a step in the direc
tion of freeing individuals to develop as total persons. Si g 
nificantly,

these critical theorists were under no illusion

that by- merely"opening things up" or by merely declaring
one's values, as critical sociologists urged, anything posi
tive toward the realization of a more significant sociology
or a more just society was going to be achieved. Although I
do not claim to have proved that the argument of Horkheimer
and Marcuse is more valid,

I do believe it is worthy of con

sideration by sociologists and it does seem to offer one
possible resolution of the value question in sociology,
whereas the predominant position among critical sociologists
provides no basis for defining a more significant direction
for sociology or society.
In light of the same reservation as that expressed
above, I presented the views of Elijah Jordan on the question
of value. As was noted,

Jordan does not subscribe to the

prevailing view that fact and value can be considered separate
ly. Indeed, as Jordan points out, value is the meaning of fact
in a larger system of relations. The value of the United States'
decision to intervene in Vietnam,
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for example,

is the meaning

of that fact in the context of a larger system of relations.
That fact can be analyzed in terms of its meaning for U.S.
foreign policy,

its meaning for the people of the United

States or Vietnam,

or, most significantly,

its meaning for

the world as a whole. The ultimate determination of the value
of that fact, whether it was good or bad policy, rests upon
the question of how it fits in the world as a whole. Obviously,
the determination cf value on this basis is a very complex
matter, but what Jordan proposes is, in a sense, no different
from the judgment an agricultural specialist makes with res
pect to the value of a particular soil -- how that soil fits
in the larger agricultural system. We have no quarrel with
the agricultural specialist making an objective determination
of what is good soil and what is bad soil for various purposes;
and, significantly,

I believe we would all agree that this is

not a judgment that can properly be based on mere subjective
opinion .
To define specifically what Jordan's objective base
for value is would take us far beyond the purposes of this
dissertation,

but I believe enough of Jordan's position and

the position of Horkheimer and Marcuse have been presented
to warrant serious consideration by sociologists interested
in developing a more significant,
sociologists,

relevant sociology. Critical

by subscribing to the prevailing subjective

view of value, leave us with a plethora of value options and
no basis for determining which among these value options
should guide the work of sociologists in their capacity as
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social scientists and social reformers. 3y shifting the focus
of the value question from individuals
beliefs and attitudes)

to the world

tions which exist there)

(and their subjective

(and the objective rela

Jordan provides some basis for deter

mining what a significant sociology is and toward what kind
of society should sociologists be working.
In Chapters IV and V more of Jordan's objective base
is revealed by way of presenting his conception of society:
that society is essentially an organized system of institutions.
Jordan argues that institutions (or "corporate persons") are
the basic units of society and, significantly,

the real actors

in society. They are the real actors in the sense that it is
by way of them that we achieve human ends, from relatively
simple acts

(such as making breakfast)

to more complex acts

(such as designing a school system). All of these acts are
bound up with institutions, with the myriad of objects and
their organization and distribution which are necessary to
carry them out. Moreover,

Jordan maintains that human relations

are mediated by these institutions:

that a teacher enters the

lives of students by way of education,

by way of the system

of objects which has been developed to carry out the act of
education -- the libraries,

the books,

the classrooms,

etc..

A farmer enters all of our lives by way of an agricultural
and marketing system,

even though we may never have face-to-

face contact with that farmer or with the people involved in
marketing what the farmer produces. This is not to deny the
existence or significance of human relations such as love,
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offered by critical sociologists focused on the individual
and subjective relations among individuals,, which I suggested
were not all that different from mainstream sociology. A more
significant alternative,

I argued,

lies along the lines of

the objective,

institutional conception of society presented

by Jordan and,

in somewhat different forms, by a few critical

sociologists and members of the Frankfurt School. Although no
proof of the greater validity of Jordan's position was offered
as such, I believe his views on the nature of modern society,
as they are described at the end of Chapter V, are significant
and appear to have a firmer basis in fact than do the views
of critical sociologists which largely ignore the existence
of an objective order of things.
In sum, I believe this dissertation has shown that
the sociological critique of American sociology has offered
little more than superficial criticism of mainstream sociology
and much less in terms of developing a more significant soci
ology. On the other hand, I believe the promise of the soci
ological critique of American sociology (i.e.,

if it is to

contribute to the realisation of a more significant sociology
and a just society)

lies in the direction of the criticism of

sociology given by members of the Frankfurt School and Elijah
Jordan.
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NOTES

T h e o d o r A d o r n o , " S o c i o l o g y and E m p i r i c a l R e s e a r c h " in C r i t i c a l
S o c i o l o g y , e d i t e d b y P a u l C o n n e r t o n , pp. 2 4 0 - 24 1.
N e w York,
N. Y.:
P e n g u i n B o o k s , 1976.
^S ee p.

163.
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